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ABSTRACT
Financial constraints and limited access to markets are the most important obstacles for eco-
nomic development in developing economies that are largely dependent on agriculture. Lack
of access to credit and output markets, in particular, is frequently identified as a key barrier
to transformation of subsistence agriculture. The fundamental problems are related to infor-
mation asymmetry, lack of collateral and limited economies of scale. Innovative institutional
mechanisms, in the form of microfinance and producer organizations, offer ways to address
information asymmetry and increase scale economies. This dissertation examines the outreach,
financial performance and impact of microfinance institutions as well as the key drivers of
agricultural cooperatives and its impact on smallholder farmers efficiency in Ethiopia. To meet
these objectives four data sets from Ethiopia, one institutional and three household survey data,
are used.
The analysis of microfinance generally focuses on examining the trade-offs between outreach
to the poor and financial sustainability by ownership forms (shareholder-owned vs. member-
owned). The outreach-financial sustainability trade-offs analyzed first using the institutional
survey data. The empirical results show that serving the poor and financial sustainability are
challenging objectives to achieve together. There is also evidence that suggests the presence of
mission drift. Second, the role of ownership form on outreach, financial performance and cost-
efficiency is analyzed within the framework of efficient ownership assignment theories using
regression and stochastic cost frontier approaches. This analysis aims at testing whether the
commonly held proposition of greater efficiency of shareholder firms in microfinance by pol-
icy advocates is empirically supported. The results reject the superiority of shareholder-owned
microfinance over financial cooperatives. In fact, the evidence here supports the advantages of
member-owned microfinance on cost-efficiency and balancing the double bottom-lines of microfi-
nance. Third, the impact of access to microfinance credit on farmers investment on agricultural
inputs is assessed using propensity score matching (PSM) and control-function-regression
methods that address potential participation selection biases. Results from both approaches
show that access to credit increased the use of productivity enhancing inputs among borrower
farmers. Indeed, farmers that borrow from financial cooperatives tend to invest more on modern
inputs.
The analysis of agricultural cooperatives tested theoretical propositions from organizational
and the new institutional economics theories on the drivers of agricultural cooperatives inci-
dence and farmers membership and patronage decisions. Discrete choice models are employed
for the empirical analysis. The results indicate that the incidence of agricultural cooperatives
in Ethiopia is more related to the countervailing market power argument than to the trans-
action cost reduction hypothesis. Despite open membership polices, the analysis on farmers
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participation indicates that membership and patronage decisions are related and significantly
influenced by location, asset and relational specificities. Finally, the impact analysis estimated
technical efficiency gains of membership in agricultural cooperatives and employed matching
and stochastic production frontier techniques. The evidence suggests that membership in agri-
cultural cooperatives significantly enhances efficiency gains among smallholder farmers.
Keywords:Microfinance, financial cooperatives, outreach, financial sustainability, trade-
offs, impact, ownership form, agricultural technologies, agricultural cooperatives, coun-
tervailing market power, economizing transaction costs, membership and patronage
decisions, technical efficiency, cost efficiency, propensity score matching, stochastic
cost and production frontier, double discrete choice model, Ethiopia.
R IASSUNTO
I vincoli finanziari e l’accesso limitato al mercato sono gli ostacoli maggiori per lo sviluppo
economico dei paesi in via di sviluppo, che dipendono in larga misura dall’agricoltura. La man-
canza di accesso ai mercati del credito e dei prodotti, in particolare, è spesso identificato come
uno degli ostacoli principali per la transizione da un’agricoltura di sussistenza. I problemi fon-
damentali sono l’asimmetria informativa, la mancanza di garanzie e le limitate economie di
scala. Meccanismi istituzionali innovativi, come le organizzazioni di microfinanza e di produt-
tori, offrono delle soluzioni per affrontare le suddette asimmetrie informative e aumentare le
economie di scala. Questa tesi esamina le istituzioni di microfinanza attraverso il loro raggio
d’azione, le performance finanziarie e il loro impatto, ma anche i fattori chiave della perfor-
mance delle cooperative agricole e l’impatto sull’efficienza dei piccoli agricoltori in Etiopia. Per
raggiungere questi obiettivi sono stati esaminati quattro dataset sull’Etiopia, uno sulle orga-
nizzazioni e tre di questionari alle famiglie.
Lo studio della microfinanza si concentra generalmente sull’esame dei trade-off tra l’impatto
sulle fasce più povere e la sostenibilità economica delle forme di proprietà (azionisti vs. soci). I
trade-off tra la capacità di servire anche le fasce più deboli della popolazione e la sostenibilità
economica vengono analizzati utilizzando i dati sulle organizzazioni. In primo luogo, i risultati
empirici mostrano che rivolgersi ai più poveri e mantenere la sostenibilità finanziaria sono obi-
ettivi impegnativi da raggiungere contemporaneamente, e i dati mostrano un allontanamento
dalla missione originaria. In secondo luogo, il ruolo della forma di proprietà su impatto, perfor-
mance finanziaria ed efficienza viene analizzato nel quadro delle teorie di assegnazione efficiente
dei diritti di proprietà utilizzando gli approcci della regressione e dei costi di frontiera stocas-
tici. Questa analisi mira a verificare se la maggiore efficienza delle imprese con azionisti anche
nel settore della microfinanza propugnata dai loro sostenitori sia empiricamente supportata.
I risultati negano la superiorità della microfinanza gestita da società per azioni rispetto alle
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cooperative di credito. Anzi, da questo lavoro emergono i vantaggi di una microfinanza gestita
da organizzazioni di proprietà dei loro soci in termini di efficienza e di capacità di bilanciare
la doppia bottom- line della microfinanza. In terzo luogo, l’impatto dell’accesso al microcredito
sugli investimenti degli agricoltori in risorse agricole viene valutata utilizzando la propensity
score matching (PSM), e i metodi control-function-regression che affrontano i potenziali er-
rori di selezione dei partecipanti. I risultati di entrambi gli approcci mostrano come l’accesso
al credito abbia aumentato lacquisto di input più produttivi. Infatti, gli agricoltori che pren-
dono prestiti da cooperative di credito tendono a investire di più in metodi di produzione più
avanzati.
L’analisi delle cooperative agricole ha testato le affermazioni teoriche delleconomia organizza-
tiva e neo-istituzionalista riguardo ai driver dell’incidenza delle cooperative agricole e sulle
decisioni degli agricoltori in merito a quali istituti di credito rapportarsi come soci o come cli-
enti. I modelli di scelta discreta sono impiegati per l’analisi empirica. I risultati indicano che
l’incidenza di cooperative agricole in Etiopia è più legata alla questione del ’potere di bilan-
ciamento del mercato’ che all’ipotesi della ’riduzione dei costi di transazione’. Nonostante le
politiche di adesione libera, l’analisi della partecipazione degli agricoltori indica che la scelta
di usufruire dei servizi o diventare soci è legata e significativamente influenzata da posizione
geografica, asset e specificità relazionali. Infine, l’analisi dell’impatto ha stimato guadagni di ef-
ficienza tecnica grazie all’appartenenza a cooperative agricole e ha utilizzato tecniche di stochas-
tic production frontier. I risultati indicano che l’appartenenza a cooperative agricole migliora
in modo significativo i guadagni in termini di efficienza per i piccoli agricoltori.
Parole chiave: Microfinanza, cooperative di credito, outreach, sostenibilità econom-
ica, trade-off, impatto, forma proprietaria, tecnologie agricole, cooperative agricole,
contropotere di mercato, economizzare i costi di transazione, l’appartenenza e le de-
cisioni clientelari, efficienza tecnica, efficienza dei costi, , propensity score matching,
stochastic cost and production frontier, double discrete choice model, Etiopia.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 background
The role of access to finance and markets in smallholder agriculture development
has received considerable attention among policy makers and academicians over the
last three to four decades. Following the contributions of Hansmann (1996), Staatz
(1987), Bonus (1986), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Akerlof (1970), among others, sig-
nificant advances were made in designing policies to better link smallholder farmers
and farmer organizations to institutional finance providers. Strides were made in re-
ducing transaction costs for farmers in developing countries seeking finance or par-
ticipating in agricultural input and output markets, in filling missing markets, and
in overcoming problems related to information asymmetry within agricultural and fi-
nancial markets. The most notable developments were the revolution of microfinance
institutions1 in rural financial markets and the revival of agricultural cooperatives as a
key factor in fostering improved input supply and in undertaking product aggregation
and marketing functions.
Before the blossoming of rural microfinance institutions, the principal way in which
smallholder farmers were offered financial support was through subsidized credit
packages offered through specialized state-owned development banks. While subsi-
dized credit has played a crucial role to kick-start rural financial markets in some
developing economies (Dorward et al., 2004), direct subsidies have been criticized for
generating allocative inefficiencies and failing to achieve their primary goal of over-
coming the credit constraints facing small-scale farmers, mainly due to elite capture
and poor repayment rate (Binswanger et al., 1993; Adams et al., 1984; von Pischke and
Adams, 1983; Adams and Graham, 1981). The dissatisfaction with subsidized credit
schemes, coupled with the economic structural reforms, made in most developing
countries during 1980s, led to a significant reduction in state involvement in rural fi-
nancial markets and the dissolution of many state-owned development banks. This,
in turn, resulted in a paradigm shift in how rural financial services were provided to
farmers; from credit subsides to a more market-oriented approach that priced finan-
cial products and services to cover costs and associated risks (Meyer, 2011; Conning
and Udry, 2005).
1 Note that the phrase microfinance institutions in this dissertation is used in its broader meaning and
includes non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), financial cooperatives, saving groups, and village banks
that provide micro-credit, savings, and insurance services for members.
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The new paradigm guided a revival of formal rural financial services across many de-
veloping countries. Financial cooperatives and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)
made inroads in rural financial markets with loans tailored and customized to the
seasonal needs of smallholder farmers. These new institutions disproved the earlier
conventional belief that the poor are neither creditworthy nor are they able to save.
Through their innovative loan terms the new rural financial institutions demonstrated
that the rural poor can borrow, pay substantial interest rates, and save continuously
(Morduch, 1999). Innovations such as providing loans to a group in which all mem-
bers are jointly liable for servicing the loan and structuring a dual role for members of
financial cooperatives both as providers of the demand for loans and suppliers of loan-
able funds. These innovations created suitable screening and monitoring mechanisms
for individual borrowers, which enabled the lending institutions to inexpensively ad-
dress many common information and enforcement challenges associated with micro-
lending. The success of microfinance institutions in overcoming these information and
enforcement costs also rests on their use of progressive lending and the promise of fu-
ture loans to the borrower (i.e., dynamic incentive) as a tool to discourage strategic de-
faults. Starting with very small loans and gradually increasing loan sizes as borrowers
demonstrate reliability enable the lending institutions to systematically increase the
opportunity costs for the borrower of non-repayment (Galariotis et al., 2011; Tedeschi,
2005; Besley, 1995).
In general, the use of social collateral by microfinance providers to mitigate the infor-
mation and enforcement costs they face in serving resource poor borrowers is largely
considered a breakthrough for micro-banking and resulted in greater optimism for
improving rural financial markets in developing countries. However, translating the
gains from innovative loan conditions that result in high repayment rates into profits
or surplus earnings to enable the microfinance institutions to sustain themselves as
viable businesses is a challenge that is not yet mastered (Morduch, 1999). Moreover,
there is still debate on whether microfinance providers can be financially self-sufficient
while serving the poor. Some researchers see an inevitable trade-off between finan-
cial sustainability and outreach to the poor (see Herms et al., 2011; Armendáriz de
Aghion and Szafarz, 2009; Cull et al., 2007). Conversely, others claim to have found
self-sufficient microfinance institutions in serving the poor (Quayes, 2012). Nonethe-
less, most such studies focus largely on the effect of loan terms (e.g., individual vs.,
group) on market contract costs. They pay little attention to how the ownership of
a micro-finance institution is organized and practiced and how it affects the costs of
microfinance delivery (i.e., ownership costs).
One of the particular interests of this dissertation is, therefore, understanding the
trade-offs between microfinance outreach and the commercial sustainability of the
microfinance institution across different form of ownership. Particular emphasis is
given to financial cooperatives and specialized non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)
as member-owned and shareholder-owned microfinance providers, respectively. Ac-
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cording to agency theory, organizations that are owned by agents with pecuniary
incentives are better able to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). More-
over, when it comes to the provision of microfinance, organizations that are owned
by their customers are better able to reduce costs of market contracts (Hansmannn,
1996). While pecuniary incentives can be at a play for both shareholder-owned and
member-owned microfinance institutions, the effect of ownership form on the relative
costs of market contracts merits empirical investigation. Whether microfinance institu-
tions providing micro-credit, savings services, or insurance services have any impact
on the livelihoods of their clients is also a fundamental policy question which remains
unsettled.
In addition to finance provision, improving smallholder farmers access to input and
output markets is an important topic of discussion in development policy circles fol-
lowing the increasing recognition of the links between productivity gains, smallholder
commercialization, and income growth (Fafchamps, 2005; Timmer, 1997; Pingali, 1997).
However, pervasive market imperfection and high transaction costs in developing
countries often make it difficult for small-scale farmers to fully exploit the potential
gains from market participation (Poulton et al., 2005; Key et al., 2000; de Janvry et
al., 1991). Although they have proved insufficient, price-based policy interventions for
agricultural development have been in place since the 1970s - price stabilization poli-
cies until 1980s and policies on getting prices right during 1980s and 1990s - to address
market imperfections and to stimulate smallholder market participation (Barrett, 2008;
Reardon et al., 1999).
One response to imperfect markets and high transaction costs is organizing marketing
groups of farmers to enable the farmers to gain bargaining power in their market trans-
actions (Barrett, 2008; de Janvry et al., 1991; Staatz, 1987). Agricultural cooperatives
have been revived over the past decade across developing countries with expectations
of increasing smallholder market participation, improving access to productive tech-
nologies, better aggregating surplus output, and reducing or sharing transaction costs
(Valentinov, 2007; Stockbridge et al., 2003; Rondot and Collion, 1999; Sexton, 1990).
Despite their earlier turbulent history of being closely associated with and dominated
by state-centered governance regimes, agricultural cooperatives are now being rebuilt
in many developing countries. Substantial public development programs and private
initiatives are channeled through agricultural cooperatives (Pingali et al., 2005). How-
ever, it is still contested as to whether these collective farmer organizations can kindle
significant increases in smallholder technology use and market participation.
While there is evidence of reasonable success by agricultural cooperatives in improv-
ing smallholders access to productive technologies and generating better terms of
trade (Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Bernard et al., 2008; Nyoro and Ngigi, 2007, Hellin et
al., 2007; Poulton et al., 2004; among other), their impact on smallholder productivity
and output marketing remain unclear. Moreover, empirical studies on what explains
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the presence of an agricultural cooperative in a particular location and not in oth-
ers and drivers of farmers membership and patronage decisions are scarce. Whether
agricultural cooperatives are formed mainly to economize transaction costs or to im-
prove bargaining power remains an open question. Therefore, of particular interest in
the second part of this dissertation is seeking to explain the incidence of agricultural
cooperatives, farmers decisions on membership and use of agricultural cooperatives
services and their impact on smallholders technical efficiency.
1.2 problem statement
Microfinance institutions have two objectives, viz. outreach to the poor, more specifi-
cally, to poor women borrowers; and financial sustainability. During the early stages
of the revival in rural microfinance, the potential conflict between achieving financial
self-sufficiency while serving the poor was not subject to methodical scrutiny, despite
the costs and risks involved in lending to collateral-poor clients. Especially among
NBFIs/NGOs, much focus was paid to expanding outreach to the poor using reallo-
cated resources from traditional poverty alleviation programs, with little attention to
financial sustainability (Morduch, 1999). As a result, a reliance on subsides to cover
start-up costs and to perpetuate financial services by the microfinance institutions
was not uncommon, as, in spite of the high repayment rates that resulted from their
innovative loan terms, the institutions were seldom able to generate profits.
Recently, however, increased commercialization and competition among microfinance
providers coupled with a withdrawal of subsides has drawn attention to the need
for financial sustainability in the industry. These developments resulted in a shift in
focus from outreach per se to outreach and financial sustainability though some ob-
servers argue that pursuing financial sustainability alone is the surest way to deliver
social impact by microfinance institutions (Christen et al., 1995). Theoretically, pursu-
ing financial sustainability together with serving the poor can be either conflicting
or complementary. On the one hand, the two objectives can be in harmony if the fi-
nancial self-sufficiency requirement induces an improvement in how a microfinance
institution allocates its resources and prompts the institution to better attract commer-
cial funds that can be used to expand outreach (Frank, 2008; Ronsengard, 2004). On
the other hand, striving for financial sustainability may undermine the social mission
of such institutions by crowding-out smaller loans and poor borrowers, as they are
more costly to service per unit of funds lent (Weiss and Montgomery, 2005; Hulme
and Mosley, 1996).
Empirical understanding on whether the principal objectives of microfinance are in-
herently in conflict is imperative for guiding policy interventions, as microfinance in
most developing countries is promoted to meet the financial needs of the unbanked
poor. Failure to achieve wider breadth and deeper outreach in the pursuit of prof-
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itability is an issue of policy concern. However, several years after the resurgence of
microfinance, empirical evidence on the trade-off between outreach and sustainability
is still scarce, and that which exists yields mixed results. Moreover, only few of the em-
pirical studies take into account the form of ownership of the microfinance institution
and the effect of this on costs of service delivery. On top of that, most of such stud-
ies have overlooked or omitted financial cooperatives in their coverage, even though
that in many developing countries cooperatives are the dominant rural microfinance
model2.
While the early commitment to experimentation and innovation can be useful in find-
ing mechanisms for reconciling the two objectives of outreach and sustainability (Mor-
duch, 1999), the underlying question is whether access to microfinance services helps
to improve the lives of clients. Like studies of the trade-off between outreach and sus-
tainability, there are only few evaluations on the impact of microfinance services on
client welfare that have used systematically chosen treatment and comparison groups
within a rigorous methodological framework for evaluation. Those that do exist show
a mixed picture of impact. In Ethiopia, which is the focus of this dissertation, there has
been no careful evaluation on the impact of microfinance credit on modern input use
by small farmers, despite that most of the loans of financial cooperatives and two-third
of the loan portfolio of NBFIs are geared to investments related to primary produc-
tion activities by smallholder farmers (Amha and Peck, 2010). Disaggregated impact
evaluations by credit source and lending terms are equally scarce, so there is little
understanding of how the impact on clients welfare varies by the type of ownership
of the microfinance institution and the loan terms employed.
The gap between theoretical guidance and the empirical evidence on the incidence and
impact of agricultural cooperatives is also considerable. Significant progress has been
made in theoretically understanding the economic rationale behind the formation of
agricultural cooperatives - the existence of agricultural cooperatives is associated with
market failure-related grounds. That is, they exist to countervail market power, econo-
mize transaction costs, balance costs of market contracts and ownership, achieve gains
from economies of scale, and fill missing markets (see Valentinov and Iliopoulos, 2012;
Hansmann, 1996; Cook, 1993; Staatz, 1987; Bonus, 1986; Sexton and Iskow, 1988). How-
ever, given pervasive market imperfections in agricultural input and output markets
across developing countries, the participation in and use of cooperative services in
such countries are not anywhere close to what one would expect on a theoretical ba-
sis. Empirical evidence on what explains the presence of agricultural cooperatives in
a particular community and not in the others and the use of cooperative services by
a particular group of farmers and not by others are lagging far behind our theoretical
understanding.
2 For instance, in Africa credit unions/cooperatives are the major provider of microfinance services and
exceed other providers on number of clients and number of deposit accounts (Gaul, 2011).
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Although establishing cooperatives on the basis of theoretically credible economic or
social rationales is the gateway towards increasing membership and patronage, assess-
ment of the success of such cooperatives is fundamentally based on a clear understand-
ing of whether the organization helped to achieve its intended goals of stimulating
market participation and technology use and improving productivity and efficiency
among its farmer-members. Nonetheless, evaluating the impact of agricultural coop-
eratives is more demanding than most other program evaluations. First, finding a
creditable comparison group that represents the scenario that would be in place in the
absence of the agricultural cooperative is challenging due to indiscriminate service
provision by most such cooperatives. Second, despite similarities in organizational
structure and target membership groups, services provided by agricultural coopera-
tives vary considerably from one cooperative to the other, as they are often established
to respond to a particular need or problem. As a result, several decades after the re-
vival of agricultural cooperatives, empirical evidence on their impact on the welfare
of their members is very limited.
1.3 research questions
The main focus of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of microfinance
institutions and agricultural cooperatives and their impact on smallholder agriculture
development in Ethiopia. To do so, it addresses the following six major research ques-
tions.
Is there a trade off between outreach to the poor and institutional sustainability in microfinance?
Is it possible for microfinance providers in Ethiopia to serve the poor on a sustainable cost
covering basis?
Microfinance institutions in Ethiopia operate in an environment where there are many
risks to the livelihoods of their target clients - weather risk, price risk, etc. Moreover,
the nature of the clients they serve means that the microfinance institutions entail
higher business costs due to the scattered locations and limited financial literacy of
the clients. Yet, microfinance institutions are expected to serve such target groups on
a cost-covering basis. The assumption is that microfinance providers can transfer the
higher costs and associated risks of lending to such clients onto the clients themselves.
However, this assertion may not be always true, as charging high interest rates will
depress credit demand and adversely affect the financial sustainability of the lending
institution. The dissertation examines such claims and seeks to provide answers to
such specific questions as: Does raising interest rates exacerbate agency problems that
can be detected by lower profitability for the lender? Does serving small loan sizes and
focusing on poor borrowers undermine the financial self-sufficiency of microfinance
providers?
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Are microfinance institutions in Ethiopia reasonably cost efficient, or do their costs include
significant avoidable expenses?
One of the greatest challenges facing the microfinance industry is lowering the cost
of services. Even several years after the introduction of microfinance, the costs of mi-
crofinance lending often are reportedly high, and this often is used as a rationale for
charging borrowers higher interest rates. While lowering costs are beneficial for clients
and for microfinance institutions through making loans affordable to borrowers, stim-
ulating demand for the services microfinance institutions offer, and consequently im-
proving the financial performance of lenders, microfinance providers often are unable
to contain their operating costs. Recent studies on microfinance cost structure docu-
mented that of the interest charges borrowers incur, about 62 percent goes into cover-
ing the operating expenses of the lending institution (Gonzale, 2007). This dissertation
analyzes this issue in the Ethiopian context. It specifically examines whether microfi-
nance providers in Ethiopia are reasonably cost efficient, with little scope for reducing
wasteful operating expenses.
What type of form of ownership for a microfinance institution (financial cooperative vs. share-
holder or investor owned NBFIs) better balances the two objectives of microfinance - outreach
and financial sustainability? How do shareholder owned microfinance institutions in Ethiopia
contrast with financial cooperatives on the basis of their cost efficiency?
The institutional modalities in addressing problems of rural financial markets in devel-
oping countries through microfinance encompasses a diverse range of organizational
designs and ownership forms that are spawned by the common idea of lending to the
unbanked poor. These include public owned banks for small and medium enterprises,
social venture capital funds, private credit unions, financial cooperatives, shareholder
or investor owned microfinance institutions, saving groups, and village banks (Gaul,
2011; Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). These varying forms of microfinance providers have
contrasting degrees of ability to reduce and balance costs of establishing and enforc-
ing market contracts and ownership. For instance, theoretically, institutions owned
by their customers are better able to reduce costs of establishing market contracts,
but may face higher ownership costs. In this dissertation the two main providers of
microfinance in Ethiopia, financial cooperatives and shareholder owned NBFIs are
compared and contrasted on their cost-efficiency and ability of achieving financial
self-sufficiency together and on their ability to serve poor borrowers.
Does access to institutional finance (microfinance credit) improve small farmers agricultural
technology adoption and intensity of use in Ethiopia?
Given the crucial roles of agricultural technology use on farm households well-being
and poverty alleviation, improved technology adoption rates are very low in sub-
Saharan Africa (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010). Theoretical and empirical evidence
on agricultural technology adoption overwhelmingly report limited credit access as a
binding constraint that deters adoption. In Ethiopia, in recent years, most of the loans
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of financial cooperatives and two-thirds of the shareholder-owned NBFIs loan portfo-
lio goes to agriculture to encourage smallholders to invest in productivity-enhancing
agricultural technologies (Amha and Peck, 2010). This dissertation seeks to estimate
the direct impact of microfinance credit access on modern input uptake and use by
smallholders in Ethiopia. It also examines the potential impact of heterogeneity in
credit provision by explicitly considering the source of the credit and the size of the
farm of the borrower.
What explains the incidence of agricultural cooperative in some villages and not in others?
What determines smallholders participation and use of cooperative services?
In Ethiopia, like in many other developing countries, establishment of farmers cooper-
atives as an institutional remedy for agricultural market failure is an accepted policy
alternative. Over the last two decades, agricultural cooperatives have been revitalized
with rising expectations of playing crucial roles in improving smallholders access to
modern inputs, achieving economies of scale through aggregating surplus outputs,
and in bargaining better terms of trades for their members. However, despite con-
tinuous promotional efforts, their prevalence and farmers participation in them are
limited - only about 35 percent of the kebeles in the country have agricultural coopera-
tives and only 17 percent of farmers residing in these kebeles are members (Bernard et
al., 2008). Nonetheless, our empirical understanding of the rationale for cooperative
incidence and the determinants of farmers membership and patronage decisions are
limited. To fill this research gap, the dissertation addresses questions such as: What
drives the actual existence of agricultural cooperatives in particular places and not in
others? Which types of farmers become members and/or users of agricultural cooper-
atives and why? Is there a link between farm households membership and patronage
decisions in relation to agricultural cooperatives?
Does participation in agricultural cooperatives have an impact on smallholders technical effi-
ciency?
Besides modern input supply and commercialization, agricultural cooperatives in
Ethiopia are expected to play a role in linking members to agricultural extension
services. Most of the agricultural cooperatives are anticipated also to provide infor-
mation and training to farmers on better agronomic practices. The last chapter of the
dissertation evaluates the impact on members technical efficiency of such services by
agricultural cooperatives.
1.4 analytical approaches and data
Different data sets and empirical methodologies are used to address these research
questions. The dissertation uses four data sets that resulted from surveys conducted
by the author and by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) between
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2008 and 2012. The data sets include household, institutional, and community surveys.
The methods and data used to address each research question are described in this
section.
The first two research questions are about the tension for rural microfinance institu-
tions between lending to the poor and maintaining financial sustainability and about
the role of ownership form in realizing these two objectives. An Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) regression method is used to describe the correlates of financial self-sufficiency
and microfinance outreach. After examining the trade-off between outreach to the
poor and institutional sustainability, the analysis uses OLS regression forms that al-
low factors of interest to vary by microfinance ownership form in order to investigate
which type of ownership better balances outreach and financial sustainability in mi-
crofinance. Moreover, the study uses a Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) to predict
cost-efficiency at the microfinance institution level. The one-step stochastic cost fron-
tier suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) is followed to estimate the cost frontier
and inefficiency correlates simultaneously. Institutional data from 107 microfinance
providers in Ethiopia (30 shareholder-owned microfinance institutions and 77 finan-
cial cooperatives) is used for the empirical analysis.
The third and fifth research questions aim at evaluating the impact of access to insti-
tutional finance and participation in agricultural cooperatives on farmers adoption of
modern inputs and on farmers technical efficiency, respectively. The investigation of
both questions demands a systematic observation of adoption patterns and efficiency
levels in the absence of access to finance and cooperative services. Ideally, a random-
ized experiment would provide such data. Identifying causal impact in the absence of
observations on the counterfactual case of no access to institutional finance and no par-
ticipation in agricultural cooperatives (the set-up on both cases) requires a method that
can restore the missing data. The non-parametric Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
approach is used to construct the counterfactual based on pre-exposure observable
covariates to estimate average effects. The results from PSM are also compared with
estimates of control-function-regression models to check the robustness of the results
and to obtain insights on the bias reductions obtained from using PSM. Data from
a farm household survey conducted by the author (i.e., 820 households) in 2012 is
used to address the fourth research question, while data from an agricultural market-
ing household survey conducted by IFPRI (i.e., 1707 households) in 2008 is used to
address the sixth research question.
To address the fifth research question, the analysis used a data set from the 2012
Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) baseline survey conducted by
IFPRI. The data set includes a survey of 102 agricultural cooperatives, 200 communi-
ties or peasant associations, and 3,000 farm households. A flexible probit and seem-
ingly unrelated bivariate probit models are used to analyze the determinants of agri-
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cultural cooperative presence in a kebele and the participation and use of cooperative
services by smallholder farmers.
1.5 outline of the dissertation
Together with the introductory and summary chapters, the dissertation contains seven
chapters in two parts. The first part, chapters two to four, focuses on shareholder
owned NBFIs, financial cooperatives, and their impact on agriculture technology use
by smallholder farmers in Ethiopia. The second part contains the remaining two chap-
ters and focuses on agricultural cooperatives and their role in improving farmers tech-
nical efficiency.
The background section provides a description of the landscape of agricultural finance
in Ethiopia and the share of agricultural lending in the country accounted for by
each type of agricultural finance institution. Chapters two and three give a picture
of the outreach, financial performance, and cost-efficiency of microfinance providers
in Ethiopia. These include analysis of the trade-offs between outreach to the poor,
financial self-sufficiency, and cost-efficiency in microfinance service provisions. The
link between interest rates and profitability and the effect on costs of microfinance
services delivery of the way ownership is organized and practiced are also explored in
these two related chapters. Chapter four evaluates the effects of access to institutional
finance (e.g., credit from NBFIs and financial cooperatives) on adoption and uptake of
productivity-enhancing agricultural technologies by smallholder farmers in Ethiopia.
The impact of access to institutional finance disaggregated by farm size and credit
source are also presented in this chapter.
Chapter five presents the results of tests on some of the theoretical economic ratio-
nale behind the incidence of agricultural cooperatives. It explores the prevalence of
agricultural cooperatives, discusses the locations where agricultural cooperatives pri-
marily are found in Ethiopia, and considers why they are located where they are. It
explicitly considers whether agricultural cooperatives are located primarily in remote
locations to reduce or share transactions costs where such costs are high or are they
located in locations where markets are better developed with good access for bargain-
ing better terms of trades for their members. It also discusses the determinants of
household membership and patronage decisions. Chapter six evaluates whether the
embedded support services provided by agricultural cooperatives improve the tech-
nical efficiency of members. It also depicts the sources of technical inefficiencies for
smallholder farmers in Ethiopia, in general. The last chapter summarizes the key find-
ings and conclusions of this dissertation and sets out the implications of these findings
for rural microfinance service development and for the promotion of agricultural coop-
eratives in Ethiopia. Potential future areas of researches on these two thematic topics
are also suggested in the last chapter.
Part I
M ICROF INANCE SERVICE PROVIDERS IN ETHIOP IA :
OUTREACH, F INANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT
- BACKGROUND
The first part of this dissertation focuses on microfinance services providers
in Ethiopia. It examines their depth of outreach, financial performance and
impact on smallholders agricultural investment in the country. It also in-
vestigate the roles of microfinance ownership and organizational form on
cost-efficiency in serving the poor using data from financial cooperatives
and shareholder owned Non-Bank-Financial Institutions (NBFIs), the most
widespread microfinance services providers in Ethiopia. To give readers a
background for the following three chapters that belongs to the first part
of the dissertation, this section discuss a brief account on the status of fi-
nancial inclusion and the roles played by microfinance institutions towards
the process of building inclusive financial sector in Ethiopia.
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access to financial services in ethiopia
It is widely recognized that a well-developed financial system is vital to stimulate
economic growth through facilitating allocation of resources to its most productive
use. Availability of financial services like credit, saving, payment and insurance prod-
ucts trigger investments, spread risks and facilitate ease of exchanges. Broader and
inclusive financial system that overcomes price and non-price barriers in particular
benefits the poor segment of the population who are often systematically excluded
from accessing financial services (Demirgyc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012).
In recent decade, like other developing countries, Ethiopia experienced a positive de-
velopment in dealing with financial access obstacles and expanding financial services
to the poor compared to the pre-reform periods. Before the economic reform in 1991
the financial sector in Ethiopia was under state control, with no or little institutional
independence. The lack of institutional autonomy during those periods has been a
barrier to inclusive financial provisions. In particular during the socialist regime, na-
tionalization of financial institutions and direct state control over credit allocations se-
riously undermine individuals access to financial services in the country. For instance,
over the ten year period before the economic reform the share of private credit (which
includes private business and individuals) was only 8.3 percent, while the government
and state enterprise loans accounts for the difference (see Geda, 2006; Admassie, 1987).
It is only later after the economic reform important policy changes have taken place in
the financial sector that allow the establishment of private owned domestic banks and
liberalized interest rates with a floor for deposit and ceiling lending rates. In recent
decades, the entry of domestic private banks in the financial sector coupled with the
expansion and downsizing of commercial banks in rural areas, the revolution of mi-
crofinance institutions, and the revival of financial cooperatives fairly expand access
to financial services in the country.
Nonetheless, the financial sector in Ethiopia still remains under-developed as com-
pared to other developing countries. Financial depth and size indicators show a sig-
nificance access gap that entails considerable efforts towards building an inclusive
financial sector in the country. For example, liquid liabilities to GDP, a common mea-
sure of financial depth and overall size of the financial sector, are reported 35.9 and
44.6 percent in 2000 and 2007, respectively. Despite relatively low GDP, the ratio of
private credit to GDP is only 19.1 percent compared with 24 percent for Sub-Saharan
Africa and 77 percent for all developing economies (Trading Economics, accessed on
October 29, 2013; Demirgyc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012; Kiyota et al., 2007). Moreover,
Ethiopias gross domestic saving rate is estimated only 3.6 percent, the lowest in East
African region (Kiyota et al., 2007) and recent diagnostic study on Ethiopian financial
sector indicated a USD 3 billion unmet credit demand in the country (Amha and Peck,
2010).
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Access and use of financial products and services by individual adults also indicates
lower rates of financial penetrations in Ethiopia. Recent financial inclusion data from
the World Bank plotted in Figure 1.1 shows that only 14 percents of adults in the coun-
try use formal financial institutions, the lowest compared to neighboring benchmark
countries. The relative financial access gap measure that take into account individuals
poverty status by Gaul (2011) also shows that in Ethiopia the size of population liv-
ing below the national poverty line exceed total accounts in the country by about 85
percent (Figure 1.1), implying limited access and use of formal financial institutions.
Access to financial services by rural population is even more limited, as most of the
banks are clustered in the urban areas. Recent estimates show that only one percent
of the rural households have accounts in formal financial institutions and number of
bank branches per 100,000 rural adult population is 0.8 (i.e., one branch for about
125,000 rural adults) compared with 45,000 adult population per branch for urban
areas (World Bank, 2012).
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and Gaul (2011).
Figure 1.1: Percentage of adults using formal financial institutions and relative financial access
gap, 2011.
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Data on domestic loans and advances by sector of the economy further indicates that
the rural agricultural sector is the most affected by the aforementioned credit crunch
and limited access to financial services compared to other sectors in the economy. The
proportion of domestic credit channeled to the agricultural sector is very limited de-
spite the fact that the sector account for about 41 percent of the countys GDP. Figure
1.2 shows the total domestic credit and share of agricultural credit during the last
eight years. Over these years the share of agricultural credit averaged only 9 percent.
Even though lending volume has been increasing in nominal terms (albeit marginally),
its share didn’t exceed a maximum of 14 percent. Moreover, studies indicated that sig-
nificant proportion of the agricultural loans is allocated to agricultural investments
related to internationally traded commodities. Only small fraction of the commercial
lending to agriculture goes to individual farmers for primary production activities
(World Bank, 2012). Individual farmers looking for financial services heavily relay
either on microfinance institutions (i.e., financial cooperatives, shareholder NBFIs, vil-
lage banks, etc.) or on the informal financial sector.
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Figure 1.2: Total and agricultural loans and advances disbursed, 2004-2011.
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the microfinance landscape in ethiopia
In Ethiopia, as noted above, mainstream commercial financial institutions are not only
unwilling, but they also lack the capacity to serve the needs of the poor (Amha, 2007).
Financial services to the poor are largely delivered by the microfinance industry, which
is mainly made up of services rendered by financial cooperatives, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and shareholder owned NBFIs. Financial cooperatives are the
forerunners in delivering financial services for the poor excluded by conventional fi-
nancial institutions. Financial cooperatives in Ethiopia are notable both in lending
small uncollateralized loans, saving mobilization, and in inculcating the importance of
financial services in the society at large (Degefe and Nega, 2000). Despite a weakening
of cooperative activities in the country during the economic reforms in the early1990s,
financial cooperatives were among the most resilient cooperative institutions and gen-
erally survived the reform and have grown steadily subsequently.
As shown in Figure 1.3, the spread of financial cooperatives has grown over the period
since 1974. It grows sharply from 2003 onwards, right after the establishment of the
Federal Cooperative Commission, a public body organized with the aim of revitaliz-
ing cooperative businesses in the country. Currently, about 42 saving and credit unions
and over 7,000 primary saving and credit cooperatives reportedly are providing mi-
crofinance services (i.e., saving, loan and insurance) for about one million members in
the country (Federal Cooperatives Agency, 2012). Similar to most credit cooperatives
elsewhere, financial cooperatives in Ethiopia are organized by individuals (i.e., farm-
ers, laborers, employees, etc.) working or living in the same localities. They mainly use
standard bilateral lending contracts between the cooperative and a member borrower.
Liability for repaying the loan rests with the individual borrower and the co-signer,
who is also a member of the same cooperative. In most cases, the savings of the bor-
rower and the co-signer serve as a guarantee for loan - they are savings-led in their ap-
proach. In terms of market share, however, financial cooperatives in Ethiopia account
for only less than one percent of the total credit in the economy, very low compared to
NBFIs, on the contrary to the global scenario where credit union/cooperatives surpass
other providers of microfinance both in number of clients, loans and deposit accounts
(Gaul, 2011; Amha and Peck, 2010).
Besides the role played by financial cooperatives, the development of microfinance in
Ethiopia also counts on efforts made by international NGOs, local NGOs, and gov-
ernment credit programs that integrate credit services in their development and relief
schemes to bring sustainable improvement to the welfare of their beneficiaries. His-
tory teaches us that the involvements of the government and NGOs in credit delivery
have been encouraging in terms of poverty reduction. Nevertheless, poor financial dis-
cipline and distorted resource allocation by NGOs and government credit programs
have been equally substantial. Interest rate subsidies, debt write-off, and equating
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loans with humanitarian assistance by the NGOs were among the distortions which
have indoctrinated a bad credit culture - a culture of entitlement - that undermines the
development micro-credit markets in Ethiopia today (Amha, 2007; Degefe and Nega,
2000).
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Figure 1.3: Number of microfinance institutions in Ethiopia and volume of loans outstanding,
by organizational form.
Following the economic reform in 1991, some of the NGO and government pilot
credit programs engaged in financial intermediation transformed into formal (spe-
cialized or non-bank) microfinance institutions. The transformation was made mainly
to reverse the bad credit culture instituted by NGOs and state credit programs. This
was done through establishing efficient microfinance institutions that adhere to the
market mechanism while serving the poor. Nonetheless, the involvement of regional
governments and mother NGOs as contributors of ownership equity that impacts
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decision-making powers is still prevalent. In addition to the NBFIs evolved from prior
NGOs and government credit programs, the industry also witnessed new start-ups
of investor-owned microfinance providers. As of 2011, a total of 30 NBFIs in Ethiopia
reported reaching over 2.3 million clients, with total loans outstanding of 6.5 billion
birr - about $365 million (Figure 1.3). Altogether they account about 13 percent of the
total loan outstanding in the economy (Figure 1.4) and two-third of their loan portfolio
geared to smallholder agriculture, with government-owned microfinance institutions
representing the lion share (Amha and Peck, 2010).
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Figure 1.4: MFIs loans as percentage of total loan disbursements and outstanding in the econ-
omy.
NBFIs in Ethiopia are share companies that are registered and regulated by the Na-
tional Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). They are owned by individuals, public bodies, or
mother NGOs or by a combination of the three. Most of them are commercial lenders
that aim at achieving financial self-sufficiency while serving the poor. Unlike credit
unions or financial cooperatives, which are confined to specific locations, NBFIs cover
wider areas of operation, such as entire region. NBFIs use both bilateral individual
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lending contracts and contracts based on joint liability. In the case of group lending,
which is the main lending contract of NBFIs in Ethiopia, loans are made to individu-
als, but the group that is formed by the borrowers shoulder responsibility for a loan if
one among the group members defaults.
In spite of the prominence and wider prevalence of both types of microfinance insti-
tutions in the country in general and in the agricultural sector in particular, empiri-
cal work on their outreach, financial performance, and impact are scarce. Except the
works by Berhane and Gardebroek (2011) and Liverpool and Winter-Nelson (2010),
the existing research is based either on anecdotes or on very small samples. While
the samples used in these two studies still overlooked financial cooperatives, they
systematically documented a positive impact of specialized microfinance on borrow-
ers income, consumption, and housing. With the purpose of bridging the knowledge
gap on the institutional performance of microfinance, the following three chapters of
this dissertation aims at estimating impact and understanding the extents of outreach,
financial performance, and outreach financial sustainability trade-offs from an orga-
nizational point of view using disaggregated data that encompass both shareholder
owned NBFIs and financial cooperatives.
2
F INANCIAL SUSTAINABIL ITY AND OUTREACH OF
MICROF INANCE INST ITUT IONS IN ETHIOP IA : DOES
ORGANIZAT IONAL FORM MATTER?
Abstract
Growing commercialization and competition in microfinance drives the focus of micro lenders
from outreach per se to achieving financial sustainability in serving the poor. Such a goal can
conflict with the traditional social mission of microfinance - outreach to the poor. In places
where credit markets are inefficient, attaining financial sustainability while serving the poor
depends largely on the ability of lenders to reduce the costs of market contracts. Such ability of
cost containment often varies by lending terms and organizational forms. Using disaggregated
data of microfinance providers in Ethiopia, we compared financial cooperatives and specialized
or non-bank microfinance institutions on their outreach, financial performance and ability to
achieve financial self-sufficiency together with outreach to the poor. The results show that non-
bank microfinance providers perform relatively well in terms of breadth and depth of outreach,
but face higher cost, which creates tension between outreach and financial sustainability. In
contrast, there exists a positive complementarity between outreach and financial viability for
financial cooperatives. On average, financially self-sufficient cooperatives lend small size loans
and serve larger proportions of women borrowers, implying a greater depth of outreach together
with achieving financial sustainability. While non-bank microfinance providers do better in
expanding outreach, based on the findings, financial cooperatives should better contain their
costs, balance social and economic goals and enable the microfinance industry to fulfill its full
promise - serving the poor on a cost-covering basis.
keywords : Financial cooperatives; Non-bank microfinance institutions; Financial sus-
tainability; Outreach; Trade-off; Ethiopia.
2.1 introduction
Making finance accessible to the poor is a crucial mechanism for poverty reduction and
wealth creation in developing economies where there exists a huge unmet demand
for financial services. So far, access to financial services by the poor from financial
mainstream institutions is very limited1 , mainly due to high costs of market contracts
1 For instance, in most of Sub-Saharan African countries about 80 percent of the population lack a bank
account (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012; World Bank, 2008).
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and constraints (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012; World Bank, 2008). Microfinance
has emerged as a dedicated pro-poor financial institution to lend uncollateralized
and tailored loan terms to the unbanked poor in low-income communities. Through
institutional innovations and innovative loan terms, microfinance institutions become
able to dispense with information and enforcement costs and generate high repayment
rates (Morduch, 1999; Banerjee et al., 1994). Microfinance institutions demonstrate that
the poor can borrow, pay substantial interest rates and save continuously, which in
turn results greater optimism for improving credit markets in developing economies2.
However, the efforts of microfinance institutions to expand and perpetuate financial
services to the poor are often backed by a steady flow of subsides (Morduch, 1999).
Providing financial services on a cost-covering basis and translating high repayment
rates into profits remains a challenge not mastered yet. Besides the inherent costs
of market contracts in micro lending, focus on outreach per se and dependence on
non-commercial sources of funds, such as subsidies3, undermines the need for finan-
cial self-sufficiency in microfinance practices (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch,
2010). Recently, however, increasing regulations, commercialization and competition
in microfinance has driven micro lenders to shift their focus from outreach and a re-
liance on donated funds to achieving financial sustainability - a demanding goal that
requires the ability to cover costs out of the income generated.
A natural concern is, thus, the implications of shifting the focus towards financial
viability on the traditional social mission of microfinance - outreach to the poor. Such
a concern can be even greater in countries like Ethiopia where the financial market
is less developed and microfinance institutions are promoted as a poverty reduction
instrument (Amha, 2007). As they are mainly promoted to extend financial services
to the unbanked poor, failure to achieve wider breadth (scale) and deeper outreach in
the pursuit of financial sustainability can be indeed a policy concern.
In theory, outreach to the poor and financial sustainability can be potentially either
complementary or conflicting4. On the one hand, a focus on financial performance
and efficiency can reduce excess costs and attract commercial funds (including vol-
untary savings), which may, at the same time, contribute to expand outreach. Once
the institution becomes financially sustainable, it can mean wider outreach today, to-
morrow and in the future (Frank, 2008; Rhyne and Otero, 2006; Christen, 2001). On
2 Credit cooperatives have been operating since about century ago in Germany. At present, Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh, VBSP in Vietnam, Spandana in India and Caja Popular of Mexico are some of the very
well known cases in point. Their innovative contracts and lending arrangements have partly managed to
reduce the costs of information asymmetries that hinder micro-lending.
3 Empirical evidences suggest that subsidies can hamper efficiency, especially if continuous and beyond a
threshold (Hudon and Traca, 2011).
4 See Robinson (2001) for a full account of the debates between the poverty lending approach (i.e., wel-
farist view) and the financial systems approach (i.e., institutionalists view) on the outreach - financial
sustainability trade-off.
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the other hand, striving for financial sustainability and efficiency can result in a shift
in the composition of new clients at the cost of lending to the poor, as lending small
and customized loan terms are very costly to maintain5. In other words, seeking finan-
cial sustainability can push microfinance institutions to crowd-out of their portfolio of
lending the small size loans that are demanded by the poor (Hashemi and Rosenberg,
2006; Weiss and Montgomery, 2005; Woller and Schreiner, 2002). Moreover, priority to
achieve profitability can lead to higher interest rates and anti-social contract enforce-
ment methods (Roberts, 2013; Galariotis et al., 2011).
Despite its policy salience, there are very few systematic empirical works that analyze
the potential trade-offs between outreach and financial sustainability in microfinance.
The evidence presented by these studies is mixed. Studies by Hermes et al. (2011) and
Cull et al. (2007) found tensions between outreach to the poor and financial sustain-
ability and efficiency. In their global analysis of microfinance providers, they found
that institutions with lower average loan balance and more women borrowers are less
financially sustainable. In particular, Cull et al. (2007) found that, for larger individ-
ual lenders, the pursuit of improved financial performance considerably reduces their
focus on the poor. On the other hand, a recent study using data from 702 microfi-
nance providers operating in 83 countries by Quayes (2012) documented a positive
complementary relationship between depth of outreach and financial performance.
With the aims of expanding the body of existing empirical works, this study provides
an in-depth analysis on how organizational form (i.e., the way ownership is organized
and practiced) affects the potential compatibility or trade-offs between financial perfor-
mance and outreach for microfinance providers in Ethiopia. It also examine patterns
of profitability and variations in cost containment by organizational form (i.e., finan-
cial cooperatives vs. non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)), as it is equally important
to know whether one type of organizational form is more cost effective than another
in explaining differences in financial performance of lending institutions (Berger and
Mester, 1997).
To this end, the study used disaggregated data of 107 microfinance providers to com-
pare financial cooperatives and specialized NBFIs - the two prevailing microfinance
providers in Ethiopia - on their outreach, financial performance, and ability to balance
social and financial/economic goals. Considering both specialized microfinance and
financial cooperatives enables the analysis to reduce potential biases towards large
and commercial firms and selection biases seen in prior studies6. Furthermore, the
study aims at going beyond existing empirical works in measuring the outreach of the
5 The cost differential between serving small uncollateralized loans and large collateralized loans is mainly
emanated from varying level of screening and monitoring efforts (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2009).
6 The analysis in works by Cull et al. (2007), Hermes et al. (2011) and Quayes (2012) are largely based
on microfinance institutions that are united by their strong commitments to achieving financial self-
sufficiency. Whereas, our work encompasses microfinance institutions that are committed to achieving
economic viability, social visibility, or both.
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microfinance providers. In addition to average loan size and percentage of women bor-
rowers that measures depth of outreach; it used average length of client relationships
and time between installment payments as measures of length and scope of outreach,
respectively.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews organizational va-
rieties of microfinance providers and their innovations to overcome costs of market
contracts and constraints in micro-lending. Section 3 describes the data source and
summary statistics. Section 4 explains the methodology used to understand the po-
tential compatibility or trade-offs between outreach and financial performance. The
analysis and results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes by summarizing
the main findings and sets a recommendation.
2.2 organizational forms in microfinance
The modalities of interventions towards addressing problems of credit/financial mar-
kets in low-income communities in the name of microfinance encompass a diverse
range of organizational designs spawned by the common idea of lending to the un-
banked poor. These range from public state-owned banks for SMEs (Small andMedium
Size Enterprises) and social venture capital to private credit unions, financial coopera-
tives, specialized or non-bank microfinance institutions/NGOs, saving groups, mobile
network operators and village banks (Gaul, 2011; Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). All of
these forms have varying degrees of ability to overcome costs of market contracts
and constraints, which are partly intrinsic to their organizational design. In our com-
parisons hereunder, this review examine the comparative advantage of the two most
popular organizational forms, financial/credit cooperatives and specialized or non-
bank microfinance institutions, in terms of their inherent ability in reaching the poor
and containing information and enforcement costs.
The microfinance practices of lending to individuals whom banks would spurn and
tailoring the loan terms more closely to the needs of poor borrowers (e.g., farmers and
laborers) were pioneered by the 19th century German financial cooperatives7 in credit
markets that are similar to those found in many developing countries today ( World
Bank, 2007; Helms, 2006; Guinnane, 2002; Guinnane, 2001a). The German financial co-
operatives therefore were an early antecedent for the current microfinance revolution.
They paved the way for lending policies and loan terms that catered for the needy and
differed from conventional banks - they can be considered as institutional innovations
in the financial sector8. In principle, financial cooperatives are local, autonomous or
7 Credit cooperatives were first established in Germany during the 1840s by Schulze-Delitzsch and Raif-
feisen. See Guinnane (2001a) for a detailed economic history of German credit cooperatives.
8 Enforcement of unlimited liability as an instrument to overcome any form of empathy and moral hazard
was part of the innovation, which were strictly followed by the Raiffeisen model of credit cooperatives.
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Source: Mixmarket - Gaul (2011).
Figure 2.1: Outreach of microfinance providers in Africa by product type.
freestanding organizations owned and controlled by their members. They are self-help
institutions established to made loans to members who cannot otherwise obtain credit
from conventional banks.
Financial cooperatives remain major players in the microfinance industry today and
it is a dominant model in Western Europe and French-speaking Africa (Helms, 2006;
Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). Currently financial cooperatives are serving over 857 mil-
lion people worldwide, 13 percent of the world population (ILO, 2012). As shown in
Figure 2.1, in Africa alone, financial cooperatives are numerous and surpass other
providers of microfinance services by number of active clients, loans and deposit
accounts - it serve about 20 million active clients in the continent. From Figure 2.1
that shows outreach of microfinance providers by product type in Africa, one can
clearly see that financial cooperatives are competitive in credit provision and excel
other providers in number and saving mobilization.
Compared to conventional banks, the efficiency and success of financial cooperatives
in lending uncollateralized loans rests on a combination of better information about
borrowers, repeated interactions, and their ability to use sanctions against default that
are not available to banks (Banerjee et al., 1994). In most cases, they are established
by people who live in the same communities, so that members know each others
Besides being an incentive to choose recipients of credit with care and to vigilantly monitor its use,
pursuing unlimited liability also was used as a tool to continuously engage members in their cooperative
(Emmons and Mueller, 1997; Guinnane, 2001a).
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habits, characters, abilities and creditworthiness. Having this information about fellow
members, people could impose a wide variety of economic and social sanctions on
one another. Unlike bank clients, members in cooperatives act both as borrowers and
lenders, providing both the demand for and supply of loanable funds. Such dual roles
are the sources of credible incentives for members to monitor each other (Smith et al.,
1981). In other words, the need for continuous access for loans push borrowers to exert
maximum efforts and the fear of losing their saving encourage depositors to be actively
involved in screening potential borrowers and in monitoring those who had received
loans. Equally important is that social sanctions within the community available for
cooperatives in case of defaults by their members (Guinnane, 2001a; Banerjee et al.,
1994).
Despite their ability to overcome information and enforcement problems through cap-
italizing on local information and imposing inexpensive but effective sanctions, finan-
cial cooperatives can be challenging to run. They may entail considerable costs of
ownership, as members should continuously save and commit to helping the institu-
tion operate. As they do not pursue the traditional bank-client relationship, in order
to borrow, members should continuously save. Experience tells us that members often
disappear when they are unable to perpetuate their savings in the cooperative due to
economic reversals. Hence, financial cooperatives can be fragile due to their thin cap-
ital base (i.e., being highly dependent on local resources) and limited options for risk
diversification (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; Adams, 1995). Nonethe-
less, financial cooperatives that strictly follow rules requiring them to keep aside a
fraction of profits as indivisible assets can be resilient to members economic reversals.
The second and most popular institutional form for lending small, uncollateralized
and tailored loans are the specialized or non-bank microfinance institutions9, which
we call non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) throughout this dissertation. Their
roots can be found in many places, but a typical example is the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh and its replicas, which have received considerable attentions over the
last three decades. They emerged during 1980s and spread all over the world with
the premise that the existing lending mechanisms of conventional banks are not pro-
poor or highly constrained by local resources (e.g., financial cooperatives and informal
credit market). They are the dominant models in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe
and Middle East and Northern Africa (Helms, 2006). As of 2010, 3,652 specialized mi-
crofinance institutions reported reaching over 205 million clients worldwide, of which
about 65 percent were among the poorest when they took their first loan (Microcre-
dit Summit Campaign, 2012). In Africa, NBFIs along with NGOs account for above 5
million active microfinance clients and 6 million loans (Figure 2.1).
9 The ownership of the specialized microfinance institutions ranges from informal non-governmental own-
ership to public and private ownership. Here we focus on those microfinance institutions that are share
companies in their legal status, as all microfinance institutions in Ethiopia are shareholder firms.
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Building on the experiences of financial cooperatives, NBFIs opened up with the dis-
covery of joint liability that harnesses social collateral and strengthens and expands
the role of the group in microfinance (Morduch, 1999). Joint liability lending was an
innovation of NBFIs, which enable borrowers to self-select10 on their own and avoid
risky borrowers in their credit group using their local knowledge. Such a mechanism
helps them to overcome ex ante moral hazards at lower costs by inducing borrowers
to monitor each others choice of project to which to apply the borrowed funds and
impose sanctions upon borrowers who have chosen excessively risky projects (Stiglitz,
1990). It can also reduce ex post default risks in the presence of dynamic incentives
(Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). In its strict sense, joint liability lending is a transfer of
default risks from lenders to borrowers.
The success of NBFIs in overcoming information and enforcement costs also rests on
their ability to use progressive lending11 both as screening mechanism and as a tool to
discourage strategic defaults. Starting with very small loans and gradually increasing
loan sizes as borrowers demonstrate reliability enable them to systematically increase
the opportunity cost of non-repayments (Galariotis et al. 2011; Tedeschi, 2005; Besley,
1995). Equally important in the design of NBFIs is to dispense with repayment risks by
using a repayment schedule that starts shortly after the disbursal of the initial short-
term loan and changes the nature of the risk for lenders (Armendáriz de Aghion and
Morduch, 2010).
Besides the loan terms and types of innovations noted above, the fundamental dif-
ferences between the two-microfinance providers considered in this study are their
ownership structure and approach. Financial cooperatives are member-based organi-
zations and saving-led in their approach. In contrast, specialized or non-bank micro-
finance are not member-owned (i.e., often owned either by NGOs, investors or gov-
ernments) and credit precedes saving. The other major differences between financial
cooperatives and NBFIs are the source of loanable funds and its implication on their
ability to overcome the costs of market contracts. Unlike financial cooperatives, which
are self-supporting by their nature and serve large number of depositors (Figure 2.1),
NBFIs are commonly attached to international donor agencies and rely on outside
sources of capital.
Hypothetically, microfinance institutions based on extensive outside financial sources
can be less effective in overcoming ex post moral hazards. For instance, the group can
collude against the lenders by collectively deciding not to repay or to avoid impos-
ing social sanctions on one another (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010). In
10 Despite its imperative in overcoming adverse selections in micro lending, the group mechanism, based
on self-selection or assortative matching emphasizing the need for homogeneity, could be exclusionary
of the poor and less practical in the presence of dynamic incentive mechanisms (Guttman 2008; Montgo-
mary, 1996).
11 See Besley (1995) for a detailed analysis of dynamic incentives mechanisms in the form of progressive
lending that result in high repayment rates in microfinance.
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the case of credit cooperatives, however, the members fear of losing their savings de-
posits (and his/her deposits and the deposits of relatives) mentioned above prevents
or sharply reduce the possibility of conspiring against the cooperative. Moreover, de-
spite its limits on diversification of risks, being confined to small communities places
financial cooperatives at an advantage in terms of capitalizing on borrowers local
knowledge. NBFIs, however, cover wider areas and borrowers have less chance to ob-
serve each others effort level, especially in urban areas where getting to know each
other is imperfect.
The possible distinctions between these two forms of microfinance institutions in
terms of serving the poor while maintaining their financial viability is a topic less
studied, mainly due to a dearth of data. The understanding is that both forms of
microfinance institutions make financial services accessible for a considerable propor-
tion of the poor and female populations in the world. In relative terms, the roles of
NBFIs, in particular, are well recognized by international development organizations
and donor agencies, as they are the big-push behind their revolution. What is less ob-
vious for policy makers is the extent and depth of outreach of financial cooperatives.
Implicit or explicit in much of the policy and academic literature on financial coop-
eratives is the notion that they are meant for unbanked middle-income clients and
have limited outreach only to their members. However, studies by World Bank (2007)
and Lapenu and Zeller (2002) shows that the scale and depth of outreach and pace of
adaptability by financial cooperatives are comparable with NBFIs, and even higher in
some contexts12.
While they may be similar in terms of scale and depth of outreach, so far there is
no comparison of financial cooperatives and specialized non-bank microfinance insti-
tutions in their financial viability and ability of achieving financial sustainability in
serving the poor. Theoretically, financial cooperatives are assumed to be financially
self-sufficient and sustainable, as they largely depend on member savings for lending.
Moreover, they are at an advantage in terms of overcoming costs of market contracts
and constraints (Mershland, 2008). However, this does not mean that financial cooper-
atives are always cost efficient, as they may bear higher ownership costs13 than NBFIs
and are constrained by local resources and limited opportunity for risk diversification
(Hansmann, 1996).
With regard to non-bank microfinance institutions, conventionally, outreach to the
poor is their principal focus - achieving financial viability while serving the poor was
12 Reseau de Caissese Popularies du Burkina in Burkina Faso; Sistema de Cooperativas de Crédito do Brasil
(SICOOP) and SIGREEOI in Brazil; Sanasa network of financial cooperatives in Sir Lanka; and Saving
and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) and Cooperatives Bank of Kenya in Kenya are examples of greater
scale and depth of outreach by financial cooperatives (Turtiainen, 2008; World Bank; 2007).
13 Although ownership costs are intrinsic and cannot be completely neutralized by either of the two organi-
zational forms, ownership costs related to capital efficiency can be higher for financial cooperatives due
to capital lock in and the indivisibility of assets (Mershland, 2008).
2.3 data and summary statistics 29
considered as unattainable, and constitutes an inherent challenge to micro-lending.
Despite potential trade-offs with their traditional social missions, the recent commer-
cialization of non-bank microfinance institutions driven by the need for financial self-
sufficiency results in a greater optimism for this form of microfinance. In order to
reduce such knowledge gaps, this chapter aims at comparing financial cooperatives
and non-bank microfinance institutions in Ethiopia based on their ability of achieving
financial self-sufficiency together with serving the poor.
2.3 data and summary statistics
As described by Cull et al. (2007) and Morduch (1999), in the microfinance industry,
uniformity of products provided by lenders (i.e., lack of variations in contracts, in-
terest rates, loan size, etc.) and homogeneity in institutional structure and size make
it difficult for researchers to systematically assess the effects of products and institu-
tional changes on social and economic outcomes. The data here, which include both
non-bank microfinance institutions and financial cooperatives, however, offer consid-
erable variations in institutional structure, size, loan terms, contractual types, prices
and costs, and risk-mitigating strategies. Such variation enables this study to describe
patterns of institutional change and their effects on financial performance, cost con-
tainment, and depth of outreach.
The study used primary data collected from microfinance providers in Ethiopia be-
tween April and June 201214. After dropping institutions with missing data points,
the data set contain information for 107 microfinance institutions. This includes all
non-bank microfinance institutions in Ethiopia, which are 30 in number, and 77 finan-
cial cooperatives that account for about nine percent of the total number of financial
cooperatives in the country. In the case of financial cooperatives, the data set is not rep-
resentative of all such institutions. The selection of financial cooperatives were mainly
based on the auditing status of the institution, with those selected being those that
were audited during 2011 and have an audit report for 2010. However, most financial
cooperatives are not audited every year due to the limited capacity of the supervisory
authority15. The availability of the audit reports for prior year enables us to get reliable
historical financial data for calculating some of our variables of interest (e.g., average
assets, average equity, average loan outstanding, etc.). In spite of the small proportion
14 The data was collected through structured interviews. The survey was conducted with the financial
and logistical assistance of the European Research Institute on Cooperatives and Social Enterprises (EU-
RICSE), the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the Association of Ethiopian Microfi-
nance Institutions (AEMFIs) and the Federal Cooperative Agency (FCA) of Ethiopia.
15 In Ethiopia, financial cooperatives are audited by the regional cooperative promotion offices, public
bodies organized to promote and supervise cooperatives, or by a person assigned by this office. Without
authorization, they are not allowed to independently arrange auditing services from private auditors
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Proclamation No. 147/1998).
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of financial cooperatives included in our analysis, when combined with the non-bank
microfinance institutions, however, the institutions in the data set serve the majority
of microfinance clients in the country.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics by organizational form on financial performance
indicators, outreach variables and other control covariates used in the analysis for the
microfinance institutions in our data set. On average, the microfinance institutions
considered are marginally financially self-sufficient (i.e., 1.03). However, when it is
disaggregated by organizational form, it is found that NBFIs are not financially self-
sufficient, on average. Financial cooperatives, on the other hand, are able to generate
sufficient revenues to cover their costs, although their return to assets is significantly
lower than that for NBFIs. The possible explanations behind such disparities can be
loan sizes, cost of loans, and loan-loss expenses. The summary statistics at the middle
of Table 2.1 indicates that, on average, financial cooperatives spend less for both per-
sonnel and capital expenditures relative to their assets. The costs of capital and labor
and loan-loss expenses are higher for NBFIs, with the difference with financial cooper-
atives being statistically significantly. Another measure of cost efficiency, cost per unit
of birr16 lent, further indicates that financial cooperatives incur lower costs per unit of
currency lent compared to NBFIs. Besides lower capital and labor costs, this could be
in part due to differences in loan sizes or target markets.
The outreach indicators suggest that NBFIs cater more to poor borrowers relative to
financial cooperatives. On average, NBFIs offer lower loan sizes with short and fre-
quent repayment schedules (suggesting a wider scope of outreach) and serve a higher
proportion of women clients. The difference in loan sizes, however, can be due to dif-
ferences in breadth of outreach and length of client relationships. As shown at the
bottom of Table 2.1, financial cooperatives are characterized by limited breadth, but
have repeated interactions with their borrowers (i.e., longer relation with their mem-
bers, as measured by average number of borrowings). Financial cooperatives in the
sample serve a smaller set of members compared to NBFIs, - 247 to 70,397, respec-
tively. This difference on breadth of outreach is expected, because financial coopera-
tives in Ethiopia are confined to a particular location or communities by their nature.
And their breadth can be further constrained by local resources, as they have limited
sources of capital compared to NBFIs - they heavily rely on members equity and de-
posits for lending. NBFIs, on the other hand, are at an advantage in attracting various
sources of capital and cover wider areas of operations (e.g., regional states).
The summary statistics in Table 2.1 also show statistically significant differences by
organizational form in the interest rates charged. The costs of loans are found to be
considerably higher for NBFIs. On average, they charge 19 percent on a flat basis,
compared to the 9.6 percent interest rates charged by financial cooperatives. This dif-
ference can be due to differences in the costs of loans - the higher the cost of the loans,
16 Birr is a currency of Ethiopia; its exchange rate to US dollar was 17.2941 on December 30, 2011.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics by organizational form.
Indicator
Non-Bank
Financial
Institutions
(NBFIs) (n=30)
Financial
Cooperatives
(n=77)
Significant
Mean
Difference?
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Financial Self-Sufficiency 0.771 0.426 1.133 0.591 Yes
Operational Self-Sufficiency 1.031 0.466 1.372 0.525 Yes
Adjusted Return on Assets 0.121 0.058 0.078 0.052 Yes
Average Loan Size 0.464 0.340 1.135 1.224 Yes
Total number of active borrowers 70,39 149,3 247 600 Yes
Women borrowers, proportion 0.581 0.168 0.395 0.233 Yes
Rural borrowers, proportion 0.493 0.343 0.395 0.479 No
Gross Loan Portfolio 232.8 537.4 1.56 3.27 Yes
Yield (in percent ) 19.01 5.699 9.652 2.295 Yes
Loan to assets 0.733 0.181 0.798 1.018 No
Labor cost to asset 0.067 0.054 0.021 0.031 Yes
Capital cost to asset 0.076 0.076 0.021 0.048 Yes
Cost per unit of birr lent 0.263 0.157 0.099 0.074 Yes
Loan loss reserves over GLP 0.080 0.160 0.035 0.035 Yes
Donation over loan 0.214 0.361 0.077 0.265 Yes
Age of institution 10.8 4.3 11.5 7.4 No
Size of institution 2.6 0.674 1.42 0.637 Yes
Time between payments 1.68 2.36 3.55 4.20 Yes
Number of sources of capital 2.4 0.498 1.85 0.530 Yes
Length of client relationship 5.31 1.94 8.59 4.48 Yes
Individual owned, proportion 0.400 0.498 1.000 0.000 Yes
NGO owned, proportion 0.266 0.449 0.000 0.000 Yes
Amhara region 0.066 0.253 0.363 0.484 Yes
Oromia region 0.066 0.253 0.415 0.496 Yes
Other regions 0.233 0.430 0.064 0.248 Yes
Note: Other regions include Tigray, Benishangul-Gumuz, Dire-Dawa, Gambela, Harari, Somali and South-
ern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNP). They are categorized in a single group due to
small population of microfinance providers in all the regions, with the exception of Tigray and SNNP.
In Tigray and SNNP we have collected data from considerable number of microfinance providers. How-
ever, we consider only NBFIs and drop all financial cooperatives from our sample due to data quality
problems, which had to do with problems in data collection. Note: Addis Ababa is a reference group for
regions.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
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the higher the prices. Besides, the conventional measure of risk-taking (i.e., equity-to-
assets ratio) show that financial cooperatives are less leveraged, indicating lower costs
of capital. They use a higher proportion of their own equities to finance their assets.
NBFIs, on the other hand, are found to be risk-taking in their strategies, as measured
by the extent of loan-loss reserves and equity-to-assets ratio. Moreover, NBFIs rely on
grants for lending - on average 21 percent of their loans come from donations.
In the sample considered, the two providers of microfinance also differ in size (i.e.,
measured in total assets) and equity capital ownership that renders decision-making
powers more diffuse. Financial cooperatives are relatively small in sizes and individ-
ual members own equity capital. NBFIs, on the other hand, are bigger and their equity
capital is owned either by individual investors, NGOs, or regional governments. There
are also cases where ownership equity is contributed by a combination of the three.
Based on ownership of the majority of the shares (i.e., more than 70 percent) NGOs
and regional states owned 27 and 33 percent of the NBFIs surveyed, respectively. Indi-
vidual investors own the remaining 40 percent of NBFIs.
Overall, the sample is reasonably balanced across regional states. 28 percent of the
institutions are in Amhara region, another 32 percent in Oromia region. Institutions
from regions other than Amhara, Oromia, and Addis Ababa comprise 11 percent of
the sample. The remaining 39 percent are from Addis Ababa, where most of NBFIs
and financial cooperatives are located. However, when we disaggregated by organiza-
tional form, the majority of NBFIs are found to be from Addis Ababa and financial
cooperatives from Amhara and Oromia regions.
Figure 2.2 shows that patterns of revenues, prices, and costs vary systematically by
organizational form. As already indicated, despite their access to cheaper financial
capital (e.g., grants and loans on concessional rates), on average NBFIs charge the
highest prices and incur the highest average costs, as measured by Operational Ex-
pense Ratio (OER), which is the ratio of total expenses over total assets. Our measure
of interest rates, however, captures only direct interest charges and we presume that
the price charged could be even higher if we account additional fees charged by NBFIs,
for which we do not have the data. Since costs prevail slightly over the interest rates
charged for NBFIs, significantly lower returns on assets relative to prices results. Fi-
nancial cooperatives, conversely, charge lower interest rates and face lower operational
costs, resulting in higher returns relative to the prices of loans.
These patterns points to cost containment differences between the two groups of
lenders. Costs are higher for NBFIs and results in higher interest rates for their bor-
rowers. On the other hand, costs and interest rate charged by financial cooperatives
are significantly lower and the difference is statistically significant. The possible expla-
nation for this is that, in relative terms, the NBFIs cater for poor and female borrowers,
which entails higher costs than financial cooperatives. In all, the results from the sum-
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Figure 2.2: Return on Assets (ROA), Gross Portfolio Yield (YIELD) and Operation Expense
Ratio (OER), by organizational form.
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mary statistics imply differences in cost-efficiency and target markets between the
NBFIs and financial cooperatives.
2.4 empirical approach
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is used to describe the correlates of prof-
itability, total costs of lending, and outreach of microfinance institutions. It is mainly
used to understand why some microfinance providers are more financially sustain-
able than others and to examine which organizational form is able to achieve financial
self-sufficiency together with serving the poor. The estimated OLS model allow fac-
tors of interest to vary by lender organization type in order to understand the extent
of variation in profitability and cost containment relative to the scope and depth of
outreach by organizational form, which are the primary objective of this chapter. The
reduced-form of the regression model is as follows:
yi = α+ β1xi + β2Di + β3 (xiDi) + f i (·) + ui (2.1)
Where yi is a dependent variable - representing profitability, total cost and outreach
in this chapter - xi is a factor which is allowed to vary by organizational form (e.g., in-
terest rates in the profitability regression and financial self-sufficiency in the outreach-
sustainability regression), Di is organizational dummy and f i (·) is a function that
contains control variables about the history, orientation, ownership and location of
the microfinance providers.
Different specifications are used for correlates of profitability, cost, and outreach. The
first specifications on profitability and total costs are a benchmark regression that
describes the question we raised above - why some microfinance institutions are more
profitable than others - focusing on the role of interest rates, lending expenses, loan
sizes, and organizational form. For the specification of profitability, we use a modified
version of the models employed by Quayes (2012) and Cull et al. (2007), which define
financial self-sufficiency mainly as a function of prices, costs, history, and orientation
of lenders. The empirical profitability function estimated is specified as follows:
FSSi = α+ β1yieldi + β2yieldi × org f ormi + β3capitalcosti + beta4laborcosti+
β5org f ormi + β6historyi + β7orientationi + β8outreachi+
β9regioni + ϵi
(2.2)
FSS represent the financial self-sufficiency ratio of microfinance institution i. It is one
among the profitability indicators used to measure the financial performance of mi-
crofinance institutions. Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) and Return on Assets (ROA)
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are also used as additional measures of profitability. The correlation matrix in Table
A.1 shows that the measures of profitability are interdependent. Their descriptions and
summary statistics are presented in Table 2.1 and Table A.1. The summary statistics
are within the expected ranges, although with a wider range between the maximum
and minimum values. Robust regression methods is used to ensure the robustness of
the results to possible outliers.
yield is a measure of interest rates or the price of loans charged by the microfinance
institution. Yield in this case captures only direct interest rates charged by lenders. It
neither includes additional fees charged nor is adjusted for loan losses. As shown in
Table 2.1, the price of loans largely varies by organizational form. As a result, yield
is allowed to vary by organizational designs. Hence, the coefficient of the interaction
term, β2, shows how the effect of yield varies by organizational type. As NBFIs are
omitted for reference, the difference between β2 and β1 is a yield coefficient for finan-
cial cooperatives. Thus, β1 is the effect of yields on financial self-sufficiency of NBFIs.
capitalcost and labourcost measures the effects of personnel and capital expenditures
relative to assets on the lenders level of financial self-sufficiency. The constructions
and summary statistics of these measures appear in Table A.1 and Table 2.1. Besides
its interaction with yields, the organizational form dummy, org f orm, also enters the
model independently (i.e., org f orm = 1 if the organization is a financial cooperative, 0
otherwise). Note that there is no parallel coefficient for NBFIs, as they are the omitted
category.
The matrix history includes two common measures of organizational backgrounds
- age (measured by number of years since founding) and size (measured by total assets)
of the microfinance institution. The matrix orientation includes variables that describe
the lenders level of risk taking and extent of dependency on grants to sustain lending.
The variables it contains are loan to assets and donation over loan portfolio ratios.
outreach comprises proxy indicators of client or member poverty levels (i.e., average
loan size, percentage of women borrowers) and a variable that measures the length of
outreach based on average length of client relationships with the microfinance institu-
tion. region is a dummy variable for each major regional states and regions that come
under the other regions category, with Addis Ababa as the omitted reference group.
The second benchmark regression relates total cost per unit of currency lent to average
loan sizes of the microfinance institution. Understanding the effect of increasing loan
sizes on cost of loans and how this effect varies across organizational form are the
empirical questions. The regression model correlates the cost of loans with average
loan size and other control variables. It is specified as follows:
TCi = α+ β1loansizei + β2loansizei × org f ormi + β3org f ormi + β4historyi+
β5donationi + β6outreachi ++β7regioni + ϵi
(2.3)
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where TC is total cost of loans of microfinance institution i. It is a ratio of total operat-
ing costs during the period over total amount of loan outstanding. Capital costs and
labor costs are also used as dependent variables. loansize is the average loan size of
lenders (i.e., total loan outstanding divided by total number of active borrowers rela-
tive to regional income per capita). This variable is allowed to vary by organizational
form and the interpretation of the coefficient is similar to that of yield discussed above.
In the results table of the total cost regression that follows, the squared average loan
size is also included to capture potential non-linear effects. donation is the amount of
grants to loans over the gross loan portfolio of the institution. history, outreach and
region matrices are as defined above in the profitability regression.
The main regression model relates outreach and profitability of microfinance institu-
tions in our sample. It analyzes the relationship between depth of outreach and finan-
cial self-sufficiency using a variety of outreach proxy measures as dependent variables.
Can microfinance institution be profitable while serving the poor and which organiza-
tional form is relatively at a better position in balancing the two bottom-lines are the
issues put forward. The specification of the model is as follows:
LSi = α+ β1FSSi + β2FSSi × org f ormi + β3org f ormi + β4agei + β5agei × org f orm+
β6sizei + β7sizei × org f orm+ β8donationi + β9lengthi+
β10ownershipi + β11regioni + ϵi
(2.4)
where LS is average loan size relative to regional income per capita for microfinance
institution i. It is a widely used measure of depth of outreach in the microfinance lit-
erature. As noted above, the study also uses other proxy measures of outreach, which
includes percentage of women borrowers, percentage of rural borrowers, and time
between installment payments as a measure of outreach scope17. FSS is financial self-
sufficiency that measures the ability of a microfinance institution to generate sufficient
revenues to cover its costs. As is clear from the model, FSS vary by organizational
form in order to understand differences by organizational form in achieving financial
viability together with outreach to the poor. Thus, the coefficient of the interaction
term, β2, shows how the effect of FSS varies by organizational types. As NBFIs are
17 Scope of outreach measures the number of types of financial contracts provided by microfinance insti-
tutions. It includes both contracts between products (i.e., loan and saving) and within products (i.e.,
individual and group contracts), Schreiner, M. (2002). We measure scope based on loan repayment terms
for two reasons. One, as all microfinance institution in our sample provide both loan and saving services
and individual and group contracts and therefore no variability to systematically distinguish the effects
of types of products on financial performance. Two, the frequency of repayment schedules can matter
most if microfinance institutions are concerned with the welfare of their clients. While it inculcate fiscal
disciplines for better repayment behavior, for borrowers engaged in seasonal activities and variable in-
come, more frequent repayment schedules can result in over-borrowing, sale of productive assets and
failure to smooth consumption (Fischer and Ghatak, 2009).
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the omitted category, the difference between β2 and β1 is a FSS coefficient for finan-
cial cooperatives. β1 is therefore the effect of financial self-sufficiency on outreach of
NBFIs.
The interaction coefficients β5 and β7 shows how the effects on outreach of age and
institutional size vary across organizational forms. The coefficient vectors β4 and β6,
on the other hand, summarize the effects of age and institutional size on outreach for
NBFIs. The variable donation and length measures the amount of grants received to
loans and the average length of client relations with the microfinance institution, re-
spectively. ownership is a matrix of dummy variables for individual- and NGO-owned
microfinance institutions, with government-owned institutions as the omitted cate-
gory. region is a matrix of regional dummies as defined in the preceding models.
2.5 estimation results and discussions
2.5.1 Financial performance
The summary statistics in the preceding sections shows that the financial performance
of the microfinance institutions in the sample considered is encouraging. It indicates
that over half of the institutions are profitable and, on average, all are financially self-
sufficient - that is, they generate sufficient revenues to cover costs. However, patterns
of financial viability vary considerably when the sample is disaggregated by organiza-
tional form. The level of financial viability turns out to be below the cost-covering line
for NBFIs, indicating that NBFIs, on average, are not financially self-sufficient. In con-
trast, financial cooperatives remain financially viable after disaggregation. This section
further analyze the correlates of profitability with a greater emphasis on prices and
costs of loans charged and incurred by microfinance lenders and their varying effects
on profitability by organizational form.
Table 2.2 summarizes the results from the estimation given under equation (2.2), which
examines the relationship between profitability and interest rate charged. The results
show a strong association between interest rates and levels of financial performance,
with varying effects across types of institutions. For NBFIs, the coefficient for gross
portfolio yield is positive and statistically significant across all measures of profitabil-
ity used in this study (i.e., financial self-sufficiency, operational self-sufficiency, and
return on assets). It indicates that specialized microfinance institutions tend to be
more profitable when their average interest rate is higher.
Conversely, the results for financial cooperatives show that raising interest rates re-
sults in reduced financial performance, which rejects the hypothesis that claims sim-
ilar effects of interest rates on financial performance across microfinance institutions
form of ownership. The coefficients of financial cooperatives are negative and signif-
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icant across all profitability indicators, signifying that increasing interest rates does
not necessarily result in improved financial performance for these institutions. This
result remain the same after we sum the coefficients for yield and yield interactions,
which further marked an inverse and significant relationship between interest rates
and profitability for financial cooperatives, even after controlling for costs and depth
of outreach. This result can be because well-functioning cooperatives18 have less in-
centive to increase returns, as their motive is, in principle, not profit maximization.
As noted above, the study also looks at the effect of costs on financial performance
in the same model. The results show that higher capital costs are associated with re-
duced financial performance in two of our profitability indicators. The capital cost
coefficient is negative and significant, which suggests that containing those costs (i.e.,
rent, transportation, depreciation, etc.) is a key to the profitability of microfinance
providers. Labor costs also tend to be inversely and strongly related with profitabil-
ity in our specifications of financial and operational self-sufficiency - its coefficient is
negative and statistically significant. In a similar way, this result suggests that contain-
ing labor costs is associated with improved financial performance. In particular, an
unreported specification that allowed the effects of capital and labor costs to vary by
organizational form exclusively showed that containing labor cost and capital costs
are key to improved financial performance among financial cooperatives and NBFIs,
respectively. Overall, the coefficients on the cost indicators suggest that cost efficiency
or cost containment play a crucial role in determining the profitability of microfinance
providers.
After permitting the effects of interest rates to vary by organizational form, the finan-
cial cooperatives dummy introduced independently also explains additional variation
in financial performance. Across all measures of profitability, the coefficient for the
financial cooperatives dummy is positive and statistically significant. Indicating that
in terms of financial performance, microfinance providers that are member owned
outperform the specialized NBFIs.
Age of the institution, the variable that controls for experience, is negatively associ-
ated with financial performance. Older microfinance providers were expected to be
more profitable, as they can develop efficiency through experience. However, the alter-
native hypothesis that holds in this case is also plausible, as more recently established
microfinance providers could also learn from the existing knowledge accumulated
by their antecedents at lower costs. Moreover, costs of older microfinance institutions
can also rise as they try to reach beyond their initial target clients to those that are
more isolated and difficult to reach - the correlation matrix indicates that breadth in-
creases with age (Table A.1). Size of institutions, a control for scales of operation, is
significantly positively linked with financial performance. It suggests that large mi-
18 Our presumption with regard to this inverse relationship between profitability and yield is that financial
cooperatives strive for higher interest rates while they are poorly performing and vies versa.
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Table 2.2: Gross portfolio yield and financial performance.
Indicator Financial
self-
sufficiency
(FSS)
Operational
self-
sufficiency
(OSS)
Return on
Asset
(ROA)
Yield 0.027
(2.49)**
0.024
(2.00)**
0.007
(7.50)***
Yield (coops) -0.090
(3.16)***
-0.069
(2.38)**
-0.008
(1.83)*
Capital cost to assets ratio -1.806
(1.88)*
-1.857
(2.73)***
0.105
(1.20)
Labor cost to assets ratio -4.186
(3.17)***
-4.656
(4.09)***
0.179
(1.71)*
Financial coops dummy 0.955
(2.65)***
0.810
(2.17)**
0.088
(2.13)**
Age of the institution -0.027
(2.11)**
-0.025
(2.44)**
-0.002
(1.68)*
Institution size (in total asset) 0.211
(1.93)*
0.173
(1.91)*
0.016
(1.42)
Loan to assets ratio 0.166
(2.86)***
0.165
(3.53)***
0.014
(3.20)***
Donation over loan -0.076
(0.49)
-0.008
(0.08)
-0.007
(0.58)
Average loan size 0.050
(1.10)
0.021
(0.71)
0.000
(0.08)
% of women borrowers 0.512
(1.84)*
0.619
(2.53)**
0.010
(0.38)
Length of client relationships 0.050
(2.47)**
0.057
(4.06)***
0.005
(2.55)**
Amhara region 0.895
(5.97)***
0.607
(5.08)***
0.039
(2.61)**
Oromia region 0.418
(2.75)***
0.214
(2.00)**
0.047
(2.93)***
Other regions 0.189
(1.10)
0.173
(1.46)
0.008
(0.40)
Constant -0.395
(1.02)
-0.043
(0.12)
-0.101
(2.97)***
R-squared 0.51 0.52 0.47
Number of obs. 107 107 107
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%. Capital cost is the sum
of rent and transportation expenses and depreciation.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
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crofinance institutions are more profitable, as they benefit from economies of scale or
from the potential intensity of larger assets over a larger client base with diverse risks.
Controls for depth of outreach indicate mixed results. Average loan size is positively
linked with financial performance (although not significant so), suggesting smaller
loans are, on average, less profitable. Serving more women tend to be linked with
improved financial performance. The coefficient of percentage of women borrowers is
positive and statistically significant in the first two measures of profitability. Length of
outreach, among the six aspects of outreach proposed by Schreiner (2002), is also pos-
itively associated with financial performance. Microfinance providers with longer and
repeated client relationships are more profitable than those offering one time or less
repetitive loans. The regional dummy variables at the bottom of Table 2.2 also explain
some variation in financial performance. The results show that microfinance providers
operating in Amhara and Oromia regions do better than microfinance providers oper-
ating in Addis Ababa and other regions19 in terms of financial self-sufficiency, opera-
tional self-sufficiency, and return on assets.
The results summarized in Table 2.3 further extend the analysis of interest rates and
profitability indicated above to examine the implications of high enough interest rates
on financial performance. Charging exorbitant interest rates by microfinance providers
to offset higher costs of information and enforcement is not uncommon. Based on
agency theory, our hypothesis is that charging very high interest rates above a cer-
tain threshold could result in problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. This
is because of possible low repayment rates and less demand for expensive loans. Hy-
pothetically, high interest rates drive worthy borrowers out of the market and only
risky borrowers would find it in their interest to borrow, which in turn may results in
low repayment rates and profitability (Morduch, 1999). The relationship with demand
is straightforward - high interest rates can reduce demand, as it crowd out safe bor-
rowers (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; Stiglitz, 1990). If these assertions
are true, microfinance providers in our sample charging comparatively higher interest
rates should experience lower financial performance.
The implications of relatively high interest rates on financial performance is examined
by including the quadratic term of gross portfolio yield in our profitability specifica-
tion given under equation (2.2). The association between the squared portfolio yield
and profitability is also allowed to vary by organizational form, as was done in the pre-
vious estimation. As shown in Table 2.3, for NBFIs, the relationship between interest
rates and financial performance follows the hypothetical predictions. Both the linear
19 We presume that the financial performance of some of the microfinance institution under the Other
regions category might be undermined by other microfinance institutions in the group. For instance, if
we consider individual microfinance specific statistics, one of the microfinance institution surveyed from
Tigray Region (which is placed in the Other regions category) is among one of the best microfinance
providers in Ethiopia.
2.5 estimation results and discussions 41
yield and quadratic yield coefficients are statistically significant across the two mea-
sures of profitability, with positive and negative signs, respectively. This indicates that
financial and operational self-sufficiency for NBFIs increases with portfolio yield, but
only up to a certain point at which the negative quadratic yield coefficient outweigh
the positive linear yield coefficient. Figure 2.3-(a) shows the pattern of this relationship
between interest rates and financial self-sufficiency for NBFIs based on the estimation
from Table 2.3, column 1. Consistent with theoretical predictions, levels of financial
self-sufficiency increase with yield up to a point and, as interest rates exceed about 25
percent per annum, the curve start trending down20.
For financial cooperatives, the coefficients for linear yield and quadratic yields are
the opposite sign of those for NBFIs. Similar to the results of the base regression, the
linear portfolio yield coefficient is negative and significant before and after summing
the yield and yield interaction coefficient, signifying an inverse relationship between
interest rates and financial performance. However, the hypothesis that associates rel-
atively high interest rates with lower financial performance for financial cooperatives
cannot be rejected, since the quadratic yield coefficient is not statistically significant
(although it is positive). In all, as far as financial cooperatives are concerned, any rela-
tive increase of interest rates have a decreasing effect on financial performance. Figure
2.3-(b) shows the pattern of this relationship between interest rates and financial self-
sufficiency for financial cooperatives based on the estimation from Table 2.3, column
1.
In summary, the results from the specification that permits for non-linear effects of
interest rates on financial performance (Table 2.3) suggest a negative association be-
tween financial performance and relatively higher interest rates. NBFIs that charge
higher interest rates above the threshold are less profitable than those who charge
relatively lower rates. For financial cooperatives, on the other hand, charging lower
interest rates tends to be strongly linked with improved financial performance. The
signs and levels of significance of other cost and outreach control variables remain
similar to the base profitability regression.
The profitability analysis in this section is further extended to examine the implica-
tions of cost of loans on financial performance. As indicated above, the higher interest
rates charged by microfinance providers often are ascribed to the high lending costs
associated with small loans. Based on the results of the base profitability regression
and theoretical predictions, here the study put forward cost reduction as an alternative
solution to achieve improved profitability in microfinance service provision. Microfi-
nance institutions that are able to dispense with information and enforcement costs
through cost reduction mechanisms can at the same time overcome loss of demand
and repayment problems that might arise from the prescription of higher interest
20 This can be due to higher costs correspond with charging higher interest rates, as recently found by
Roberts (2013) among for-profit microfinance institutions.
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Table 2.3: Gross portfolio yield and financial performance: allowing non-linear effect of interest
rates.
Indicator FSS OSS ROA
Yield 0.109
(2.27)**
0.143
(2.98)***
0.013
(2.37)**
Yield squared -0.002
(1.93)*
-0.003
(2.81)***
-0.001
(1.18)
Yield (coops) -0.299
(1.71)*
-0.342
(2.00)**
-0.028
(1.11)
Yield (coops) squared 0.008
(1.01)
0.010
(1.33)
0.001
(0.78)
Capital cost to assets ratio -1.716
(1.73)*
-1.730
(2.54)**
0.113
(1.27)
Labor cost to assets ratio -4.175
(3.05)***
-4.665
(3.92)***
0.186
(1.71)*
Financial coops dummy 2.412
(2.35)**
2.771
(2.70)***
0.222
(1.48)
Age of the institution -0.030
(2.24)**
-0.028
(2.80)***
-0.003
(1.72)*
Institution size (in total asset) 0.213
(1.93)*
0.174
(1.88)*
0.017
(1.49)
Loan to assets ratio 0.147
(2.43)**
0.142
(2.93)***
0.012
(2.19)**
Donation over loan -0.081
(0.53)
-0.017
(0.16)
0.001
(0.29)
Average loan size 0.060
(1.29)
0.034
(1.06)
0.012
(0.49)
% of women borrowers 0.544
(1.90)*
0.663
(2.60)**
-0.006
(0.56)
Length of client relationships 0.050
(2.42)**
0.058
(4.07)***
0.005
(2.50)**
Amhara region 0.903
(5.78)***
0.616
(5.14)***
0.040
(2.67)***
Oromia region 0.434
(2.70)***
0.233
(2.11)**
0.049
(2.98)***
Other regions 0.218
(1.25)
0.218
(1.87)*
0.010
(0.47)
Constant -1.238
(1.88)*
-1.260
(2.08)**
-0.160
(2.59)**
R-squared 0.52 0.54 0.48
Number of obs. 107 107 107
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%. Capital cost is the sum
of rent and transportation expenses and depreciation.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
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Note: Both of the graphs are from specification 1 of Table 2.3.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
Figure 2.3: Predicted trade-off between financial self-sufficiency and gross portfolio yield, by
organizational form.
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rates. If this conjecture is true, microfinance providers in the sample that contained
their costs of lending should be more profitable than others.
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Table 2.4: Cost per unit of currency lent and financial performance.
Indicator Total
costs/GLP
Capital
costs/GLP
Labor
costs/GLP
Financial self-sufficiency -0.276
(5.13)***
-0.133
(3.52)***
-0.127
(3.51)***
Financial self-sufficiency (coops) 0.273
(4.66)***
0.118
(2.74)***
0.097
(2.62)**
Financial coops dummy -0.408
(7.05)***
-0.181
(2.97)***
-0.164
(3.60)***
Age of the institution -0.001
(0.29)
0.003
(1.72)*
-0.003
(2.43)**
Institutional size (in total assets) -0.023
(1.14)
-0.018
(0.91)
-0.007
(0.46)
Average loan size indicator -0.008
(0.82)
-0.008
(1.43)
-0.003
(0.50)
% of women borrowers -0.001
(0.02)
-0.014
(0.46)
-0.002
(0.08)
% of rural borrowers -0.023
(0.95)
-0.012
(0.71)
-0.013
(1.03)
Donation over loan portfolio 0.001
(0.03)
-0.016
(0.87)
0.017
(0.91)
Length of client relationships 0.002
(0.64)
-0.003
(1.37)
0.004
(2.46)**
Amhara region -0.023
(0.79)
-0.009
(0.39)
0.030
(1.44)
Oromia region 0.023
(0.89)
0.010
(0.50)
0.010
(0.75)
Other regions -0.024
(1.01)
-0.032
(1.64)
0.005
(0.26)
Constant 0.553
(6.87)***
0.268
(3.01)***
0.227
(3.88)***
R-squared 0.67 0.46 0.51
Number of obs. 107 107 107
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
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For NBFIs, the estimated coefficient for financial self-sufficiency (our measure of fi-
nancial performance) clearly suggests that cost containment is strongly related to
improved financial performance. The results in Table 2.4 show that financially self-
sufficient NBFIs are estimated to have 28 percent lower costs per unit of currency lent
than others within the same group that are not financially self-sufficient. Although
less in magnitude, when FSS and FSS interaction coefficients are summed, the ef-
fects of costs of loans on financial performance is also negative and significant for
financial cooperatives, indicating that cost containment results in profitability. Self-
sufficient financial cooperatives are estimated to have 0.3 percent21 lower costs per
unit of currency lent than financial cooperatives that are not financially viable. More-
over, the financial cooperative dummy indicates that, as a whole, cooperative lenders
outperformed NBFIs in cost reduction22. Financial cooperative are estimated to have
41 percent lower costs per unit of currency lent compared to NBFIs, with the difference
being statistically significant.
Experience measured in terms of age of the institution has effects on capital cost and
labor costs of similar magnitude, which offset its effect on total cost of loans. More
experienced microfinance providers in the sample tend to reduce labor costs, but face
higher capital costs per unit of currency lent. The coefficient for size suggests that large
asset bases can reduce costs of lending (although insignificant). While the coefficient
signs hints that deeper of outreach can entail higher costs, neither of the outreach
indicators and controls for microfinance location are significantly linked to cost of
loans.
2.5.2 Outreach
Outreach is the customary matrix used to measure microfinance social performance
and includes breadth, depth, scope and length of lenders product (Schreiner, 2002).
The breadth of microfinance providers in the sample is encouraging. On average, each
microfinance provider extends services to about 19,915 individual borrowers. How-
ever, when disaggregated by organizational type, the coverage of NBFIs is show to
be much wider. Each of the NBFIs on average extends financial services for about
70,397 individuals23, while financial cooperatives are very limited in their breadth of
outreach - on average they serve about 247 individuals. This, however, does not mean
21 The small percentage is due to lower cost difference among financial cooperatives.
22 This result is consistent with prior work by Mersland (2008) and theoretical predictions. While cost
of ownership can be higher, cooperatives are effective in mitigating the cost of market constraints or
contracts (Hansmann, 1996). Such mitigation of market costs is highly relevant for the issue at hand,
since MFIs in Ethiopia operate in an inefficient financial market.
23 It should be noted that this figure on average breadth of NBFIs is influenced by three to four big microfi-
nance institutions that are partly owned by regional public bodies. The median size of active borrowers
is rather 10,592 and there are NBFIs with less than 200 active borrowers.
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that the coverage of financial cooperatives is very tiny in the country as a whole. As
they are very large in number (i.e., above 7,000), the number of individuals served by
financial cooperatives in total is comparable to that of the NBFIs clients.
From the descriptive statistics, it was evident that NBFIs do better than financial co-
operatives in terms of depth of outreach, as measured by average loan sizes and per-
centage of women borrowers. Woman borrowers constitute 58 percent of NBFIs total
clients, and, on average, their average loan size is small at 46 percent of the regional
income per capita. Financial cooperatives, on the other hand, extend loan with aver-
age sizes equivalent to the regional income per capita, and their female borrowers
account for only 40 percent of their total members. However, financial cooperatives
are in better position in terms of length of outreach. On average, they have more than
eight years of a repeated borrowing relationship with their members, compared to
five years of average client relationship in the case of NBFIs. Overall, microfinance
providers in our sample extend a loan size equals to 95 percent of regional income per
capita and female borrowers account 45 percent of their total clients/members.
This section look into the implications of depth of outreach (measured in terms of av-
erage loan size per regional income per capita) on cost of lending. Understanding the
extent to which lowering loan sizes to the needs of the poor reduces financial viability
by increasing average costs is the issue examined at this point (i.e., the cost - loan size
trade-off). Table 2.5 presents estimated coefficients from a regression that correlates
the total cost per unit of currency lent to average loan sizes of microfinance providers
in the sample (equation 2.3). It also includes quadratic average loan size to capture
non-linear effects and allow loan size indicators to vary by organizational form. For
the interpretation of the results that follows, the estimates reported on column (2) of
Table 2.5 are mainly used.
While the magnitude varies across organizational form, the estimated coefficient for
average loan size indicates that large loan sizes are associated with lower average costs,
but only up to a certain point. For NBFIs, the linear and quadratic loan size coefficients
are negative and positive, respectively, with statistical significance. As shown in Table
2.5 column (2) and Figure 2.4, for NBFIs, relatively larger loan sizes are estimated
to have 43 percent average lower costs per unit of currency lent up to a loan sizes
equivalent to regional income per capita. Loan sizes above the regional income per
capita are estimated to have 21 percent average higher costs per unit of currency lent.
When the linear and quadratic terms are summed up, the effect of loan sizes on loan
costs turns out to be the same for financial cooperatives as for NBFIs, but it is much
smaller in magnitude. However, the organizational dummy introduced independently
indicates that financial cooperatives perform well in cost containment, even after con-
trolling for average loan sizes. The estimated coefficient suggests that microfinance
providers in our sample that are financial cooperatives have a 33 percent average
lower costs per unit of currency lent compared to NBFIs.
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Table 2.5: Average loan size and cost per unit of currency lent.
Indicator
Total costs/GLP Capital costs/GLP Labor costs/GLP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average loan size -0.113
(2.12)**
-0.433
(2.33)**
-0.079
(2.10)**
-0.360
(3.23)***
-0.066
(2.39)**
-0.074
(0.68)
Average loan size
square
- 0.213
(1.93)*
- 0.188
(2.50)**
- 0.004
(0.06)
Average loan size
(coops)
0.115
(2.09)**
0.409
(2.22)**
0.076
(1.92)*
0.346
(3.07)***
0.067
(2.23)**
0.054
(0.49)
Average loan size
square (coops)
- -0.210
(1.91)*
- -0.187
(2.49)**
- -0.001
(0.02)
Financial coops
dummy
-0.273
(4.55)***
-0.326
(4.39)***
-0.141
(2.92)***
-0.198
(3.36)***
-0.138
(3.28)***
-0.120
(2.52)**
Age of the
institution
-0.002
(0.60)
-0.002
(0.73)
0.003
(1.57)
0.002
(1.39)
-0.003
(2.03)**
-0.003
(2.01)**
Institutional size (in
total assets)
-0.064
(2.52)**
-0.055
(2.18)**
-0.040
(1.70)*
-0.034
(1.45)
-0.031
(1.93)*
-0.028
(1.75)*
% of women
borrowers
0.070
(1.31)
0.063
(1.16)
0.008
(0.24)
0.004
(0.10)
0.008
(0.29)
0.006
(0.22)
% of rural borrowers -0.035
(1.33)
-0.044
(1.45)
-0.018
(1.08)
-0.022
(1.13)
-0.018
(1.21)
-0.025
(1.62)
Donation over loan
portfolio
-0.022
(0.72)
-0.026
(0.81)
-0.025
(1.06)
-0.027
(1.12)
0.012
(0.57)
0.010
(0.47)
Length of client
relationships
0.001
(0.37)
0.002
(0.45)
-0.004
(1.68)*
-0.004
(1.60)
0.003
(1.52)
0.003
(1.49)
Amhara region -0.060
(2.01)**
-0.059
(1.97)*
-0.036
(1.50)
-0.032
(1.46)
-0.007
(0.46)
-0.012
(0.70)
Oromia region -0.003
(0.08)
0.004
(0.13)
-0.004
(0.15)
0.003
(0.13)
-0.007
(0.48)
-0.008
(0.52)
Other regions -0.008
(0.23)
0.005
(0.13)
-0.027
(1.47)
-0.017
(0.97)
0.006
(0.27)
0.009
(0.36)
Constant 0.480
(5.22)***
0.545
(5.55)***
0.258
(3.00)***
0.314
(3.36)***
0.230
(3.81)***
0.233
(3.88)***
R-squared 0.52 0.54 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.41
Number of obs. 107 107 107 107 107 107
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%. Capital cost includes
rent, transportation and depreciation (i.e., all administrative costs, except personnel costs).
Labor cost includes all expense for personnel (i.e., salary, plus per diem).
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
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Note: The graph is from specification 2 of Table 2.4.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
Figure 2.4: Predicted trade-off between costs per unit of currency lent and average loan size
for non-bank financial institutions in Ethiopia.
50 financial sustainability and outreach of mfis in ethiopia
2.5.3 Outreach and financial performance: is there a trade-off?
The outreach to financial performance trade-off is an issue that has received atten-
tion from all observers (including policy makers) who are concerned about the social
performance of microfinance providers. The concern largely emanates from proposi-
tion that asserts that focus on financial performance can crowd out the small loans
demanded by the poor, as they are costly to service. Recently, the issue become more
pressing following the growing commercialization, competition, and regulation in the
microfinance industry that affected the way microfinance institutions do business and
resulted in a shift in performance assessment criteria (Rhyne and Otero, 2006; Christen,
2001). Traditionally, the development impact of microfinance providers was assessed
based on outreach as measured by breadth or depth (e.g., loan size, fraction of women
to total clients, etc.). Institutions were considered successful if they expanded outreach
to the poor (Robinson 2001; Yaron et al., 1997).
Currently, however, expanding outreach per se does not mean triumph over poverty.
To be considered successful, a microfinance institution should provide durable and
pro-poor financial services on a cost-covering basis. The later criterion opens the new
debates mentioned above on the potential compatibility or trade-off of the two bottom-
lines - outreach and financial sustainability. As noted before, there are few systematic
empirical works that examine the trade-off of outreach to the poor and financial sus-
tainability and the evidence that has been developed is mixed (Bassem, 2012; Haremes
et al., 2011; Quayes, 2011; Cull et al., 2007). This section further investigates this issue to
understand possible varying effects of outreach to the poor on financial performance
by organizational form.
Table 2.6 summarizes the results on the outreach to financial performance trade-off
estimated following equation (2.4), which associates financial self-sufficiency with var-
ious measures of outreach to the poor. While the unreported specification for the
whole sample and the simple correlation shows that outreach is not significantly asso-
ciated with financial self-sufficiency24, varying and strong evidences emerged when
the estimation is allowed to vary by organization form.
As shown in column 1 of Table 2.6, the coefficient for financial self-sufficiency cor-
responding to NBFIs is positive and statistically significant for the average loan size
variable, indicating that NBFIs that are financially self-sufficient are those that extend
relatively large size loans. The negative and significant coefficient for women borrow-
ers in column 2 of Table 2.6 also suggests that NBFIs that are self-sufficient are less
focused on women borrowers. Moreover, NBFIs that are financially sustainable tend to
provide loans with limited scope of outreach - they offer loans with relatively extended
24 The estimated coefficient for financial self-sufficiency in the specification that does not control for organi-
zational design is negative but statistically insignificant, indicating no evidence of a relationship between
financial performance and outreach to the poor.
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installment periods that are less demanded by poor clients25. In all, the coefficients for
NBFIs across the measures of outreach marked the presence of trade-off between fi-
nancial self-sufficiency and outreach to the poor. In other words, the result suggests
that NBFIs lend small size loans and serve more women borrowers face higher costs
that eventually affect their financial viability.
On the other hand, the coefficients of financial self-sufficiency for financial coopera-
tives turn out to have the opposite signs to those for NBFIs in all measures of outreach.
The estimated coefficient for financial self-sufficiency for average loan size is negative
and statistically significant, indicating a positive complementary relationship between
outreach to the poor and financial viability. While financial cooperatives overall did
not cater more to women borrowers compared to NBFIs, the positive and significant
coefficient for percentage of woman borrowers both before and after summing with
the interaction term concurrently marked a harmony between outreach and financial
self-sufficiency for cooperatives that are financially self-sufficient. It indicates that fi-
nancially self-sufficient cooperatives serve higher fractions of women borrowers as
compared to their counter-parts, implying greater depth of outreach along with fi-
nancial sustainability. These results are also found to be insensitive for the samples
considered (i.e., comparable results are found after omitting the four major semipub-
lic NBFIs) (Table A.10).
As shown in the last column of Table 2.6, time between loan repayment schedule is pos-
itively linked with financial performance for both NBFIs and cooperative lenders that
are financially self-sufficient (although less in magnitude and marginally insignificant
for financial cooperatives). This results show that less frequent repayment schedules
results in improved financial performance. This can be due to reduction of transaction
costs. However, the welfare consequences of less frequent repayment schedules for
borrowers are not clear cut. On the one side, given the presumed liquidity constraints
of the typical microfinance clients, less frequent repayment can be pro-poor (wider in
scope of outreach), as it does not require borrowers to have smooth income through-
out the period. On the other side, more frequent loan repayment schedules can reduce
the burden of one lump sum repayment for borrowers and therefore reduce potential
defaults and delinquencies by inculcating fiscal disciplines. If the first conjecture is
true, financial cooperatives are better in scope of outreach, as they provide loan terms
with extended time between installments compared to NBFIs and vice versa.
Besides the commonly accepted measures of outreach, the study estimated the effect
of catering to rural borrowers on financial performance, as serving the rural poor
may involve additional costs. However, the results in column 3 of Table 2.6 show that
percentage of rural borrowers is not significantly linked with financial self-sufficiency,
irrespective of organizational form. What the study found is that, as compared to
25 The assumption is that loans with an extended repayment schedule are in the interest of better-off clients.
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Table 2.6: Outreach and financial performance.
Indicator Average
loan size
over GNP
per capita
Percentage
of women
borrowers
Percentage
of rural
borrowers
Time
between
install-
ment
Financial self-sufficiency 0.514
(2.28)**
-0.245
(2.39)**
-0.025
(0.16)
3.800
(2.64)***
Financial self-sufficiency (coops) -0.628
(1.99)**
0.320
(2.90)***
0.028
(0.16)
-2.582
(1.55)
Financial coops -0.648
(1.44)
-0.665
(6.40)***
0.638
(2.42)**
4.570
(2.91)***
Age of the institution -0.014
(0.51)
-0.002
(0.32)
0.049
(3.81)***
0.189
(2.18)**
Age (coops) 0.076
(1.68)*
0.006
(0.62)
-0.054
(3.26)***
-0.124
(0.91)
Institutional size 0.092
(0.58)
-0.062
(0.99)
-0.175
(1.64)
-1.632
(2.51)**
Institutional size (coops) 0.664
(2.46)**
0.100
(1.29)
-0.108
(0.76)
0.268
(0.21)
Length of client relationship -0.048
(1.04)
-0.003
(0.27)
-0.005
(0.29)
-0.400
(2.57)**
Donation over loan portfolio 0.098
(0.49)
0.234
(3.76)***
-0.022
(0.14)
0.590
(0.41)
Number of source of capital -0.532
(2.59)**
0.118
(3.02)***
0.116
(1.27)
0.463
(0.60)
Individual/investor owned -0.022
(0.11)
0.057
(0.75)
-0.077
(0.69)
-1.565
(2.03)**
NGO owned -0.087
(0.40)
0.013
(0.15)
0.345
(2.31)**
-1.664
(1.60)
Constant 1.514
(2.79)***
0.611
(4.19)***
0.133
(0.42)
2.894
(1.64)
R-squared 0.46 0.43 0.30 0.31
Number of obs. 107 107 107 107
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
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NBFIs client compositions by territory, a considerable proportion of clients served by
financial cooperatives are from rural areas.
Additional trends that vary by organizational form also emerged from the controls
of experience and scale. For NBFIs, no new evidence is found on the relationship
between experience and institutional size on outreach indicators, with the exceptions
of positive effects of age and size on the proportion of rural borrowers and scope of
outreach, respectively. The significant positive coefficient for age and institutional size
before and after summing up with respective interaction terms in the specification
of average loan size indicates that experienced and large financial cooperatives do
relatively poorly in outreach - large and experienced financial cooperatives have larger
average loan sizes (Table 2.6). In this case, progressive lending, increasing loan sizes
based on repayment records and with passage of time, can be at play. However, with
the cross-sectional data at hand the effects of progressive lending and possible shifts
in the composition of new members on average loan sizes as the institutions grow
older, a phenomenon which is common in microfinance, cannot be identified.
The results on other variables accounted for in the specification are consistent with
our predictions. On women borrowers, the positive and statistically significant coef-
ficient of donation over loan portfolio indicates that donated microfinance providers
in our sample tend to cater more to women borrowers. Their proportions of women
borrowers are 23 percent higher than those of self-standing microfinance institutions.
NGO-owned microfinance institutions, on the other hand, cater more to rural clients
as compared to investor- and government-owned institutions. Furthermore, the sig-
nificant negative and positive coefficient for the number of sources of capital in the
specification of average loan size and percentage of women borrowers, respectively,
suggests that microfinance providers with diversified sources of capital tend to focus
on poor and women borrowers.
Overall, the evidence that emerged in this section clearly shows varying relationships
between outreach to the poor and financial performance by organizational form. Af-
ter controlling for experience and scale of operation, NBFIs that are financially self-
sufficient perform poorly in outreach to the poor, signifying a tension between out-
reach and financial performance. In contrast, financially self-sufficient cooperatives
perform well and are able to balance or achieve their dual objectives. The results show
a positive complementary relationship between outreach and financial self-sufficiency
for financial cooperatives. These results significantly mark the crucial role of orga-
nizational form in microfinance delivery. Specifically, it indicates that organizational
form (with their differences in cost containment) matters most towards fulfilling the
full promise of microfinance and achieving the double bottom-lines - serving the poor
with financial sustainability.
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2.6 conclusions
From the early 19th century to the present, microfinance institutions have evolved
as providers of customized financial services to the needy excluded by conventional
banks. Through their innovative institutional arrangements and contract terms, they
have overcome the high costs of market contracts and achieved high loan repayment
rates, even in places where credit markets are inefficient. Financial cooperatives and
non-bank microfinance institutions are typical models that disprove the traditional as-
sumption that the poor are neither creditworthy nor able to save. They largely demon-
strate that the poor can be bankable - the poor can borrow, pay substantial rates of
interest, and save continuously. Nonetheless, their efforts used often to be backed by
substantial subsidies in recognition of the costs involved in micro lending and their
poverty focus. Providing financial services to the poor on cost-covering basis is a chal-
lenge that remains for most microfinance institutions.
Recently, however, growing commercialization and competition in the microfinance
industry has driven a shift from reliance on subsidies to achieving financial sustain-
ability - a goal that can be in conflict with outreach, as it requires the ability to cover
costs out of the income generated, while serving the poor. The relevant policy question
is, thus, whether and to what extent shifting the focus towards achieving financial self-
sufficiency has impinged on outreach to the poor. Outreach and financial sustainabil-
ity can be either complementary if the focus on financial viability attracts commercial
funds, which at the same time contributes to expand outreach. Or it can be conflicting
if it crowds out small loans that are often demanded by the poor, as they are costly to
service.
Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression that allows variables of interests to vary
by organizational forms on data disaggregated by types of microfinance providers in
Ethiopia, this study analyzed the implication of the pursuit for financial viability on
outreach and the role of microfinance ownership or organizational form. It specifically
compare financial cooperatives and NBFIs in their outreach and financial performance,
and address whether and to what extent these two forms of organization vary in their
ability to achieve financial self-sufficiency together with outreach to the poor. The
study used a census of all NBFIs and a selection of financial cooperatives based on
their audit status.
The results obtained from the analysis show that the effects of interest rates, poten-
tial compatibility or trade-off between outreach and financial sustainability, and cost-
efficiency largely depends on organizational form. It shows that the NBFIs that charge
higher interest rates are more financially self-sufficient than others, but only up to
a certain point. Consistent with theoretical predictions, charging interest rates higher
than the threshold results in lower profitability. For financial cooperatives, on the other
hand, lower interest rates are linked with improved financial performance. Their bet-
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ter performance in cost containment found in the cost of loans analysis could justify
the profitability of financial cooperatives even when charging lower interest rates. The
results also suggest that financial cooperatives charging higher interest rates are less
profitable, indicating the extent of social compulsions and agency costs involved.
The evidence that emerged on the compatibility or trade-off of outreach to the poor
and financial self-sufficiency, the primary issue this chapter sought to address, also
varies by organizational form. The estimates show tensions between outreach and fi-
nancial performance for NBFIs. The results obtained indicates that NBFIs lend small
size loans and more to women borrowers, which are often taken to imply depth of
outreach, face high costs that affect their financial viability. In contrast, the results
show a positive complementary relationship between outreach and financial perfor-
mance for financial cooperatives. On average, financially self-sufficient cooperative
lend small size loans, serve larger fractions of women borrowers, charge lower inter-
est rates, and reduce cost of loans compared to their counter-parts that operate below
the cost-covering line.
Generally, the results suggest that the organizational form of microfinance providers
has implications on both financial sustainability and outreach. NBFIs perform well in
breadth and depth of outreach, but face higher costs, which strikes a tension between
outreach and financial performance. On the other hand, with relative less breadth,
financial cooperative are cost-efficient and earn better income after covering the costs
incurred in serving the poor. Though it is probable that the development of financial
market with a mixture of organizational or ownership form would best serve the
clients, based on our findings, financial cooperatives better contain costs, balance the
social and economic goals of microfinance, and enable the microfinance industry to
fulfill its full promise - serving the poor on a cost-covering basis.

3
COST-EFF IC IENCY AND OUTREACH OF MICROF INANCE
PROVIDERS IN ETHIOP IA : TRADE-OFF AND THE ROLE OF
OWNERSHIP
Abstract
Using a stochastic frontier approach, this chapter analyzes the cost-efficiency levels of micro-
finance providers in Ethiopia and spot the drivers of in/efficiency. It specifically examined the
linkage between cost-efficiency levels and outreach of microfinance institutions so as to un-
derstand whether the recent imposition of financial sustainability and efficiency requirements
in the industry influence microfinance institutions to compromise their traditional social mis-
sion. It also investigates the cost-efficiency differentials by ownership form of microfinance. The
results show that operating at efficient cost frontier is an objective not yet achieved by the ma-
jority microfinance providers in Ethiopia. It indicated that most of the microfinance providers
in the sample could have reduced their costs by half had they been achieved technical and al-
locative efficiency. The results from the drivers of cost in/efficiency suggested that serving the
poor and more to women borrowers and cost-efficiency are challenging objectives to achieve al-
together and can be contradictory. Microfinance providers that are closer to the best practicing
cost frontier are those with higher average loan sizes and lower proportion of women borrow-
ers. The results also indicated cost differentials by microfinance ownership form and financial
cooperatives are found to be efficient in cost containment compared to non-bank microfinance
institutions.
keywords : Microfinance; Financial cooperatives; cost-efficiency; Outreach; Trade-off;
Ethiopia.
3.1 introduction
Providing financial services tailored to the needs of small borrowers is a high cost
business, as it requires considerable monitoring and enforcement costs. Due to the
cost it entails, conventional banks in most of developing countries often exclude small
borrowers from accessing financial services. Microfinance emerged as institutional in-
novation to overcome prevailing costs of market contracts and constraints in credit
markets of low income communities where such costs are substantial. While their
innovative loan terms and lending practices enable them to secure unusual high re-
payment rates in lending the poor, translating high repayment rates into profit and
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perpetuating financial services to the poor on cost-covering basis have been a chal-
lenge remain for most microfinance, mainly because of high service or operating costs
(Morduch, 1999).
Although lowering services costs can be beneficial both for borrowers and lenders in
microfinance through reducing interest charges borne by poor borrowers and boost-
ing credit demand and financial viability of lenders subsequently, microfinance insti-
tutions do little on cost reduction. Several decades after the introduction of microfi-
nance, reducing high costs of services remain one of the greatest challenges facing the
microfinance industry. For instance, recent estimates on the cost structure of microfi-
nance still indicated higher interest charges to borrowers, of which about 62 percent
are emanated from higher operating costs (Rosenberg, 2007; Gonzalez, 2007). Little
attention on cost reduction by microfinance providers is partly because of a simplistic
assumption which claims that poor borrowers demand financial services at any cost
and microfinance institutions can pass costs of lending and associated risks onto bor-
rowers and hence they should focus on expanding accessibility of financial services
to the poor. Even in places where such costs cannot be adequately covered through
interest charges to borrowers, they often tend to rely on subsides other than engaging
on cost reduction experimentation and innovation (Morduch, 1999).
Recently, however, the growing commercialization and competition1 in microfinance
coupled with withdrawal of subsidies standout the need for cost-efficiency and achiev-
ing business viability in the industry. These recent developments which led microfi-
nance institutions to strive for financial self-sufficiency and cost-efficiency in turn re-
sult a concern on its social mission or poverty focus. Despite its long term imperatives,
the concern is that strife for profitability by microfinance institutions may shift its tar-
get to unbanked wealthier clients, as small loans are costlier to service and can be
even challenging to serve on cost-covering basis (Weiss and Montgomery, 2005; Con-
ning, 1999; Hulme and Mosley, 1996). In theory, however, these two goals - serving the
poor together with financial self-sufficiency - can be in harmony if self-sufficiency re-
quirements attract commercial funds and induce improvements in resource uses and
allocations (Frank, 2008; Rhyne and Otero, 2006; Rosengard, 2004).
Despite growing concerns on the impositions of pursuing financial self-sufficiency on
traditional social mission of microfinance (outreach to the poor), systematic empirical
analysis on the drivers of microfinance efficiency is limited. Is serving the poor and
more to women borrowers undermine cost-efficiency and profitability in microfinance
is an open question. The evidence emerged from the existing few works is mixed. Stud-
1 Commercialization refers to the transformation of microfinance institution from heavily donor dependent
sector of subsidized operation into financially self-sufficient and sustained microfinance that are part of
the mainstream finance, which provides a wider range of financial services, that are saving, insurance,
remittance, money transfer and so forth, in addition to credit. The competition on the other hand includes
ex ante competitions from money lenders, competition among microfinance themselves and between
microfinance and commercial banks (Christen, 2001; Kapper, 2007; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).
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ies by Hermes et al. (2011) and McIntosh et al. (2005) found tension between serving
the poor and achieving efficiency and they indicated that wealthier client benefits from
the strife for better financial performance. A global analysis of micro lenders by Cull
et al. (2007) also corroborated the presence of potential trade-off between outreach
and financial performance, which in their case varies by lending terms - for larger in-
dividual lenders the quest for improved financial performance considerably reduces
outreach to the poor compared to other lending terms. In contrast, recent study by
Quayes (2012) found profitable and efficient microfinance providers in serving the
poor.
Building on prior works, of particular interest of this chapter is examining whether mi-
crofinance institutions in Ethiopia are reasonably cost efficient or do their expenses in-
clude avoidable or unnecessary expenses. It also tests whether relatively cost efficient
microfinance institution do better in serving the poor. The information is useful for pol-
icy intervention, as microfinance institutions in Ethiopia involve considerable amount
of public resources and promoted to expand financial services to the unbanked poor
and hence failure to achieve wider breadth and deeper outreach in the pursuit of prof-
itability can have a policy concern (Amha, 2007). The data set also allow us to compare
and contrast the cost-efficiency or containment levels of the more traditional microfi-
nance providers (i.e., financial cooperatives) with the recent non-bank microfinance
institutions (the two dominate microfinance providers in Ethiopia) with the purpose
of understanding the effects of ownership form (i.e., the way ownership is organized
and practiced) on costs of microfinance delivery.
This study is distinctive compared to existing empirical works in two important as-
pects. First, it use disaggregated data that include both social oriented (financial coop-
eratives) and economic oriented (private-for-profit non-bank microfinance institutions)
microfinance of varying size, which potentially reduces the large commercial firm and
self-selection biases seen in prior studies2. Second, it deployed cost-efficiency as indi-
cator of financial performance or sustainability and applied Stochastic Frontier Ap-
proach (SFA), a method that has not been widely applied in microfinance. The SFA
is used to estimate cost-efficiency scores, which are used for comparing efficient use
of available resources by ownership form, and to correlate outreach indicators with
cost-efficiency estimated at a microfinance level.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 review the relationship be-
tween outreach, ownership structure and cost-efficiency in microfinance and set hy-
potheses that guide the study. Section 3 describes the data used in the study, definition
2 The analysis of works by Cull et al. (2007), Hermes et al. (2011) and Quayes (2012) are largely based
on microfinance institutions that self-select to voluntarily supply data to organizations like MIX Market
and are united by their strong commitments to achieving financial self-sufficiency. Whereas, our data
encompass both microfinance that are committed to achieving either economic viability or social visibility
or both and the institutions are selected following stratified random sampling for financial cooperatives
and census based for NBFIs.
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of variables and results from the summary statistics. Section 4 presents the analytical
approach followed to estimate and correlate cost-efficiency with outreach indicators.
The results and discussions are presented in Section 5. The last section concludes by
summarizing the main findings.
3.2 cost-efficiency, outreach , and ownership structure in microfinance
Like any other goods and services, the pricing of microfinance products and services
is a function of market contract and ownership costs. Interest charges to borrowers in-
clude costs of funds (i.e., financial costs), costs of associated risks, and operating costs
- screening, monitoring and enforcement costs, agency costs, and decision making
costs. However, such costs are not likely to be the same from microfinance to microfi-
nance that varies by their target clients/orientation and ownership structures. These
transaction and ownership costs are potentially affected by microfinance loan sizes,
loan terms, scale, age, client location and density, and ownership form (i.e., which
patron of the microfinance own the firm - investors/shareholders who supply capital,
workers who supply labor or customers/clients who provide the demand).
While ownership costs may not greatly vary by orientation, microfinance providers tar-
geting poor clients that demand small loan sizes and located in remote areas are likely
to involve higher market contract costs than a microfinance serving unbanked wealth-
ier clients or clients of a commercial bank (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2009; Ghatak-
Guinane, 1999; Morduch, 1999; Conning, 1999). In particular, costs related to screen-
ing, monitoring and enforcement of loans and costs of associated risks are expensive
for microfinance providers that cater more poor borrowers. Consistent to theoretical
predictions, despite the use of innovative loan terms like joint liability lending by mi-
crofinance institutions with poverty focus to deal with the likely consequences of these
adverse characteristics of poor clients, costs are reported up the roof and still used as
a rationale for higher interest charges to borrowers (Rosenberg, 2007).
In addition to the cost serving poor clients entail, microfinance reaching out poor and
more women clients residing in rural areas with limited financial literacy also spent
considerable energy and time on providing related services like training that doesn’t
directly contribute to output in terms of loan provided (Armendáriz de Aghion and
Morduch, 2005). Moreover, continuous subsidies to microfinance providers targeting
the poor owing to their poverty focus can be a disincentive for this type of lenders
to engage in experimentation and innovation to avoid unnecessary expenses (Rosen-
berg, 2007; Morduch, 1999). These arguments on cost and efficiency differentials by
microfinance orientation leads to the first hypothesis this chapter sought to test:
h1. Microfinance providers that serve small size loans and more to women borrowers are less
cost efficient (i.e., there is inevitable outreach cost-efficiency trade-off in microfinance).
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The way ownership is organized and practiced is another key determinant of microfi-
nance performance. In theory, ownership is typically assigned to one or another class
of firms patron (i.e., investors/donors, workers or customers) is to reduce the costs
of ownership and market contracts between the firm and those patrons (Hansmann,
1996). Within the microfinance industry, despite their resemblances in products, ser-
vices and client base, various ownership form exist, including Non-Bank Financial In-
stitutions (NBFIs), credit unions/cooperatives, and Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs). NBFIs are shareholder owned firms and distribute excess profits to investors.
Credit unions/cooperatives are owned by their clients and distribute surpluses as a
dividend for members. NGOs, on the other hand, are non-profit organization with no
clearly defined owners and characterized by a non-distribution constraints.
Although microfinance institutions of all type face market contract and ownership
costs, their ability to reduce such costs varies by ownership structure. For instance, as
investor owned firms have clearly defined owners with pecuniary incentive, they are
more able to reduce agency and decision making costs per output (Fama and Jensen,
1983). However, shareholder owned microfinance providers are at disadvantage po-
sition in terms of internalizing transaction costs which are significant component of
microfinance cost structure, especially in imperfect financial markets where most of
the microfinance providers operate. On the contrary, microfinance providers that are
owned by their clients are more able to reduce costs stemming from market contracts
through internalizing transactions (Desrochers and Fischer, 2002; Hasnmann, 1996).
Taping on local information and dual roles of clients (i.e., clients as provider of both
the demand for and the supply of loanable funds) that generate credible screening
and monitoring incentives, credit unions/cooperatives can efficiently operate even
in underdeveloped financial markets characterized by information asymmetries than
NBFIs.
Moreover, while credit unions/cooperatives may involve collective decision making
costs that doesn’t directly contribute to output, pecuniary incentives that reduce agency
costs are at a play, as they too have clearly defined owners like that of shareholder
owned microfinance providers. In small financial cooperatives agency costs of control-
ling managers might not even arise, as there is no clear separation between ownership
and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The ability of customer owned microfinance in-
stitutions in internalizing market contract costs and reducing agency costs related to
delegation of authority over shareholder owned microfinance providers lead to the
second hypothesis put forward in this chapter:
h2. In microfinance provision institution that are owned by their clients/customers are more
able to reduce transaction and ownership costs and achieve a maximum output given
inputs than shareholder-owned non-bank microfinance institutions (NBFIs).
The rationale for the H2 is also stems from low loan loss risks in credit unions/cooper-
atives. As most of them are saving-led in their approach, clients often cannot borrow
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more than the sum of his/her saving and the saving of a co-signer (see examples from
German credit cooperatives in Ghatak-Guinane, 1999). As a result, in case of default
financial cooperative spent less time in loan recovery, as they can use the saving of
the defaulter and co-signer to set-off unpaid loans. Whereas, NBFIs can be required
to spend additional energy and time on loan recovery in case of default, extra activity
which is not directly related to output production.
3.3 data and variable descriptions
3.3.1 Data source
The study used primary data collected from 107 microfinance providers in Ethiopia
between April and June 20123. After dropping institutions with missing data points,
the sample retained 107microfinance institutions for analysis. This includes the whole
NBFIs in Ethiopia, which are 30 in number and 77 financial cooperatives that account
for about nine percent of the whole financial cooperatives. As indicated in chapter
2, in the case of financial cooperatives the data set is thus not representative of all.
Together with NBFIs, however, the institutions in the data set serve the majority of
microfinance clients in the country. The selection of financial cooperatives were mainly
based on audit status of the institution, as most of the financial cooperatives are not
audited continuously every year due to limited capacity of the supervisory authority4.
For this reason, the institutions selected are those audited during 2011 and have audit
report of the preceding year (2010). The availability of the audit reports for prior year
enables the study to get reliable historical financial data for calculating some of our
variables of interest.
As noted above, the sample include both specialized microfinance institutions and fi-
nancial cooperatives with varying degree of social and economic motives. Considering
both microfinance institutions with social and economic orientation offers substantial
variations in institutional structure, size, loan terms, prices, costs, and risk taking
strategies. It considerably reduces uniformity of products and lending terms which of-
ten make it difficult for researchers to systematically portray effects of products, loan
terms and institutional changes on social and economic outcomes of microfinance
(Cull et al., 2007; Morduch, 1999). Moreover, as the sample includes both small and
3 The data is collected afresh using a structured interview with the help of European Research Institute
on Cooperatives and Social Enterprises (EURICSE), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI),
Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions (AEMFIs) and Federal Cooperative Agency (FCA) of
Ethiopia.
4 The cooperative promotion office audits financial cooperatives in Ethiopia, a public body organized to
promote and supervise the cooperative businesses, or by a person assigned by this office. They are not
allowed to independently arrange auditing services from the market (Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia: Proclamation No. 147/1998).
3.3 data and variable descriptions 63
large microfinance providers, it also potentially reduces the large firm bias of prior
studies, which relies on microfinance institutions that self-select to supply data and
are united by their size and strong commitments to achieving financial sustainability
(see Quayes, 2012; Hermes et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2007).
3.3.2 Variable definitions
Total costs and output
The study follow the financial intermediation approach suggested by Sealey and Lind-
ley (1977) to measure the total costs. The approach define the production process of
financial institutions as borrowing of funds from surplus spending actors and lend-
ing those funds to deficit spending actors. The paper used this approach with the
assumption that an efficient microfinance institution would minimize the total oper-
ating expenses and interest expenses involved in the intermediation for any given
output. The total cost is therefore measured as the sum of operating expenses and
interest expenses by microfinance.
In selecting a microfinance product that measures output, the study consider finan-
cial activities that produce a flow of services linked with the use of capital and labor
expenses and other material inputs. Based on this criterion, loan and deposit are the
potential measures of output for microfinance, as it is difficult to measure earning
asset which is often used to measure the output of banks5. Moreover earning assets
doesn’t directly relate to the microfinance objectives. The analysis used only one out-
put measure that is loan to customers, which include all loans outstanding of microfi-
nance, as deposit is not produced by all microfinance institutions in the sample. While
loan to customer is produced by all microfinance, the quality of the loan might not
be comparable. For instance, the loans can vary by size, repayment schedule, risk, col-
lateral requirement and contracts to be enforced. For this reason, the study include
loan loss expense and loan loss reserve over gross loan portfolio in our estimation of
cost-efficiency to account for potential differences in output quality.
Input prices
Three input prices, one for labor, one for financial capital and the other for physical
capital are included as measures of microfinance input. Salary, a price of unit of labor
for a period, is used to measure labor input price. It is measured as a ratio of total
5 Ideally, the output of financial institutions is viewed as a services flow and the physical units of this
flow are measured by earning assets, which is essentially a stock variable and consistent with the idea
of profit maximization or cost minimization in competitive markets (Sealey and Lindley, 1997).
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employee costs faced by microfinance to total number of employees for a period under
consideration. Interest rate paid for borrowing and deposit is used to account for
the price of financial capital, as the amount of financial capital hold based on the
institution level of risk preference can have varying effect on total costs6. Total amount
of deprecation for a period is used to proxy the third input price, which is a portion
of physical capital involved in the production process.
Cost in/efficiency correlates
According to theoretical and empirical works on efficiency analysis of financial insti-
tutions by Sealey and Lindley (1997) and Berger and Mester (1977) the difference in
efficiency across financial institutions can be associated with a set of factors. Such fac-
tors encompass identity and ownership structure of the institution (for example, hold-
ing vs. independent vs. member-based), market structure or concentration, market
power, asset size, experience, level of capitalization and size of CEOs stock ownership
in the institution. By the same token, in the estimation this study include ownership
structure of microfinance, as cost-efficiency or containment often vary by ownership
forms and lending terms in micro-lending (Morduch, 1999). The analysis contrasts two
forms of microfinance ownerships, which vary in their identity: financial cooperatives
vs. specialized or non-bank microfinance institutions.
It also includes age and size of microfinance, as they are major drivers of operational
expense in microfinance provisions (Gonzalez, 2007). They are measured in number of
years and volume of assets, respectively. Besides the common in/efficiency correlates
suggested in finance literature, the estimation include two measures of microfinance
outreach, average loan size and proportion of women borrowers, as correlates of mi-
crofinance in/efficiency. The assertion is that lending small size loans and more to
women borrowers, which implies greater depth, entails higher costs in microfinance.
Incorporating these outreach measures in the estimation also enable to understand the
potential trade-off between outreach to the poor and cost-efficiency in microfinance,
which is one of the primary focus of this chapter.
3.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the anal-
ysis. It reports the sample mean and standard deviation by ownership form (NBFIs
vs. financial cooperatives), for the outcome and explanatory variables. The summary
statistics comparison shows significant variations in total cost, output, input prices
6 See Berger and Mester (1997) for the implications of financial capital in cost-efficiency measurement of
financial institutions.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics by organizational form.
Indicator
Non-Bank
Financial
Institutions
(NBFIs) (n=30)
Financial
cooperatives
(n=77)
Sig.
mean dif-
ference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Total cost (in millions of birr) 22.23 43.56 0.140 0.298 Yes
Gross Loan Portfolio (in millions of birr) 232.8 537.4 1.564 3.267 Yes
Salary (per personnel) 17325 6047 6803 6272 Yes
Depreciation (in millions of birr) 0.624 1.041 0.003 0.011 Yes
Interest expenses 0.084 0.048 0.051 0.039 Yes
Loan loss reserves over loan portfolio 0.080 0.160 0.035 0.035 Yes
Loan loss expenses (in millions of birr) 1.891 3.290 0.002 0.019 Yes
Average Loan Size (ALS) 0.464 0.340 1.135 1.224 Yes
Total number of active borrowers 70397 149377 247 600 Yes
% of women borrowers 0.581 0.168 0.395 0.233 Yes
Labor cost to asset 0.067 0.054 0.021 0.031 Yes
Capital cost to asset 0.076 0.076 0.021 0.048 Yes
Cost per unit of currency lent 0.263 0.157 0.099 0.074 Yes
Age of the institution 10.8 4.3 11.5 7.4 No
Asset size 2.6 0.674 1.42 0.637 Yes
Note: Birr is currency unit of Ethiopia. US$1 was officially exchanged for birr 17.2941 on De-
cember 30, 2011.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
and outreach between financial cooperatives and NBFIs. The mean total cost of NBFIs
is found to be significantly higher as compared to financial cooperatives. Such a dif-
ference is as expected, as the volume of output and associated input costs are com-
paratively higher for NBFIs. Whereas, as shown in Table 3.1, the volume of output, as
measured by gross loan portfolio and outreach breadth, and input prices of financial
cooperatives are significantly lower. It can be because financial cooperatives are small
in size and constrained by local resources to expand breadth which at the same time
affects costs and output. Additional measures of cost at the bottom of the summary
table, labor and capital costs over assets also indicated variation in cost containment
between the two microfinance lenders in Ethiopia.
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The outreach indicators in Table 3.1 suggest that NBFIs cater more poor borrowers
relative to financial cooperatives. On average NBFIs offer relatively lower loan sizes
and serve higher proportion of women clients. The difference on loan sizes, however,
can be due to differences in breadth of outreach. As shown at the middle of the same
table, financial cooperatives are characterized by limited breadth, but have repeated
interaction with their borrowers. Financial cooperatives in the sample serve a small set
of members compared to NBFIs, which are 247 to 70,3977, respectively. This difference
on breadth of outreach is as expected, as financial cooperatives in Ethiopia are con-
fined to a particular location or communities by their nature. And their breadth can
be further constrained by local resources, since they have limited sources of capital
compared to NBFIs, - financial cooperatives heavily rely on members equity and de-
posit for lending. NBFIs, on the other hand, are at an advantage in attracting various
sources of capital and cover wider areas of operation.
3.4 empirical approach
Stochastic cost8 frontier approach is used to measure efficiency of the microfinance
institutions. In this approach cost-efficiency is measured in terms of how close a mi-
crofinance costs lie to the efficient cost frontier for a given technology (similar outputs
and working conditions). The efficient frontier is determined by two conditions: min-
imum use of inputs (technical efficiency) and optimal mix of inputs (allocative effi-
ciency) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003; Battese and Coelli, 1995). The absence of either
technical or allocative efficiency or both inevitably results in excess costs that make
institutions deviate from cost minimization frontier and creates inefficiency.
Thus, cost inefficiency in this case measures the reduction in cost that could have been
achieved if the microfinance institution were both technically and allocatively efficient.
In other words, it measures the magnitude of cost that could be reduced to enable
the microfinance institutions achieve both technical and allocative efficiency. As cost
functions are not directly observable, inefficiencies are measured relative to an efficient
cost frontier that is estimated from the data. Thus, microfinance cost inefficiency is
defined as the difference between observed costs and predicted minimum costs for a
given output, input prices and other institution specific variables.
7 It should be noted that the figure on average breadth of NBFIs is influenced by three to four big microfi-
nance institutions that are partly owned by regional public bodies. The median size of active borrowers
is rather 10,592 and there are NBFIs with less than 200 active borrowers.
8 There are three main concepts in measuring financial institutions level of efficiency; that are cost, profit
and alternative profit efficiency. Considering the heterogeneity in underlying objectives (for instance,
services motive, profit motive and so forth) of microfinance institutions in our sample, we deployed cost-
efficiency concept, which relatively suites for either institutions with either social or economic objectives
or both (Berger and Mester, 1997).
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There are non-parametric and parametric methods to measure efficiency of units (for
example, individual institutions, households and so forth). The non-parametric ap-
proach is often criticized because of its ignorance to the possible influence of measure-
ment errors and other statistical noises in the data - it does not allow for random error
caused, for instance, by luck (Coelli et al., 2005). Within the parametric approach,
which accounts for random error caused by data problem and measurement errors,
there are again two approaches, namely stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and distri-
bution free approach (DFA), which vary in their treatment of random shocks on the
production process that are not in the control of, for example, a microfinance institu-
tion (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Ainger et al., 1977).
This study use SFA, as it allows composite error terms that control both for measure-
ment errors and other random effects that are not within the control of microfinance.
Specifically, it follow the one-step SFA proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), which
estimates the cost frontier and inefficiency correlates simultaneously. The two steps
SFA, on the other hand, involves a contradiction of assumptions and the inefficiency
depends on the explanatory variables that could be partly affected by institution input
choices based on knowledge of their level of inefficiency (see Wang and Schmidt, 2002
for detailed discussion).
The estimation of a microfinance relative efficiency using cross-sectional data is per-
formed by estimating a stochastic cost function of the general form suggested by
Berger and Mesters (1997) and Battese and Coelli (1995), as follow:
lnCi = f (yi,wi, zi; β) + ui + vi (3.1)
where C is the observed total cost faced by microfinance institution i; f (·) is suitable
functional form; yi is output measured by loan to customers; wi is the vectors of input
prices; zi microfinance specific control variables; and β is vectors of unknown parame-
ters to be estimated. The error term ui is a non-negative random variable reflecting cost
inefficiency
(
ui ∼ N+
(
µi, σ2u
))
, which may increase costs above the best practice level.
It specifically captures the effects of expenses on inefficiency, either on technical or
allocative inefficiencies or on both (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). vi is the symmetric
error component, which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed
as vi ∼ iidN
(
0, σ2v
)
. It accounts random variations in cost due to measurement errors
and other statistical noises.
As indicated above, the cost-efficiency is defined as the proportion of the minimum
possible costs that can be obtained for specific inputs under using similar technology,
in this case, if microfinance i were as efficient as microfinance in the sample operating
at the efficient cost frontier (Berger and Mesters, 1997; Battese and Coelli, 1995). Thus,
the cost-efficiency of microfinance i, adjusted by random error facing the same variable
y, w, and z can be represented as follow:
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CEi =
Cˆmin
Cˆi
=
exp
[
fˆ
(
yi,wi, zi
)]× exp [ln vˆmini ]
exp
[
fˆ (yi,wi, zi)
]
× exp [ln vˆc]× exp [ln uˆic]
; CEi = exp
[
−uˆic
]
(3.2)
The cost-efficiency (CEi) ratio indicates the proportion of costs or resources that are
used efficiently. It can be also thought as the amount of cost that would have been
saved if microfinance i had been technically and allocatively efficient (i.e., equivalent
to 1− CEi).
The inefficiency term (i.e., the excess costs incurred from not operating within a min-
imum cost possible) is modeled as a linear function of a set of microfinance specific
variables. Specifically, the inefficiency term µi are assumed to be a function of a set of
explanatory institution specific variables, zn, and vectors of coefficients to be estimated,
δ. Its general form is specified as follows:
µi = α+∑ δn,izn,i (3.3)
As mentioned above, equation (1) and (3) are estimated simultaneously in one-step
SFA suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995), using maximum likelihood estimation
method.
For the empirical specification of the cost function the study use some of the output
and input measures of financial institutions suggested by Hermes et al. (2011), Fries
and Taci (2005), Sealey and Lindley (1997), and Berger and Mester (1977). Specifically,
it use loan to customers as a measure of output based on the value-added criterion ap-
plied by Fries and Taci (2005), and total expense per unit of labor and interest expense
per unit of deposit as input prices following Hermes et al. (2011) and Sealey and Lind-
ley (1977), which are consistent with the intermediation approach to modeling the
production of financial institutions. Besides output and input prices, the estimation in-
clude microfinance specific variables to account for potential heterogeneity in output
quality. The specification of the cost function estimated is given as follows:
ln (TC) = α+ β1 ln (Salary) + β2 ln (Intexp) + β3 ln (LLP) + β4 ln (GLP) +
β5 ln (LLR) + β6 ln (Depreciation) + ui + vi
(3.4)
where TCi is the sum of interest and operating expense of microfinance institution
i; Salary is the price of a unit of labor for the period, which is average salary per
unit of labor per annum; Intexp is the interest expense faced by a microfinance per
unit of borrowing and deposit held; LLP is loan loss provision expense for the period;
GLP is gross loan portfolio; LLR is loan loss provision over gross loan portfolio which
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measures an microfinance risk taking strategies; and Depreciation is financial expenses
as a result of obsolescence of physical capital.
Besides estimating cost-efficiency level of each microfinance institutions, describing
the correlates of inefficiency is the rationale behind using a two step SFA. Towards this
end, the inefficiency component of the error term denoted by µi (i.e., the first moment
of the inefficiency distribution for microfinance i) is specified as a function of a set
of outreach and microfinance specific explanatory variables in order to understand
the trade-off between outreach to the poor and cost-efficiency. The estimation also
introduced organizational dummy to understand the effect of the way ownership is
organized and practiced (NBFIs vs. financial cooperatives) on cost containment. The
complete lists of specifications of the inefficiency function estimated are as follows:
µi = α+ δ1loansizei
µi = α+ δ1womani
µi = α+ δ1org f ormi
µi = α+ δ1loansizei + δ2womani + δ3org f ormi
µi = α+ δ1loansizei + δ2womani + δ3org f ormi + δ4agei + δ5sizei
(3.5)
µi represents the inefficiency component of an MFI i, as defined above. loansize is
one of the generally accepted measures of outreach omnipresent in the microfinance
literature. It is the ratio of total loan outstanding and total number of active borrow-
ers. The lower is the ratio, the greater the depth of outreach and vies versa. women
is another accepted measure of outreach, which measures the proportion of female
active borrowers. Higher percentage of women borrowers indicates greater depth of
outreach. org f orm denotes organizational form dummy (i.e., 1 if the microfinance is
financial cooperatives and 0, otherwise). The proposition here is that the inefficiency
of microfinance may depend on the type of organizational designs, as some organi-
zational forms are more effective in reducing or internalizing market contracts and
ownership costs.
Besides outreach variables and organizational dummy, the estimation introduced age
and size, as they are also major drivers of operational expense in microfinance provi-
sions (Gonzalez, 2007). age controls for the effect of experience and learning on cost-
efficiency. The presumption is that the older the microfinance institution, the more
the experience to overcome excess costs and optimize mix of inputs. However, as far
as age is concerned, the other way round can also hold, as more recently established
microfinance institutions have the opportunity to learn from the existing knowledge
accumulated by their antecedents. size is measured in total assets of microfinance, and
controls for scales of operation. It allows the study to test the hypothesis that large
microfinance institutions are more efficient, as they could benefit from economies of
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scales or from the potential intensity of fixed costs over a large client bases and hence
risk diversification.
3.5 estimation results and discussions
3.5.1 Input prices and output
As indicated before, one of the greatest challenges facing microfinance providers is
lowering their costs of lending. Reducing costs are beneficial both for microfinance
providers and borrowers, as it can reduce interest charges to borrowers and improve
repayment rates and financial performance of microfinance institutions subsequently
(Gonzalez, 2007). The evidence emerged from the estimates of cost-efficiency indicated
that operating at the efficient cost frontier is an objective not yet achieved by the
majority of microfinance providers in Ethiopia. The predicted cost-efficiency scores9
suggest that most of the microfinance in the sample could have reduced their costs
by half had they been technically and allocatively efficient. The average cost-efficiency
score for the whole sample is 63 percent10, which implies 58.7 percent efficiency gap
between the average microfinance and microfinance operating at the frontier (i.e., what
costs 1 birr for the efficient microfinance, costs 1.587 birr for microfinance with average
efficiency level, to produce similar outputs).
Panel A of Table 3.2 summarizes the estimation results of total costs with respect to
output and input price variables from the cost frontier. The directions of relationships
for the cost function are as expected in all cases. The estimated elasticity for the mea-
sures of input prices (salary and interest expenses) and output (gross loan portfolio)
have statistically significant relationship with total cost. For a percentage fall in total
cost, output falls by 0.76 to 0.84 percent, labor cost by 0.20 to 0.32 percent, cost of
capital by 0.22 to 0.28 percent and cost of physical capital by 0.01 to 0.03 percent. In
all, these positive coefficients denote higher costs, reflecting that salary, interest ex-
penses and volume of gross loan portfolio are significant shares of the total costs of
microfinance institutions in the sample. The elasticity of loan loss provision expense
to total costs that accounts for output quality is also positive and statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that the lower the quality of output (loan to customer), the higher the
operating and interest expenses faced by the institutions. This can be due to high costs
of contract enforcement in case defaults.
9 cost-efficiency score is defined as the ratio of the best practice cost to the actual observed costs, resulting
in a score ranging from 0 to 1 representing the continuum between 100 percent inefficient and 100 percent
efficient firms, respectively.
10 This result is comparable with what has been recently found by Kebede and Berhanu (2012). In their
comparative studies of MFIs and Commercial Banks efficiency in Ethiopia they found a 64.7 percent
cost-efficiency score for microfinance institutions.
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3.5.2 Outreach and cost-efficiency: is there a trade-off?
Following the growing commercialization of microfinance, outreach-financial perfor-
mance trade-off is a topic debated by both academic scholars and policy makers from
all corners of the world and yet uncorroborated. The fundamental issue is that whether
and to what extent the quest for achieving financial self-sufficiency has implication on
the traditional social mission of microfinance - outreach to the poor. In other words,
whether microfinance providers with poverty focus serving small size loans and more
to women borrowers generate additional expenses that dont directly contribute to out-
put in terms of loans provided and undermine cost-efficiency. This section presents
the results from cost-efficiency frontier analysis that estimate efficiency scores and cor-
relate estimated inefficiency with observed microfinance specific outreach variables in
order to understand the existence and extent of trade-off between serving the poor
and more to women borrowers and cost-efficiency in microfinance.
As shown in Panel B of Table 3.2, the results found across columns with different spec-
ifications suggest the presence of trade-off between cost-efficiency and outreach to the
poor, as measured by loan size and proportion of women borrowers. The estimated
coefficient for average loan size is negative and statistically significant, even after con-
trolling for organizational form, experience and scales of operation. This signifies that
microfinance with higher average loan size are more cost efficient than microfinance
with lower average loan balance, that is often demanded by the poor. The results from
the specification in column (2) and (4) for proportion of women borrowers in the loan
portfolio has a positive and statistically significant coefficients, indicating that microfi-
nance providers who cater more to women borrowers are less cost efficient.
Besides the evidences that emerge from inefficiency correlates, the results from un-
reported simple OLS regression that associate estimated cost-efficiency scores with
outreach indicators (i.e., average loan size and proportion of women borrowers) also
substantiate the tension between serving the poor and achieving cost-efficiency. The
results found a statistically significant positive and negative relationship between cost-
efficiency scores and average loan size and fraction of women borrowers, respectively,
after accounting for age, asset size, donation over loan, average length of borrowing re-
lationship and ownership. This result further marked that serving the poor and more
to women borrowers is not in harmony with the pursuit of achieving cost-efficiency
in microfinance.
Over all, the results that emerged from the cost frontier analysis are in line with
the first hypothesis - microfinance providers that cater the poor and more women
borrowers are less cost efficient - and correspond to the findings of prior studies by
Hermes et al. (2011) and Cull et al. (2007) and are consistent with general theoretical
predictions that asserts the presence of cost differential between serving poor and less
poor or unbanked wealthier clients (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2009; Conning, 1999).
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Table 3.2: Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation of the parameters for Stochastic Cost-
efficiency Frontier (SCF) and correlates of inefficiency.
Cost function Dependent variable: Total Cost in Birr (logged)
Panel A: Input and
output variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln (Salary (per
personnel))
0.272
(3.51)***
0.323
(4.12)***
0.248
(3.06)***
0.223
(3.16)***
0.201
(2.86)***
ln (Interest expenses (per
unit of deposit))
0.236
(5.28)***
0.220
(5.25)***
0.236
(5.27)***
0.272
(6.37)***
0.278
(6.65)***
ln (Gross loan portfolio) 0.835
(18.7)***
0.760
(19.7)***
0.793
(19.1)***
0.839
(21.6)***
0.856
(23.6)***
ln (Loan loss reserve over
gross loan portfolio)
-0.006
(0.23)
-0.011
(0.40)
-0.002
(0.07)
0.001
(0.05)
0.004
(0.18)
ln (Loan loss provision
expenses)
0.046
(2.76)***
0.070
(4.63)***
0.055
(3.15)***
0.050
(3.12)***
0.044
(3.05)***
ln (Depreciation) 0.022
(1.00)
0.029
(1.33)
0.023
(1.02)
0.007
(0.36)
0.020
(1.13)
Constant -2.365
(3.61)***
-1.967
(3.07)***
-1.621
(2.31)**
-1.438
(2.37)**
-1.507
(2.62)***
Panel B: Cost inefficiency correlates
Average loan size -0.001
(1.67)*
-0.003
(2.86)***
-0.004
(2.25)**
% of women borrowers 1.896
(2.44)**
4.802
(1.68)*
1.129
(0.30)
Financial cooperatives -1.034
(1.91)*
-0.865
(0.87)
-4.770
(2.09)**
Age of the institution -0.018
(0.13)
Size of the institution (in
total assets)
-2.099
(2.33)**
Constant -0.237
(0.74)
-1.702
(2.84)***
-0.082
(0.22)
0.360
(0.20)
8.791
(2.24)**
Number of obs. 107 107 107 107 107
Wald chi2 test 3059.29 3047.94 1972.25 2697.22 3038.35
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood function -78.511 -76.976 -78.446 -70.672 -67.614
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
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Table 3.3: Cost-efficiency scores and t-test on mean difference between Financial Cooperatives
(FCs) and Non-Bank Financial/Microfinance Institutions (NBFIs).
Ownership form of MFIs Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-test with NBFIs
FCs 77 0.658 0.194 2.30 (0.041)**
NBFIs 30 0.562 0.191
All MFIs 107 0.631 0.197
Note: ** significant at 5%. Standard error in parenthesis.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June 2012.
The difference in costliness of lending small size loans relative to larger loans can be
even more significant in low income communities where most of the microfinance
institutions operate. For instance, in countries like Ethiopia, such a trade-off between
cost-efficiency and outreach to the poor can easily arise due to additional costs linked
with difficulty of access to poor rural clients and monitoring and follow up efforts
required from credit agents or microfinance institutions to deal with less educated
borrowers, labor-intensive activities that doesn’t directly contribute to the production
process of outputs.
3.5.3 Do non-bank microfinance institutions contrast with financial cooperatives in cost-
efficiency?
Another issue the study sought to analyze is the difference in cost-efficiency among
microfinance institutions in the sample by ownership form. The question the study put
forward is whether or not the way ownership is organized and practiced has implica-
tion on cost-efficiency or containment in microfinance. According to ownership theory,
organizations that are owned by agents with pecuniary incentives are more able to re-
duce agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover,
organizations that are closer or owned by their customers are more able to reduce
transaction or market contracts costs (Hansmannn, 1996). While pecuniary incentives
can be at a play for both organizational forms in the sample, if this conjectures are true,
financial cooperatives should be cost efficient as compared to specialized microfinance
institutions, as they possess a better position to reduce delegation costs and overcome
costs of market contracts which are higher in low income communities where both
institutions operate.
In line with the second hypothetical prediction, the results from the mean difference
test of predicted cost-efficiency levels show that on average financial cooperatives that
are owned by their clients are cost efficient than NBFIs. The mean cost-efficiency score
of financial cooperatives and NBFIs is 66 and 56 percent, respectively. This denotes
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Figure 3.1: Frequency distribution of cost-efficiency scores by organizational form.
that what costs 1.0 birr for financial cooperatives, costs 1.17 birr for NBFIs to produce
similar outputs. In other words, financial cooperatives in the sample are 17 percent
more efficient than NBFIs and the efficiency gap is statistically distinguishable from
zero (Table 3.3). Concurrently, as shown in Figure 3.1, about 41 percent of financial
cooperatives have an efficiency score closer to the efficient cost frontier. On the other
hand, more than 35 percent of the NBFIs operate at higher costs compared to the best
practicing microfinance providers in the sample.
Besides the average cost-efficiency scores, the financial cooperatives dummy included
as the correlates of inefficiency in the cost-efficiency estimation indicates relative cost
containment among financial cooperatives. As shown in Panel B of Table 3.2, the esti-
mated coefficient for financial cooperatives dummy is negative and statistically signif-
icant, implying that financial cooperatives are more cost efficient. They better reduce
technical and allocative inefficiencies in microfinance delivery compared to NBFIs.
This can be due to the fact that financial cooperatives benefit from better information
and cheaper enforcement mechanisms available to them, as the owners are providers
of both the demand for and supply of loanable funds. In other words, it can be due to
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the fact that financial cooperatives better mitigate cost of market contracts, which ac-
count significant proportion of operating costs in microfinance, as they are embedded
to the community where they operate. Whereas, non-bank microfinance institutions
are top down in their approaches and serve wider client bases and the extent of know-
ing each other, which serves as screening, monitoring and enforcement mechanism
is relatively imperfect. Their deeper outreach to the poor (poverty orientation) which
founds to be in trade-off with cost-efficiency in this study can be also a potential
explanation for excess expenses by NBFIs.
3.6 conclusions
This study estimated cost-efficiency levels of microfinance providers in Ethiopia and
analyze the implications of financial performance endeavor, a phenomena driven by
the recent commercialization and competition in microfinance, on the traditional so-
cial mission of micro-lenders. The results indicated that microfinance institution in the
sample are on average cost inefficient and can double their output in terms of loan
provided using existing resources. Serving poor clients and achieving financial sustain-
ability, as measured by levels of cost-efficiency, are found to be contradictory objectives.
The results show that providing small size loans and catering more women borrow-
ers, which implies greater depth of outreach, are positively and negatively linked
with level of cost-efficiency, even after controlling for ownership structure, experience
and scale of operation. It implies that microfinance providers that are closer to the
best practicing cost frontier are those with higher loan sizes and lower proportion
of women borrowers. Hence, to achieve complementarity, striving for financial self-
sufficiency should focus on cost containment or reduction of excess costs. For instance,
relying on commercial funds as a major source of loanable funds could be one among
the creditable incentive or compulsion for improved cost-efficiency in microfinance.
The results also indicate the presence of a wider cost-efficiency gap between finan-
cial cooperatives and non-bank microfinance institutions, the second issue the study
sought to address. The mean cost-efficiency score of financial cooperatives and non-
bank microfinance institutions is 66 and 56 percent, respectively, implying a 17 percent
efficiency gap between financial cooperatives and non-bank microfinance institutions.
This cost-efficiency gaps can be due to the inherent ability of financial cooperatives to
dispense with information and enforcement costs compared to non-bank microfinance
institutions. Financial cooperatives are relatively at an advantage to effectively uti-
lize social collateral as screening, monitoring and contract enforcement mechanisms,
which potentially reduces cost of microfinance delivery. Members as a providers of
both the demand for and the supply of loanable funds in financial cooperatives also
can generate a credible incentive for individual clients to exercise economic and non-
economic sanctions in case of default (Banerjee et al., 1994; Guinnane, 2001a). On
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the other side, the commitment to expand outreach through increasing branches, re-
liance on non-commercial funds and lack of pecuniary incentives in some of multi-
stakeholder owned NBFIs may have also resulted in this efficiency gap.
While institutional diversification and resulting competitions can benefit clients by
lowering costs and improving services, based on the findings, financial cooperatives
should enable the microfinance industry to deliver improved financial services at
lower costs compared to non-bank microfinance institutions, as they are found to be
relatively better in cost containment and efficient in resource allocation.
4
HETEROGENEOUS IMPACT OF ACCESS TO INST ITUT IONAL
F INANCE ON AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY ADOPT ION :
EMPIR ICAL EVIDENCE FROM ETHIOP IA
Abstract
Whether financial institutions have an impact on technology adoption is a relevant research
question to guide institutional development processes. Using farm household survey data and
propensity score matching techniques, this chapter examines the impact of access to financial
services from financial cooperative and microfinance institutions on the rates and levels of
technology adoption and use in Ethiopia. The results show a robust and positive impact of
access to institutional finance on farm households adoption and application rates of agricultural
technologies, suggesting a large scope for increasing the diffusion and application intensities of
modern farm inputs among smallholders through enhancing their access to financial services.
Furthermore, disaggregating impact by farm size and ownership of the institution from where
farmers receive financial services reveals considerable heterogeneity concealed by the mean
estimates. In particular, greater impact on technology adoption is observed for farm households
who use financial cooperatives, compared to those who use non-bank microfinance institutions.
Moreover, while the effect of financial services on small farmers fertilizer application rates is
relatively higher, its significant impact on adoption and application rates of improved seeds
is observed only for large farmers. The study strongly recommend the need for institutional
finance development and targeting in terms of farm size and form of financial institutions in
the process of promoting rural financial services.
keywords : Institutional finance; Agricultural technology adoption; Impact; Owner-
ship; Farm size; Ethiopia.
4.1 introduction
Following the experience of the Green Revolution that led to doubling of yields for the
major food grains, technological innovation and change in agriculture attracted greater
attention among policy makers and scholars. Increased adoption of new technologies
is generally believed to be a powerful force in reducing poverty. Recent studies by
de Janvry and Sadoulet (2010), Minten and Barrett (2008), and Mendola (2007) also
corroborated the crucial role of agricultural technology adoption on farm households
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well-being and poverty alleviation. However, despite its considerable welfare impact,
the diffusion of productivity enhancing technologies in agriculture remain slow, and
many innovative technologies have met with only partial success (Feder et al., 1985).
The diffusion rates are even slower in Sub-Saharan Africa where the gains from tech-
nology adoptions are direct (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010).
Substantial research work has been conducted to understand the determinants of dif-
ferential speed and extent of technology adoption throughout the world and limited
access to financial services (i.e., limited access to credit, saving and insurance) found
to be one among the binding constraints1 that deter adoption of technological innova-
tions in smallholder agriculture (e.g., Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Croppenstedt et
al., 2003; Feder and Umali, 1993; Bhalla, 1979; Lipton, 1976). Studies indicated the need
for capital in the form of either accumulated saving or greater access to agricultural
credit to the rapid and widespread adoption of agricultural technologies - differential
rates of adoption are ascribed to differential access to capital.
The assertion is that access to financial services can allow resource constrained small
farmers to adopt new technologies to some extent. Once they initially adopt, overtime
cash availability to farmers is increased by the increased profit from partial adoption.
Financial constraints, on the other hand, can discourage adoption, impede the inten-
sity of uptake or introduce an element of substitutability in adopting technologies that
are introduced as a package and complementary in yield (Feder et al, 1985; Clay, 1975).
Access to financial services can go beyond the problems of credit or capital availability,
as delivering other financial products that allow farmers to commit saving when they
have cash available, such as immediately after harvest, can positively affect technology
adoption (Duflo et al., 2008).
The conventional policy advance to overcome the adoption-discouraging effects of
financial market inefficiency is subsidization of agricultural credit, mainly through
state-owned development banks. Relaxing credit constraint through subsidies was be-
lieved to have positive effects on adoption by making credit available at lower rates
and minimizing adverse effects of risks, uncertainties, and land market inefficiencies
on adoption of agricultural technologies (Kelsey, 2011; Adams et al., 1984). While agri-
cultural credit subsidies have played crucial roles to kick-start credit markets in poor
rural economies (Dorward et al., 2004), directed subsidies, such as keeping interest
rates on farmers loan unnecessarily low, have been largely criticized for generating
allocative inefficiencies and failing to achieve their primary objective of overcoming
credit constraint of small farmers and increasing agricultural investment, production
and income subsequently (Binswanger et al., 1993; Adams et al., 1984; Adams and
Graham, 1981).
1 Other factors that inhabit adoption of agricultural technology include risk and uncertainty, imperfect
information, land size, tenure structure, labor availability, lack of insurance mechanisms and availabil-
ity of the technology itself-supply side constraints (Fisher and Lindner, 1980; Lindner, 1980; Just and
Zilberman, 1983; Feder et al., 1985; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011).
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In recent years, the dissatisfaction from prior directed agricultural credit program
shifted the agricultural finance discourse from subsidies to a more market-oriented
financial systems approach that adhere the principles of market mechanism. Along
with the so-called smart subsidies the financial systems approach represents the state
of the art in agricultural lending. Unlike the top-down government and donor credit
programs, the financial system approach emphasis more on the creation of sustainable
financial institutions and pricing of financial products and services to cover costs and
associated risks (Meyer, 2011). This new paradigm guided the revolution of specialized
microfinance institutions and revival of financial cooperatives (i.e., member-based fi-
nancial institutions) across developing countries. Currently, financial cooperatives and
specialized microfinance institutions have made inroads in the agriculture sector with
loans tailored to seasonal and smallholder agriculture. There are many examples2
demonstrating that these institutions have found mechanisms to deal with costs and
risks of agricultural lending.
In Ethiopia, as of 2010, specialized microfinance institutions and numerous financial
cooperatives channeled about two third of their loan portfolio to smallholder farmers
(Amha and Peck, 2010). And all of the financial cooperatives and the majority of the
microfinance also provide saving services that allow farmers to commit saving for fu-
ture investments. However, there has not been any systematic study that evaluates the
effects of these institutions on farm households technology adoption decision. Their
successes often measured in terms of the breadth of loan disbursement and repayment
rates rather than based on their impact at farm household level. They are often con-
sidered successful if they are able to expand availability of credits to agricultural and
rural areas and generate high repayment rates. Despite the fungibility of credit, there
is a need to better understand the impact of access to credit and other financial prod-
ucts from financial cooperatives and NBFIs on agricultural investments by smallholder
farmers. Whether access to institutional financial services contributes to the diffusion
and extent of technology adoption among smallholder farmers is the empirical ques-
tion this chapter sough to address. The study also investigate the importance of the
way the ownership of the institutional finance providers are organized and practiced
and landholding size on adoption decision within farm households who have access
to institutional finance.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The next sections review the history
of institutional finance provisions for smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia. The third
section present the data used and definition and measurement of main variables of in-
2 As of the end of 2006, 20 MFIs in Nicaragua reported that 47 percent of their portfolios were in agricul-
ture and forestry. In 2007, 37 MFIs in Uganda reported that 38 percent of their total portfolios were in
agricultural loans. The Economic Credit Institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Banco del Estado de
Chile, Small Farmer Cooperatives, Ltd. in Nepal, the Cresol and SICREDI systems of savings and loan
cooperatives in Brazil, Confianza in Peru, and several community-managed village savings and credit
organizations (CVECAs) in parts of West Africa developed innovations to serve agriculture (Meyer, 2011).
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terest, while the fourth section discuss the empirical approach - the impact evaluation
problem, propensity score matching and p-score estimation procedures, and results.
The fifth section presents the results from the descriptive statistics and matching esti-
mators. The final section concludes and sets policy recommendations.
4.2 institutional finance and smallholder agriculture in ethiopia
Smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia, which accounts 95 percent of the total agricul-
tural production, remain less attractive for conventional commercial lenders mainly
due to small transaction size, lumpy cash flows, covariant risks, and geographically
dispersed farmers living in difficult locations to reach (Amha and Peck, 2010). Dif-
ferent policies have been practiced to address largely unmet credit demand in the
agriculture sector. The most routine policy advance since 1960s is extending financial
services to smallholder farmers through specially designed institutions that aimed at
developing smallholder agriculture. However, most of these institutions often failed
to meet the demands of smallholder farmers due to low repayment rates, capacity
shortage and elite captures.
During the pre-reform periods in Ethiopia, financial products and services for the
smallholder agriculture were provided by an array of banking and non-banking fi-
nancial providers including development banks, investment corporations and coop-
eratives. Specifically, during the imperial regime (1960s - 1974), a period where agri-
culture was considered as a leading economic activity and received about half of the
total domestic credit, there were two intermediary institutions - the grain corporation
and farmers cooperatives - that received credit funds from state-owned banks and
extended credits to farmers at concessional rates (EEA, 2000). However, as in most of
the directed credit program elsewhere in the same period, the efforts to extend agri-
cultural credit to small farmers were not a success. Of the 42-65 percent of the total
domestic loan went to agriculture during the period, smallholder farmers received
only 7.5 percent - agricultural credits were mainly accrued to large and influential
farmers (Admassie, 1987; 2004).
Later on, even though the socialist regime (1974 - 1990) perpetuated the tradition of
assigning specialized financial institutions to serve the smallholder agriculture sector
with monopoly power, smallholder farmers were deprived of credit due to the credit
policy of the period, which gave priority for the socialized sector. For instance, over
the ten-year period of the regime, within the agriculture sector, about 89 percent of the
credits were channeled to state farms and private smallholder farmers received only
9-11 percent (EEA, 2000). Furthermore, towards the end of the socialist era, depletion
of capital faced by some of these lending institutions led to the complete termination
of the negligible credit shares of smallholder farmers (Amha, 2010).
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Figure 4.1: Percentage share of agricultural to GDP, share of agricultural credit to total domes-
tic credit and agricultural credit to agricultural output ratio.
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The post-reform period (1991/92 onwards), which started with the Structural Adjust-
ment Program (SAP) to reverse financial distortions of all kinds, neither made agricul-
ture attractive sector for conventional banks nor delivered adequate financial services
for smallholder farmers. As shown in Figure 4.1, during the years after the economic
reform, the total share of agricultural credit shrank considerably and its average share
has been 10 percent for the last two decades. A recent study by Amha and Peck (2010)
estimated a USD 3 billion credit shortage in the overall economic systems, and it seems
that smallholder agriculture is suffering more strongly from this credit crunch than
other sectors of the economy. While the core agriculture provides about 41 percent of
the total gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010/2011, the share of total lending of the
sector is only 14 percent (Figure 4.1). The resulting ratio of shares of lending to shares
of GDP is again lower - only 34 percent. Moreover, the credit to output ratio for the
same period indicates substantial credit shortage in the agriculture sector - the mean
credit to aggregate value of total agricultural production over the last two decades is
six percent.
Such a gap in agricultural finance is largely because the conventional financial insti-
tutions in Ethiopia provide hardly any credit to the agricultural sector (see Table A.5
in the appendix). Smallholder farmers in search of financial services mainly stum-
ble upon microfinance institutions and financial cooperatives. Currently, microfinance
institutions and cooperatives are the only institutions putting a clear focus on small-
holder agriculture with roughly two-third of their loan portfolio (Amha and Peck,
2010). Along with the regional governments, these financial institutions act as inter-
mediaries between banks and small farmers. While there have been cases of default
that necessitated repayment out of regional state budget and these intermediary in-
stitutions (DSA, 2010), the institutions manage to channel a greater deal of credit to
smallholder agriculture compared to previous regimes. As shown in Figure 4.1, since
2000 onwards, a period at which microfinance spread and cooperatives are revived,
the share of agricultural credit and credit-to-output ratio are slightly growing.
Nonetheless, most of the microfinance and cooperatives in Ethiopia are very small in
size and lack the capacity to lend large loans for indivisible agricultural investment
(e.g., tractor, tubewell, oxen, etc.). Most of them lend small amounts aimed at increas-
ing the productivity and income of small farmers through enabling them to adopt
divisible technologies, such as improved seeds and fertilizer. Moreover, to our knowl-
edge there is no systematic empirical evidence that examines adoption behaviors of
the clients of these financial providers compared to independent farmers. In the ab-
sence of such evidence, the effects of credits and other financial services delivered by
these institutions on farmers agricultural investment remain an open question, as use
or diversion of credits for purposes other than agriculture is not impossible3.
3 For instance, test of significance on product-moment correlation coefficient relating average annual rate
of growth in institutional credit for agriculture and average annual rate of growth in gross domestic
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4.3.1 Sampling and data
Despite the presence of numerous financial cooperatives (i.e., more than 7000) and
specialized microfinance institutions with considerable size of outreach (i.e., about 2.5
million clients) operating in various parts of Ethiopia, access to financial services is
still rare, found only in a few kebeles4 or villages. Many kebeles in Ethiopia do not
have any institutional financial service providers. For this reason the study found ran-
domly selecting farm households unfeasible at any geographic level above kebeles. As
it was necessary to include enough farm households who have access to institutional
financial services and choose to participate for this particular impact study, the only
practical alternative was to stratify along the kebele status of financial access with a
random selection of households in each stratum.
For this reason, the data used in the analysis come from a three month (April - June,
2012) farm household survey of 817 households selected by stratified random sam-
pling from 21 kebeles in 21 districts of Ethiopia (i.e., one kebele from each districts)5.
The kebeles are two types. The first group of kebeles is those where either specialized
microfinance institutions or financial cooperatives are operating (not both) and it ac-
counts for 46 percent of the total sample households. The list of farm households who
have received financial services, credit in particular, from microfinance institutions
and financial cooperatives is used as a sampling frame to randomly select households
who have access to finance and choose to participate. The second group includes
kebeles where no institutional financial service providers operate and represents the
remaining 54 percent of the total sample. In this case households who have not access
to financial services were randomly selected from the complete lists of households
residing in the respective kebeles.
4.3.2 Variable definition and measurement
This study take in to account both supply side (i.e., the availability of institution pro-
viding financial services) and demand side (i.e., the choice of farm households to
participate) factors in the construction of treatment variable - access to finance. Hence,
product from agriculture for the last two decades show a weak interdependence. The lack of strong
relationship between growth in agricultural credit and agricultural output can be due to diversion of
credit funds away from agricultural production purpose, if not due to time lag-questions.
4 Kebele is the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia. Each kebele consists of at least five hundred families,
or the equivalent of 3,500 to 4,000 persons.
5 The data is collected with the financial and technical support from European research institute on coop-
eratives and social enterprise (Euricse) and International Food policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
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farm households who have access to finance (treatment group) are those residing in ke-
beles where there is/are institutional finance provider(s) and choose to participate (i.e.,
received agricultural credit for 2011/2012 production year). On the other hand, the
comparison group constitutes farm households residing in kebeles where there are no
formal sources of finance or financial service providers and who have never received
institutional finance.
The outcome variables include adoption of the three most common divisible agri-
cultural technologies in Ethiopia: that are; fertilizer, improved seeds, and pesticides.
Given the complexity of adoption definition, both dichotomous and continuous mea-
sures of adoption are used for two of the technologies considered. The dichotomous
fertilizer, improved seeds and pesticide dummy measures whether or not farm house-
holds make use of these technologies during 2011/2012 production year. However, in
most of the cases knowing that a farmer is using fertilizer or improved seed may not
provide complete information. It is because in divisible agricultural technologies, the
majority of technology issues relate more to the extent and intensity of uses at individ-
ual farm level rather than the initial decision of adoption (Feder et al., 1985; Schutjer
and Van der Veen, 1977). Thus, the study include a measure of intensity for fertilizer
and improved seed technologies.
As shown in Table 4.1, farm households demographic, social and economic character-
istics and attributes of financial services are also introduced in the estimation of the
probability of access to finance (p-score). The selection of these variables is guided by
previous theoretical and empirical works on the determinants of access to finance in
similar contexts by Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2012), Ibrahim et al. (2007), Hussien
(2007), Bigsten (2003), and Diagne (1999), among others. The definition and measure-
ment of the variables are presented in Table 4.1.
4.4 empirical model and estimation strategy
4.4.1 The impact evaluation problem and propensity score matching (PSM)
While there are many theoretical and practical reasons that access to financial services,
mainly credit, can increase smallholder farmers adoption of agricultural technologies,
but a priori one cannot be sure that (increased) adoption is caused by having access
to finance. It demands a systematic observation of adoption patterns or behaviors of
farmers both in the absence and availability of financial services. Ideally, randomized
experiment would provide with the data on what would have been the status and
intensity of adoption in the face of financial constraint (i.e., the counterfactual) and
the outcomes in the two groups can be directly compared, as their units are likely
to be similar (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Whereas, observational studies like this,
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Table 4.1: Definition of variables and measurement.
Variable Type Definition and measurement
Treatment variable
Access to finance Dummy = 1 if a household have access to finance and received loan
during 2011/2012 production year.
Outcome variables
Fertilizer adoption Dummy = 1 if adopted fertilizer in 2011/2012 agri production season.
Fertilizer per hectare Continuous Volume of fertilizer applied per hectare (in Kg).
Improved seeds
adoption
Dummy = 1 if adopted improved seeds in 2011/2012 agri prod season.
Improved seeds
Volume
Continuous Volume of improved seeds used (in Kg).
Pesticide adoption Dummy = 1 if adopted pesticide in 2011/2012 agri production season.
Independent variables
Sex Dummy = 1 if male-headed and 0 if female-headed
Age Continuous Age of household head in number of years
Literacy Dummy Equal to 1 if the household head can read and write
Family size Continuous Number of household members
Distance to
FCs/MFIs
Continuous Walking distance from home to saving and FC or MFI
Distance to bank Continuous Distance from home to the nearest commercial bank (in km)
Distance to road Continuous Walking distance from home to the nearest road (in minute)
Remittance Dummy = of the household received remittance during 2011/2012 year
Off-farm income Dummy = 1 if the household generate off-farm income
Radio ownership Dummy = 1 if the household own radio
Land holding size Continuous Size of landholding in hectare
Irrigation Dummy Equal to 1 if the household own irrigated land
Livestock (in TLU) Continuous Livestock ownership in tropical livestock units
Safety net Dummy = 1 if the household participate in safety net program
Extension Dummy = 1 if the household participate in gov’t extension program
Farmer training
center
Dummy = 1 if there is farmer training center in the kebele
Extreme risk averse Dummy = 1 if the household is extreme to sever risk averse
Moderate risk
averse
Dummy = 1 if the household is moderate risk averse
Neutral risk averse Dummy = 1 if the household is risk preferring to neutral
Note: Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) is calculated based on conversion factors suggested by
Asfaw et al. (2010), Chilonda and Otte (2006), and Jahnke et al. (1988). Fertilizer includes both
DAP and UREA and improved seeds includes all types of High Yield Varieties (HYV) used
during 2011/2012 production year.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
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would not provide with the data on the counterfactual situation - there is always
missing data or observation problem (Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1973; 1977). One can only
compare farm households that have received credit with those who have not access
to credit. However, direct comparison of these two groups may be misleading, as the
self-selected household who have access to finance can generally differ systematically
from the comparison group (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002;
Heckman et al., 1998).
Thus, in order to estimate meaningful impact of access to institutional finance on
farm households status and intensity of agricultural technology adoption using obser-
vational data, one have to reduce some statistical pitfalls of cross-sectional inference
while seeking to isolate the effects of access to finance from other socio-economic
determinants of households technology adoption (e.g., education, landholding, risk
preference, etc.). The most important is that the potential interdependence between
access to institutional finance and adoption of agricultural technologies - farm house-
holds decision to be users or non-users of financial services can be associated with
the net benefits from receiving institutional financial services. This section discuss a
model that link treatment and outcome measures to show the scenario the study is in
and review the commonly-used parametric and non-parametric methods to solve the
problems of impact evaluation.
As noted before, the primary interest is to disentangle the effect of access to institu-
tional finance from other potential household characteristics that influences technol-
ogy adoption. Following Mendola (2007), the reduced-form model that define house-
hold access to finance and technology adoption can be referred in Eq. (4.1) and (4.2) to
have a clear picture of the link between the treatment variable and output measures.
YDi = fD (xi) + ϵDi D = 0, 1 (4.1)
D = g (Wi) + ηi (4.2)
Where YDi refers to status (intensity) of adoption of farm household i that have ac-
cess to finance, D. Hence, Y1i and Y0i would refers to status (intensity) of technology
adoption in farm household i who have access to finance and who have not access
to finance, respectively. And agricultural technology adoption depends on a vector
of observed explanatory variables xi and a vector of unobserved variable ϵDi. In the
second equation, D is a treatment variable equal to 1 if farm household i have access
to finance and 0, otherwise. Wi is a sub set of xi and include observable explanatory
variables that determine the use of financial services. ηi summarizes other unobserv-
able household specific characteristics that influence households access to financial
services.
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In such a situation, does access to financial services (mainly credit) improve technol-
ogy adoption among farm households is the empirical question this chapter seek to
address. In particular, the quantitative interest here is the average impact of access to
institutional finance on status and intensity of technology adoption, which is Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) in impact evaluation terminology and can be
specified as follows:
τATT = E (Y1i −Y0i | Di = 1)
τATT = E (Y1i | Di = 1)− E (Y0i | Di = 1)
(4.3)
Where E (Y1i | Di = 1) is the outcome of farm households who have access to finance
and E (Y0i | Di = 1) is the outcome of these households had it been they do not have
access to institutional finance (i.e., non-treatment outcome of treated units).
The basic problem in estimating the casual effect specified in Eq. (4.3) is that one
can observe only E (Y1i | Di = 1) from households who have access to institutional
finance. We cannot observe the counterfactual - what would have been farm house-
holds decision to adopt technologies in the absence of access to institutional finance
(i.e., E (Y0i | Di = 1)). In observational studies like this, the outcome of farm house-
holds who have not access to institutional finance (i.e.,E (Y0i | Di = 0)) is often used
to overcome the missing observation problem and approximate E (Y0i | Di = 1). How-
ever, approximating non-treatment outcome of treated units using self-selected non-
users will have a selection bias (B) = E (Y0i | Di = 1)− E (Y0i | Di = 0)(Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008; Heckman et al., 1998).
There are different parametric and non-parametric estimation methods that can be
applied to reduce the bias arise from such approximation. The commonly-used para-
metric methods include control-function regression and instrumental variable (IV) es-
timators. If one assume that conditioning on a vector of observable characteristics
restores the condition of randomization (i.e., conditional independent assumption:
(Y1,Y0) ⊥ D | x), one can estimate the casual effect of access to finance on technology
adoption using control-function OLS regression). However, if the conditional indepen-
dent assumption does not hold, which is probable in cases where the selection into
the treatment is not only due to observable variables, but also due to characteristics
unobservable to the analyst, OLS regression could lead to biased estimates.
A variation on parametric OLS regression is to use an instrumental variable (IV) es-
timator, another parametric approach that can bring consistent estimation under the
hypothesis of selection on unobservable (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Heckman et
al., 1998). It solves the problem by treating the treatment variable as endogenous. But
the application of IV estimator requires availability of at least one valid instrument Z,
that is relevant and exogenous (i.e., Cov (Z,D) ̸= 0 but Cov (Z, e) = 0 ) - the basic
exclusion restriction under which IV estimator works. While this approach has the
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advantage to restore the conditions in a natural experiment, it is fairly difficult to
find variable that explains the selection and at the same time having no relation with
the outcome. When such a variable is available its exclusion restriction is not easily
testable. Furthermore, the validity of the casual inference using these commonly-used
regression methods rests on ad hoc functional form assumptions required by standard
parametric approaches (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003).
Propensity score matching (PSM) is another non-experimental, but non-parametric
approach used for casual inference under the same hypothesis for parametric OLS
regression (i.e., selection on observable, unconfoundedness or conditional indepen-
dence). It is a method which substitutes for the absence of experimental comparison
units using a set of potential control units that are not necessarily drawn from the
same population as the treated units but from whom we observe the same set of
parametric covariates (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The
study used PSM to estimate the impact of access to institutional finance on technol-
ogy adoption, as it is generally preferred than parametric regression approaches for
at least three reasons. One, it does not require parametric model linking treatment to
outcome, it does not impose any functional forms (Smith and Todd, 2005). Two, it can
impose a common support condition that improves the quality of the match - it con-
fines attention to the matched sub-samples; unmatched comparison units are dropped.
By contrast, the regression methods commonly found in the literature use the whole
sample (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003). Three, it reduce the number of comparison groups
to a sub-sample with characteristics more homogenous to the treated once (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2005).
A further distinction relates to the choice of control variables. In the parametric re-
gression approach one naturally looks for predictors of the outcome measure and
predictors that are exogenous to outcomes are preferred. Whereas, in PSM one should
consider covariates of treatment along with variables that are even poor predictors of
outcomes, as the variables with weak predictive ability for outcome measure can still
help reduce the bias in estimating casual effects (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003; Rubin and
Thomas, 2000).
4.4.2 The p-score matching procedure and estimation results
As indicated above, the analysis deployed PSM procedure that restore the missing ob-
servations from non-users of institutional financial services for whom we observe the
same set of characteristics to that of households with access to institutional finance. To
do this, we need the conditional independence assumption from Lechner (1999), Heck-
man and Robb (1985), and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), which in this case states that
access to institutional finance is random and uncorrelated with status (intensity) of
technology adoption, once controlled for farm households pre-exposure characteris-
4.4 empirical model and estimation strategy 89
tics. Hence, the study first estimated the conditional probability of access to finance
(i.e., p (xi) = Pr (Di = 1 | xi)), which allow to identify similar farm households given
their observed characteristics since conditioning on all relevant covariates is limited
or difficult in the case of high dimensional vectors like ours (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). Here the estimation follow the common practices in PSM applications of using
the predicted values from standard probit model6 to estimate the propensity score of
each observation with and without access to finance.
The estimated probit model is statistically significant at below 1% level and the model
correctly classified 74 percent of farm households among users and 76 percent of farm
households among non-users with a total correct prediction rate of 75 percent for the
whole sample. The estimated propensity scores range between 0.000018 and 0.982266
with mean value of 0.453064 and standard deviation of 0.287863. The propensity score
of farm households with access to finance ranges between 0.126941 and 0.982266 with
mean value of 0.634021 and standard deviation of 0.187312. In contrast, with mean
value of 0.298779 and standard deviation of 0.268204 the propensity scores of farm
households without access to finance vary between 0.000018 and 0.966109. Hence,
following the minima and maxima criterion the common support region for the distri-
bution of estimated propensity scores of farm households with and without access to
finance would range between 0.126941 and 0.966109. About 20 percent of farm house-
holds whose propensity scores lie outside this range are dropped from the analysis
that follows (see Figure 4.1).
The results from the probit estimation are summarized in Table 4.2. From the results
it was evident that farm households that are female headed and literate have higher
probability of access or participation in formal financial institutions. Households that
are literate and female head have higher probability of access to finance by 6.5 and
13.5 percentage points, respectively. This is plausible, because education can provide
6 In our estimation of the probability of access to finance, the decision of farm households to receive a
financial product (e.g., credit) is analyzed using a random utility framework following similar applica-
tions by Abebaw and Haile (2013), Wollini and Zeller (2007), and Feder et al. (1985) on farmers decision
to adopt technologies and participate in cooperatives, among others. We assume that the willingness or
the decision to receive financial services is based on the maximization of an underlying utility function.
Even though the actual utility function of each farm household Ui is unknown, farm households choose
to receive financial product if the utility gain from receiving finance URi is greater than the utility of not-
receiving UNi . Hence the utility gain from receiving financial services (i.e., U
R
i - U
N
i ) can be expressed as
a function of a vector of observable variables xi and a vector of parameters to be estimated β : fi (β′xi),
where Ui = fi (β′xi) + ϵi. Following the random utility framework, the probability of receiving financial
services by a farmer can be given by Pr (ϵi < β′xi). The error term in the model is assumed to have a stan-
dard normal distribution, thus validating the use of probit model. The empirical probit model estimated
can be specified as follows: Pr (access = 1) = Pr (ϵi < β′xi) = β′xi + ϵi, where access = 1 if URi > UNi and
access = 0 if URi ≤ UNi . The observed variables in the model include attributes of financial services and
farm households demographic, social and economic variables (Table 4.1 and Table 4.2). The choice of the
variables is guided by previous theoretical and empirical works in similar contexts by Demirgüç-Kunt
and Klapper (2012), Ibrahim et al. (2007), Hussien (2007), and Diagne (1999), among others.
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farm households with the information and ability to intermediate their financial re-
sources. And greater access to finance among female headed household can be due to
the special focus of microfinance providers on female borrowers in Ethiopia. The re-
sults also indicate that farm households engaged in off-farm activities besides farming
and households residing in kebeleswith farmers training center have higher propensity
to receive institutional financial services. This hints that income from off-farm activi-
ties can provide households with insurance and thus increased demand for financial
services, like credit.
On the other hand, farm households that are relatively wealthy (as measured by live-
stock ownership and ownership of durable assets) and have access to irrigated land
are less likely to receive services from formal financial institutions. This may be due to
the fact that households that are relatively better-off and with continuous harvest have
less demand for external source of capital, as they may not face financial constraints.
The results also indicated that participating in a safety net program is inversely linked
with using financial services. This is also conceivable, because the majorities of house-
holds participating in safety net program are the very poor and are not attractive for
lenders or the cash transfer from the safety net program satisfied their credit demand
or loosen their liquidity constraint. Other variables included in the estimation of the
propensity score like family size, remittance, participating in extension services and
households degree of risk aversion do not have significant effects on households access
to institutional financial services.
After getting the predicted propensity scores from the probit model, the study impose
the common support or overlap condition (i.e., 0 < p (D = 1 | x) < 1) in order to im-
prove the quality of the match, as it drops all the comparison the value of whose p (x)
is higher or smaller than that of the treated7. The density distribution of propensity
scores for users and non-users of institutional financial services by common support
are presented in Figure 4.2. As it can be seen in the figure, the distributions appear
with sufficient common support region that allows for matching. Besides, the differ-
ence between users and non-users in their propensity score distribution validates the
use of matching techniques to ensure comparability. From several matching techniques
applicable in impact evaluation, the study used three extensively applied matching
techniques - non-parametric kernel based matching, five nearest neighbors matching,
and radius matching - that use the similarities captured by ’p-score’ to match farm
households that have access to finance with his/her closer non-users.
The non-parametric kernel regression method is used to allow matching of users with
the whole sample of non-users, since the technique uses the whole sample of the
7 By the common support condition, the propensity score is bounded away from zero and, excluding the
tails of the distribution p (x) - between 0.126941 and 0.966109 in our case. This condition rules out the
phenomenon of perfect predictability of D given x and ensures that farm households with the same x
value have a positive probability of being both users and non-users of institutional financial services
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Heckman et al., 1997; Heckman et al., 1999).
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Table 4.2: Probit estimation of determinants of smallholders access to institutional finance
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. Marginal effect
HH head gender -0.486*** 0.149 -0.135
HH head age -0.002 0.005 -0.000
HH head Literacy 0.234** 0.115 0.065
Family size 0.030 0.027 0.008
Distance to FCs or MFIs 0.011*** 0.001 0.003
Distance to bank -0.049*** 0.003 -0.013
Distance to road -0.005*** 0.001 -0.001
Remittance 0.238 0.218 0.066
Off-farm income 0.337*** 0.114 0.094
Radio ownership -0.409** 0.161 -0.113
Land holding size 0.004 0.042 0.001
Irrigations -0.389** 0.170 -0.108
Livestock (in TLU) -0.031** 0.015 -0.008
Safety net -1.791*** 0.580 -0.498
Extension 0.164 0.132 0.045
Farmer training center 0.530*** 0.204 0.147
Risk preference
Moderate -0.222 0.165 -0.062
Neutral -0.111 0.159 -0.030
Constant -0.044 0.485 -
Pseudo-R2 0.286
LR chi2(18) 322.55
Prob > chi2 0.000
Number of obs. 817
Sensitivity (%) 74.20
Specificity (%) 75.74
Total correctly classified (%) 75.03
Note: Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) is calculated based on conversion factors suggested by
Asfaw et al. (2010), Chilonda and Otte (2006), and Jahnke et al. (1988). Extreme to sever risk
averse is a reference category for risk preference dummy. *** significant at 1% and ** significant
at 5%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
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comparison with common support to construct a weighted average match for each
treated (Heckman et al., 1998; Heckman et al., 1997). That is, the entire sample of non-
users in the comparison group is used to construct a weighted average match to each
user in the treatment group. On the other hand, the five nearest neighbors matching
is used to match each user with the mean of the five non-users who have the closest
propensity score.
In the nearest neighbors matching, while all treated units find a match, some of the
matches can be fairly poor because for some treated units the nearest neighbor may
have a very different propensity score and nevertheless the unit will be considered
to the estimation of the treatment effect independently of this difference (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008; Becker and Ichino, 2001). The study used a radius matching
which offer a solution if poor matching prevails in case of nearest neighbors match-
ing. With radius matching each treated unit is matched only with the control units
whose propensity score falls in a predefined neighborhood of the propensity score of
the treated unit. The smallest the dimension of the radius, the higher the possibility
of unmatched treated units and the better is the quality of the matches (Becker and
Ichino, 2001).
It should be noted that, as propensity score (p (x)) estimated from the probit model
are used to ranks farm households according to their own behavior towards accessing
or receiving financial services, matching based on p (x) denotes evaluating the effect
of access to institutional finance among a group of farm households having similar
behavior towards receiving financial services. In other words, households preference
for financial services is taken into account in evaluating its casual effect on technology
adoption decision. The point is that, as it assume access to institutional finance is
random within the group of farm households that have similar probability of access
to financial services, the conditional independent assumption is now more plausible
than in case of OLS - it reduce the bias due to observable heterogeneity.
However, the validity of this assumption relies on the extent to which the matching
techniques construct a comparison group that resembles the treatment group. The
study perform a balancing hypothesis test of covariates within blocks and covariates
across matching techniques (i.e., D ⨿ x | p (x)) in order to ensure that farm house-
holds with similar probability of access to financial services have the same distribu-
tion of pre-exposure characteristics. From multiple variations of balancing test exist
in the literature, the study make sure that balancing across inferior bounds prevails
in the estimation of the probability model (Becker and Ichino, 2002) and performed
mean equality test across covariates suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). As
shown in Table A.4 and Table 4.3, the balancing property is satisfied in both cases.
In particular, the balancing test based on mean equality test of covariates between
households with access to finance and corresponding households without access to fi-
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of estimated propensity score by financial access and common sup-
port.
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nance sampled by the matching techniques shows that the two groups are statistically
comparable.
As shown in Table 4.3, the unmatched sample fails to satisfy the balancing property.
Although the groups are found to be comparable in terms of age, family size, land-
holding, livestock ownership and risk preference, it shows a systematic difference
between users and non-users in the majority of their observed characteristics before
matching. The balancing test results after matching that compares users of financial
services to the sub-set of comparison non-users selected through five nearest neigh-
bors matching, kernel-based matching, and radius matching shows no systematic or
statistical difference in observed characteristics between the two groups (the balancing
test results based on the radius matching are not reported to conserve space). More-
over, the standardized bias8, another indicator to assess the balance of all covariates
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), found to be less than 5 percent across
the covariates, except for sex and age of household head. In all, the results from the
balancing hypothesis test suggest that the comparison is valid from statistical point of
view.
Hence, assuming that the implicit unconfoundeness holds, since the estimation ac-
counts for variables that influence access to institutional finance (e.g., distance, ed-
ucation, off-farm income, etc.) and technology adoption decision (e.g., landholding
size, extension services, degree of risk aversion, etc.), the estimated average effect of
access to institutional finance for farm households with similar propensity score can
be specified as follows:
τPSMATT = Ep(x)|D=1 [E (Y1i | Di = 1, p (x))− E (Y0i | Di = 0, p (x))] (4.4)
Where E (Y1i | Di = 1, p (x)) is the outcome of households who have access to institu-
tional finance and choose to participate and E (Y0i | Di = 0, p (x)) is the outcome of
households who have not access to institutional finance and have similar observable
pre-exposure parametric characteristics with that of households received institutional
financial services.
It has to be also noted that, even if PSM has become popular in impact evaluation
under the hypothesis of selection on observables, the procedure is not free from other
potential source of biases. Among others, the need to consider a rich set of explana-
tory variables related to treatment and outcome, geographic mismatch (i.e., the failure
8 It is the standardized mean difference between treatment and comparison group and can be specified
as B (x) = 100× x¯T−x¯c√
VT (x)+VC (x)
2
, where x¯T and x¯C are the sample means for the treatment and comparison
groups, respectively. VT (x)and VC (x)are the corresponding sample variances. Total standardized biased
is estimated as an unweighted average of all covariates, and the percentage bias reduction can be calcu-
lated as BR = 100×
[
1− Ba f terBbe f ore
]
. Standardized bias below 5 percent after matching is seen as sufficient
(see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for detailed discussion).
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Table 4.3: Balancing test of matched sample.
Variables
Unmatched samples Kernel-based matching Five-nearest
neighbors
matching
users Non-
users
Diff:
p-value
users Non-
users
Diff:
p-value
users Non-
users
Diff:
p-value
HH head gender 0.88 0.77 0.000 0.78 0.85 0.015 0.78 0.84 0.031
HH head age 41.9 42.9 0.161 41.9 43.7 0.018 41.9 43.8 0.014
HH head Literacy 0.63 0.46 0.000 0.63 0.65 0.597 0.63 0.63 0.964
Family size 5.99 6.18 0.242 6.01 6.15 0.400 6.01 6.12 0.504
Distance to
FCs/MFIs
60.1 53.5 0.099 60.1 58.8 0.774 60.1 59.3 0.873
Distance to bank 15.0 30.6 0.000 15.1 14.7 0.740 15.1 14.4 0.561
Distance to road 65.2 69.4 0.289 65.6 60.6 0.150 65.6 62.3 0.343
Remittance 0.06 0.04 0.140 0.06 0.07 0.576 0.06 0.07 0.554
Off-farm income 0.46 0.34 0.000 0.46 0.44 0.518 0.46 0.44 0.528
Radio ownership 0.84 0.92 0.000 0.84 0.85 0.901 0.84 0.86 0.632
Land holding size 2.39 2.27 0.346 2.39 2.47 0.512 2.39 2.51 0.311
Irrigation 0.09 0.16 0.003 0.09 0.09 1.000 0.09 0.08 0.817
Livestock (in TLU) 6.43 6.64 0.508 6.45 6.84 0.189 6.45 6.97 0.079
Safety net 0.01 0.04 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.423 0.01 0.00 0.318
Extension 0.76 0.72 0.286 0.75 0.75 0.974 0.75 0.76 0.810
FTC 0.93 0.86 0.001 0.93 0.94 0.610 0.93 0.94 0.608
Risk preference
Moderate 0.37 0.36 0.614 0.38 0.36 0.707 0.38 0.36 0.694
Neutral 0.47 0.49 0.704 0.47 0.47 0.951 0.47 0.47 0.861
Note: Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) is calculated based on conversion factors suggested by
Asfaw et al. (2010), Chilonda and Otte (2006), and Jahnke et al. (1988). Extreme to sever risk
averse is a reference category for risk preference dummy. Bold p-value indicates differences
significant at a 10% level or lower. The balancing test for matched sample presented in Table
4 is for the outcome fertilizer dummy. The balancing test results based on radius matching
are not reported to conserve space. Moreover, the analysis calculated balancing tests for all
outcome variables and the results are found to be more or less similar.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
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to control local differences when matching treated and control units), the need to
measure dependent variable in the same way for both groups, and selection on unob-
servable are some of the potential sources of bias identified in the empirical literature
(Smith and Todd, 2005; Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). In the matching anal-
ysis that follows we eliminate some of the concerns related to considering relevant
variables that explain treatment and outcome and measurement issues of dependent
variable.
With regard to selection on unobservable, since the study employ PSM that compare
users and non-users of financial services whose propensity score have the same dis-
tribution, it is assumed that the distribution of unobservable characteristics are the
same or at least not so different for both groups independent of treatment to induce
a bias (Becker and Ichino, 2002). In other words, the conditional independent assump-
tion rule out potential unobserved household characteristics in the propensity score
estimation. Furthermore, since the conditional independent assumption cannot be di-
rectly tested with observational data, the estimation took the following three measures
suggested in the literature to address possible underestimation or overestimation due
to unobserved selection. One, it impose common support condition (Heckman et al.,
1997). Two, it include several relevant variables in the p-score estimation to overcome
omitted variable bias (Smith and Todd, 2003). Three, it performed Rosenbaum bounds
(i.e., rbound) sensitivity analysis to test the sensitivity of the results to possible hidden
biases due to unobservable household characteristics when this assumption is relaxed
(Rosenbaum, 2002)9.
Finally, the estimation checked for the robustness of the results using p-scores esti-
mated based on reduced probit specification (excluding potential endogenous vari-
ables), whole sample (that include households who have access to institutional finance
but choose to not participate), and alternative estimation method (control-function re-
gression). The analysis also checked for possible heterogeneous effects by plotting the
impact distribution of access to institutional finance on agricultural technology adop-
tion for user households and disaggregating the impact estimates using subrogate
9 From multiple variations of sensitivity test for matching analysis, the basic issue addressed by rbounds
approach is whether inference about the treatment effects may be changed by unobserved covariates. To
check for the sensitivity of the matching analysis for unobserved heterogeneity, it is assumed that the
participation probability πi is not only determined by observable covariates,xi, but also by unobservable
factors uI : πi = Pr (Di = 1 | xi) = F (βxi + γui). ui is the unobserved variables, and γ is the effect
of ui on the decision to participate (i.e., on the decision to receive institutional finance in this case). If
the study is free from hidden bias, γ will be equal to zero and the participation probability will be
only be determined by xi. However, if there is a hidden bias, two individuals with the same observed
characteristics x have differing probability of receiving a treatment. Varying the value of γ allow to assess
the sensitivity of the results with respect to hidden bias. Based on that, for each value of Γ, bounds
for significant levels of the treatment effect under the assumption of selection on unobservable in the
treatment status and confidence intervals can be derived (Rosenbaum, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008; Keele, 2010).
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variables, which potentially capture households and institutional factors that influ-
ence farmers adoption decision.
4.5 results and discussions
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.4 presents the summary statistics and mean difference test results between
farm households with and without access to institutional finance across the outcome
measures and household demographic, social and economic characteristics. The re-
sults from the summary statistics bring some good news on the adoption rates of agri-
cultural technologies, in particular on adoption rate of fertilizer10. Of the total farm
households who have access to institutional finance 99 percent of them use fertilizer
during 2011/2012 production year. The corresponding figure for households without
access to institutional finance is 74 percent, which is still substantial proportion. The
adoption rates of improved seeds are also encouraging. From the total sample, 63
percent of farm households among users of institutional finance and 42 percent of
non-users adopt one or more varieties of improved seeds. However, when looking at
the intensity of use, which is more important than the initial adoption decision, the
majority of households in the sample use these technologies below the recommended
rates. In particular, application rates of fertilizer among households who have not ac-
cess to institutional finance is far below the recommended rate by about 50 percent11.
Overall, the results from the descriptive statistics on the outcome measures (i.e., adop-
tion and application rates of fertilizer, improved seeds and pesticides) indicate sta-
tistically significant differences between households with and without access to insti-
tutional finance on adoption and application rates of agricultural technologies. On
average farm households who have access to institutional finance and choose to par-
ticipate have higher rates of adoption and intensity of uses. However, as stated in
the previous sections these results cannot be used to make inferences regarding the
impact of access to finance on improved agricultural technology adoption since the
results does not account for potential confounding factors (i.e., factors correlated with
both access to finance and, independent of access, are causally related to agricultural
technology adoption).
Table 4.4 also reports sample mean values and mean difference test results for farm
and household characteristics of households living in kebeles with access to finance
10 It has to be noted that the adoption and application rates of fertilizer and improved seeds might not be
the same everywhere in the country. We presume that the majority of the 21 districts considered in this
study are relatively accessible.
11 The recommended dose is 200kg per hectare as cited in Zerfu and Larson (2011).
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics of sample households by access to institutional finance.
Indicators
Users of
institutional
finance (n=376)
Non-users of
institutional
finance (n=441)
Difference
in mean
(p-Value)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Fertilizer adoption 0.99 0.07 0.74 0.43 0.000
Fertilizer per hectare 157.2 91.65 95.06 90.31 0.000
Improved seeds adoption 0.63 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.000
Volume of Improved
seeds
36.21 42.67 17.86 30.65 0.000
Pesticide adoption 0.76 0.42 0.68 0.46 0.016
HH head gender 0.88 0.32 0.77 0.41 0.000
HH head age 41.94 10.14 42.96 10.54 0.161
HH head literacy 0.63 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.000
Family size 5.99 2.10 6.18 2.46 0.242
Distance to FCs/MFIs 60.17 66.89 53.54 47.25 0.098
Distance to bank 15.02 16.80 30.62 16.65 0.000
Distance to road 65.21 44.77 69.44 65.32 0.289
Remittance 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.140
Off-farm income 0.46 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.000
Radio ownership 0.84 0.36 0.92 0.25 0.000
Land holding size 2.39 1.54 2.27 1.87 0.346
Irrigation 0.90 0.28 0.16 0.36 0.002
Livestock (in TLU) 6.43 3.58 6.64 5.30 0.507
Safety net 0.002 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.000
Extension 0.76 0.42 0.72 0.44 0.286
Farmer training center 0.93 0.24 0.86 0.34 0.000
Risk preference
Moderate 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.613
Neutral 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.704
Note: Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) is calculated based on conversion factors suggested by
Asfaw et al. (2010), Chilonda and Otte (2006), and Jahnke et al. (1988). Extreme to sever risk
averse is a reference category for risk preference dummy. Bold p-value indicates significance
differences at a 10% level or lower.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
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and choose to participate and households who have not access to institutional finance.
The results show a statistically significant difference between the two groups of farm
households on some of the households demographic, social and economic variables.
It indicates that farm households who have access to finance are comparatively more
of male-headed, educated, and residing closer to banks and farmer training centers.
Despite higher probability for receiving institutional financial services and the special
focus of microfinance institution on female borrowers, we suspect that the observed
lower level of financial service use among female-headed households can be due to
gender gaps in other dimensions, such as lower land ownership, income and educa-
tion.
Closer proximity to banks and extension providers, on the other hand, may provide
information on the availability and use of financial services for farm households who
have access to institutional finance and choose to participate. It also appears that
households who have access to finance more likely to have off-farm incomes. While
additional income from off-farm activities and remittance might loosen liquidity con-
strain at household level and thus credit demand, the positive correlation between
off-farm income and access to finance is also plausible, as off-farm income can pro-
vide households with the additional income and insurance and thus increases the
demand for saving and credit, respectively.
On the other hand, farm households who have not access to institutional finance are
more likely to participate in safety net programs. Even though increasing households
use of credit is one among the aims of the productive safety net program in Ethiopia
(Gilligan et al., 2008), this result show relatively lower use of credit among households
participating in safety net program. For all other variables (i.e., family size, remittance,
land ownership, livestock ownership, and risk preference) differences between the
two groups are not statistically significant, hinting that there is no selection bias in
receiving institutional financial services by wealth status and degree of risk aversion.
In all, the results from the descriptive statistics are consistent with similar previous
works on determinants of access to finance by Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2012),
Aterido et al. (2011), Richter (2008), Bigsten (2003), Schmidt and Kropp (1987), and
Millar and Ladman (1983), among others.
4.5.2 Average impact of access to institutional finance on technology adoption
While there are many practical reasons that access to institutional finance (mainly
credit) can encourage subsistence smallholder farmers to adopt agricultural technolo-
gies, a priori one cannot be sure that improved adoption of agricultural technologies is
caused by having access to finance, as adoption decision can be equally influenced by
many other factors (e.g., household characteristics, land size and tenure structure, ac-
cess to information, households degree of risk aversion, etc.). This chapter seek to iso-
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late the impact of access to institutional finance on farm households adoption and ap-
plication rates of agricultural technologies following propensity score matching (PSM),
a method which accounts for potential confounding factors.
Table 4.5 presents the average effect of access to institutional finance on adoption and
application rates of technologies estimated following Eq. (4.4). The results across the
three matching algorithms consistently show a positive and statistically significant
impact of access to institutional finance on smallholders adoption and application
rates of agricultural technologies, except for pesticides. On average, farm households
who have access to institutional finance and choose to participate have higher rate of
fertilizer adoption by at least 11 percent. Likewise, farm households that are users of
institutional finance are characterized by higher intensity of fertilizer application per
hectare compared to households without access to institutional finance. The results
show at least a 51 kg/ha application intensity difference between the two group of
farm households. In other words, in the absence of access to institutional finance farm
households application rate of fertilizer diminishes by about 51 kg/ha (i.e., by about
ij of the recommended application rate per hectare).
The matching results on adoption and application rates of improved seeds concur-
rently show a significant positive impact of access to institutional finance like that of
fertilizer, with larger difference between the two groups in magnitude. Its shows that
the adoption rates of improved seeds would be 30-32 percent lesser in the absence
of institutions providing agricultural finance. One explanation for greater impact of
access to institutional finance on adoption rate of improved seeds compared to fertil-
izer is that improved seeds are highly substitutable. In case of shortage of capital or
financial constraint farm households may tend to use local seeds. However, in case of
fertilizer, if there is a need to use, farm households who face financial constraint can
go to the extent of selling or renting their productive assets to partially adopt fertilizer.
The proxy measure of improved seeds intensity also indicates a statistically signifi-
cant difference between the two groups on volume of improved seeds used by 25 kg
- farm households who have access to institutional finance and choose to participate
tend to use more volume of seeds. In relative terms this can also hint that households
with financial access allocate more proportion of their lands for high yield varieties
- the more the volume of improved seeds used the more the proportion of the land
allocated for modern crop varieties.
Following similar procedure, the study further analyze the impact of access to in-
stitutional finance on combined adoption of fertilizer and improved seeds, as joint
adoption of improved seeds and fertilizer is proven to be responsive from productiv-
ity point of view. The results across the three matching estimators show significantly
higher rates of combined adoption among farm households who have access finance
by about 32 percent. In other words, the combined adoption rate of fertilizer and im-
proved seeds would be 32 percent less in a situation where farmers would not have
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access to institutional finance. Regarding pesticides, the results show that adoption
rate have not differed significantly between the two groups. This can be due to the
fact that pesticides are not an innovation aimed at increasing yields - the innovations
are more on application techniques. It is rather a technology that circumvents yield-
reduction effects of pests and application is not based on freewill and can be less
dependent on access to financial services and other common adoption factors.
In all, the statistically significant differences in adoption and application rates of fer-
tilizer and improved seeds among the two groups of farm households indicates the
crucial role of access to financial services on smallholders production decision. It ap-
pears that access to institutional credit and saving mechanisms encouraged small-
holder farmers to invest in agricultural inputs. On the other hand, lack of access to
institutional finance deter adoption or impede the uptake of agricultural technol-ogies.
These results are in general consistent with the widespread notion that ascribes limited
diffusion of agricultural technologies to financial market inefficiencies - in the absence
of access to capital for investment, to withstand economic shocks and diffuse risks,
farmers tend to mange risks through conservative production, for instance through
the use of local seeds and reducing the amount of uptakes in case of fertilizer.
Nonetheless, the above results rely heavily on the assumption of conditional indepen-
dence, selection on observables or unconfoundeness12 (i.e., once the factors affecting
access to institutional finance are taken into account, the condition of randomization
restored) and are not robust against possible hidden bias. If there are unobserved
covariates that affect access to institutional finance and adoption of agricultural tech-
nologies simultaneously, unobserved heterogeneity which affects the strength of the
estimates might arise (Becker and Caliendo, 2007; Rosenbaum, 2002; Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983).
The incidence of this problem is examined using Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity anal-
ysis when this key assumption is relaxed by a quantifiable increase in uncertainty. As
shown in Table 4.5 (rbound: ), in all cases the estimates found to be strong or insensi-
tive to a bias that would double the odds of access to institutional finance, except for
the estimates of pesticides. The majority of the results are insensitive to unobserved
heterogeneity that would triple the odds of access to finance - the magnitude of hidden
bias, which would make the finding of a positive and statistically significant effect of
access to institutional finance spurious, should be higher than =2.5. Hence, the study
deduce that the strength of the hidden bias should be sufficiently high to undermine
12 Conditional independence or unconfoundedness in this case denotes that access to institutional finance
does not depend on farm households technology adoption, after controlling for the variations in adoption
induced by differences in observable covariates. It is a strong assumption which implies that access to
institutional finance is based on observable covariates and that variables simultaneously influencing
access to finance and agricultural technology adoption are observable. Thus, systematic difference in
adoption and application rates of technologies between farm households that are users and non-users of
institutional finance with the same value of covariates are ascribed to access to institutional finance.
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Table 4.5: Effect of access to institutional finance on agricultural technology adoptions.
Outcome variables
Kernel-based
matching
(bandwidth =
0.06)
Five-nearest
neighbors
matching
Radius matching
(caliper = 0.05)
ATT
(SE)
rbound ATT
(SE)
rbound ATT
(SE)
rbound
Fertilizer adoption 0.11**
(0.057)
(31-32) 0.11**
(0.050)
(23-24) 0.12**
(0.048)
(31-32)
Fertilizer per hectare 53.15***
(18.12)
(2.4-2.5) 51.32**
(21.71)
(2.2-2.3) 53.89***
(17.14)
(2.5-2.6)
Improved seeds adoption 0.32***
(0.105)
(3.8-3.9) 0.30***
(0.111)
(3.5-3.6) 0.32***
(0.107)
(3.9-4.0)
Improved seeds (volume) 24.83***
(5.01)
(2.4-2.5) 24.12***
(5.07)
(2.3-2.4) 25.28***
(5.40)
(2.3-2.4)
Pesticide adoption 0.01
(0.090)
- 0.00
(0.109)
- 0.01
(0.086)
-
Number of obs. 548 548 541
Note: Bootstrap with 100 replications is used to estimate the standard errors. Common support
condition is imposed across the three matching estimators. rbound () is estimated Rosenbaum
bounds for critical values of hidden bias. The matched sample includes 252 users of institu-
tional finance (treatment) and 296 non-users (control) for kernel and nearest neighbors match-
ing and 245 users (treatment) and 296 non-users (control) for radius matching. *** significant
at 1% and ** significant at 5%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
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the conclusion of positive and statistically significant effect of access to institutional
finance on smallholders agricultural technology adoption and application rates.
4.5.3 Robustness check
Besides the rbound sensitivity analysis that tests the strengths of the estimates for
covariates unobservable by the analyst, the analysis further check the robustness of
the estimated ATT by using variations in the specification of the probit model, sam-
ple used and using a control-function regression model that rely on the hypothesis
of selection on observable like that of PSM. The ATT results from these variations are
reported in Table 4.6. The first variation, reported in column 1, uses the reduced probit
model specification for the estimation of p-score, which excludes potential endogenous
variables, including households literacy status, landholding size, off-farm income, live-
stock ownership, radio ownership, and degree of risk aversions. The second variation,
presented in column 2, use the whole sample that includes farm households residing
in kebeleswith access to institutional finance and choose ’not’ to participate. The balanc-
ing hypothesis is satisfied for both of these matches and only results from kernel-based
matching technique are reported to conserve space.
Comparisons of the results suggest that the estimates are insensitive for the probit
specification and sample used. Similar results is obtained from the reduced probit
model both in magnitude and statistical significance with that of the results based on
the base model. Likewise, the results from the whole sample revealed similar signs
and levels of statistical significance, with lower impact in magnitude. Relatively lower
impact for the whole sample that includes untreated units in treatment kebeles is plausi-
ble, as there can be possible spillover effects that can undermine the impact. Moreover,
the comparable results observed from disaggregated samples while checking impact
heterogeneity in the next section further ensures the insensitivity of the results for
samples considered.
As indicated above, we also checked the robustness of the results using an alternative
method to that of PSM - control-function regression. As it can be seen in column 3
of Table 4.6, the ATT results are comparable to those estimates from PSM reported
in Table 4.5. In all, the robustness check indicates the positive and statistically signif-
icant impact of access to institutional finance on agricultural technology adoption is
not sensitive for unobserved covariates, probit model specification, sample used and
estimation method.
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Table 4.6: Robustness of ATT for agricultural technology adoption.
Outcome variables
Treatment variable: access to institutional finance
Reduced probit
model
(Kernel-based
matching)
Whole sample
(Kernel-based
matching)
Control-function
regression
ATT Std. Err. ATT Std. Err. ATT Std. Err.
Fertilizer adoption 0.13*** 0.040 0.05*** 0.015 0.24*** 0.040
Fertilizer per hectare 66.72*** 14.06 24.88*** 8.85 69.84*** 10.81
Improved seeds adoption 0.35*** 0.120 0.08* 0.047 0.34*** 0.053
Improved seeds (volume) 23.74*** 4.97 8.14** 3.92 24.19*** 3.91
Pesticide adoption 0.03 0.113 -0.04 0.033 -0.05 0.055
Number of obs. 548 814 672
Note: Whole samples include farm households residing in kebeles with access to institutional
finance and choose ’not’ to participate (i.e., untreated units in treatment kebele). Bootstrap with
100 replications is used to estimate the standard errors. Common support condition is imposed
across for the matching estimators. The matched sample includes 252 users of institutional
finance (treatment) and 296 non-users (control) for the matching based on the reduced probit
model and 373 users of institutional finance (treatment) and 441 non-users (control) for the
matching based on the whole sample. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and *
significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
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4.5.4 Impact heterogeneity
The above results obtained from the matching estimates assume a homogenous impact
of access to institutional finance on farm households adoption and application rates of
agricultural technologies. However, there is no reason to believe a priori that access to
institutional finance will result similar effects for farm households that are distinct in
their demographic, social and economic characteristics. To check for possible impact
heterogeneity, the impact distribution of access to institutional finance on agricultural
technology adoption are plotted by type of technologies both for adoption rate and
intensity of use. The plots in Figure 4.A1 show a significant amount of variation in
user households response to accessing institutional finance. It was evident that for
the majority of farm households the adoption and application rates of fertilizer and
improved seeds would be much lower with varying degrees in a situation without
access to institutional finance.
The study further examine the heterogeneity observed in Figure 4.A1 to identify
sources of impact variations within farm households who have access to institutional
finance. The data allow us to disaggregating the ATT estimates by landholding size
- a potential surrogate variable for other factors affecting agricultural technology adop-
tion - and by ownership of lending institutions. Disaggregation by land size is found
to be representative, as it can substitute or proxy most of household variables that
can potentially affect farm households decision on adoption and application rates of
agricultural technologies, such as capacity to bear risk, wealth, and access to informa-
tion. Many theoretical and empirical studies also shows the importance of farm size in
adoption decisions - they indicated that adoption rates, intensity and the time pattern
of adoption are strongly related to farm sizes (Feder et al., 1985; Feder and O’Mara,
1981; Just and Zilberman, 1983; Binswanger, 1978).
The estimates obtained from the ATT disaggregated by land size show strong impact
variations between small and larger farmers. As shown in Table 4.7, while the results
from the ATT show no differential impact of access to institutional finance on adoption
rate of fertilizer by farm size, it indicates impact heterogeneity on intensity of use. The
biggest effect of access to institutional finance on intensity of fertilizer use per hectare
is observed for small farmers with the total landholding of less than 2 hectares. This
suggests that access to institutional finance can help small farmers who often cannot
afford optimal application of fertilizer. For instance, it can relax their level of risk
aversion, a barrier for technology adoption and believed to be negatively related with
farm size. Another explanation in the literature for this negative relationship between
intensity of fertilizer use and farm size is that small farmers may farm land more
intensively to meet subsistence needs compared to large farmers (Van der Veen, 1975).
Regarding improved seeds, the estimates show a strong differential impact of access
to institutional finance by land size both on adoption and application rates. The re-
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sults specifically shows that adoption and application rates of improved seeds have
not differed significantly for small farmers with access to institutional finance. In other
words, access to institutional finance does not have impact on improved seeds adop-
tion and intensity of use among small farmers with a total land holding of less than
2 hectares. In contrast, for large farmers with more than 2 hectares of landholding,
the estimates show a positive and statistically significant impact of access to institu-
tional finance on adoption and application rates of improved seeds. This is plausible,
as initial adoption of new improved varieties may entail considerable risks and set-
up costs in terms of learning and developing or locating markets for small farmers.
Limited farm size for experimentation coupled with fear of the welfare consequences
if shocks result in poor harvest can push small farmers to stick on conventional low
risk and low return agricultural practices. Whereas, farm households with large sizes
of land can overcome such uncertainties and costs by adopting on experimental plots
increasing in size and through risk reducing infrastructures (e.g., irrigation).
As indicated above, another variable used for disaggregation towards investigating
possible impact heterogeneity is ownership of the lending institutions. Difference in
ownership is highly important, as who owns and controls a financial institution takes
the decision on the types and terms of lending it should make, and in turn the re-
lation of production it promotes. Besides the terms and conditions, the two lending
institutions in the sample - the specialized microfinance institution and financial co-
operatives - considerably vary on their approaches (saving-led vs. credit-led), size or
coverage and monitoring and follow up efforts. The commonalities between the two
are very few - their target market and the group aspect is perhaps where the closest re-
semblance between the two. Nonetheless, the group in microfinance does not assume
an organizational and legal identity. In short, does the way these financial institutions
organized and practiced induce impact variation at household level is the question
the analysis seek to verify.
Table 4.8 reports the impact estimates of access to institutional finance on households
technology adoption disaggregated by ownership of lending institutions. As shown
in Panel A of Table 4.8, farm households who are users of financial cooperatives posi-
tively and significantly differ from households who have not access to institutional fi-
nance both in adoption and application intensity of agricultural technologies. In other
words, statistically significant effect of access to institutional finance is observed only
for households that are users of financial cooperatives and the impacts of financial ser-
vices form the cooperatives on adoption and application rates of technologies are even
somehow larger than the estimates of the whole sample reported in Table 4.5. In con-
trast, the study find that adoption and application rates of agricultural technologies
have not differed significantly for farm households who have received financial ser-
vices from specialized microfinance institutions, except on fertilizer adoption (Panel B
of Table 4.8).
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Table 4.7: Impact of access to institutional finance on agricultural technology adoption disag-
gregated by landholding size.
Outcome variables
Kernel-based
matching
(bandwidth = 0.06)
Five nearest
neighbors
matching
Radius matching
(caliper = 0.05)
ATT
(SE)
rbound ATT
(SE)
rbound ATT
(SE)
rbound
A: HHs with 2 ha of land
Fertilizer adoption 0.10***
(0.041)
(17-18) 0.11*
(0.062)
(12-13) 0.11**
(0.054)
(16-17)
Fertilizer per hectare 67.19***
(22.38)
(2.9-3.0) 66.71***
(24.80)
(2.7-2.8) 67.41***
(21.97)
(2.7-2.8)
Improved seeds adoption 0.15
(0.121)
(1.7-1.8) 0.15
(0.126)
(1.7-1.8) 0.15
(0.124)
(1.7-1.8)
Improved seeds (volume) 7.51
(5.67)
- 7.66
(4.67)
- 7.60
(5.88)
-
Number of obs. 496 496 496
B: HHs with > 2 ha of land
Fertilizer adoption 0.12**
(0.051)
(35-36) 0.11*
(0.063)
(27-28) 0.13**
(0.060)
(35-36)
Fertilizer per hectare 37.46**
(19.13)
(1.8-1.9) 34.11
(21.97)
(1.4-1.5) 38.86**
(17.96)
(1.9-2.0)
Improved seeds adoption 0.51***
(0.099)
(9.4-9.5) 0.47***
(0.110)
(7.5-7.6) 0.51***
(0.105)
(11.1-11.2)
Improved seeds (volume) 44.18***
(5.87)
(6.9-7.0) 42.50***
(6.93)
(6.3-6.4) 44.94***
(6.61)
(6.7-6.8)
Number of obs. 472 472 472
Note: Bootstrap with 100 replications is used to estimate the standard errors. Common support
condition is imposed across the three matching estimators. rbound () is estimated Rosenbaum
bounds for critical values of hidden bias. The matched sample for Panel A includes 200 users
of institutional finance (treatment) and 296 non-users across all the matching techniques. The
matched sample for Panel B includes 176 users (treatment) and 296 non-users across all the
matching techniques. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
108 access to institutional finance and technology adoption
The results from the users of specialized microfinance institutions hint possible di-
version of credits for unintended purposes. We presume that lower follow-up efforts
and limited information on clients, which emanated from bigger scales of operation in
non-bank microfinance institutions, can results in lower impact on technology adop-
tion. On the other hand, while financial cooperatives often constrained by limited local
resources, the saving aspect and its follow up mechanisms that are finally twined in
their organizational design (i.e., each member have an economic incentive to monitor
the practices and efforts of fellow members) seems successful in helping smallholder
farmers technology adoption. Overall, these results from ATT disaggregated by own-
ership suggest the importance of the way financial institutions are organized and
practices in agricultural finance.
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Table 4.8: Impact of access to institutional finance on agricultural technology adoption disag-
gregated by ownership of lending institutions.
Outcome variables
Kernel-based
matching
(bandwidth = 0.06)
Five nearest
neighbors
matching
Radius matching
(caliper = 0.05)
ATT
(SE)
rbound ATT
(SE)
rbound ATT
(SE)
rbound
A: Only users of FCs
Fertilizer adoption 0.12**
(0.050)
(45-46) 0.11**
(0.056)
(34-35) 0.13***
(0.049)
(46-47)
Fertilizer per hectare 67.55***
(21.09)
(3.2-3.3) 65.19**
(28.12)
(2.8-2.9) 70.13***
(20.55)
(3.4-3.5)
Improved seeds adoption 0.42***
(0.104)
(5.9-6.0) 0.40***
(0.123)
(5.3-5.4) 0.43***
(0.112)
(7.0-7.1)
Improved seeds (volume) 36.02***
(5.73)
(3.6-3.7) 35.45***
(5.75)
(3.7-3.8) 36.73***
(5.98)
(3.6-3.7)
Number of obs. 451 451 448
B: Only users of NBFIs
Fertilizer adoption 0.10*
(0.059)
(12-13) 0.10
(0.073)
(9-8) 0.11**
(0.057)
(11-12)
Fertilizer per hectare 30.15*
(17.83)
(1.5-1.6) 29.15
(27.10)
(1.3-1.4) 27.30
(18.10)
(1.3-1.4)
Improved seeds adoption 0.16
(0.113)
(1.6-1.7) 0.14
(0.119)
(1.6-1.7) 0.15
(0.109)
(1.5-1.6)
Improved seeds (volume) 6.9 (6.03) - 6.01
(5.38)
- 6.56
(5.06)
-
Number of obs. 393 393 389
Note: Bootstrap with 100 replications is used to estimate the standard errors. Common support
condition is imposed across the three matching estimators. rbound () is estimated Rosenbaum
bounds for critical values of hidden bias. The matched sample includes 155 users of institu-
tional finance (treatment) and 296 non-users (control) for Panel A kernel and nearest neigh-
bors matching and 152 users (treatment) and 296 non-users (control) for radius matching. The
matched sample for Panel B includes 97 users (treatment) and 296 non-users (control) for ker-
nel and nearest neighbors matching and 93 users (treatment) and 296 non-users (control) for
radius matching. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
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4.6 conclusions
Despite considerable public extension efforts, the diffusion and application rates of
modern agricultural technologies among smallholder farmers are limited in Ethiopia.
Large mass of smallholder farmers trapped in low return, lower risk farming prac-
tices, mainly due to shortage of funds or access to financial services to invest on pro-
ductive technologies. The government of Ethiopia promotes specialized microfinance
institutions and financial cooperatives to encourage technology adoption among re-
source constrained smallholder farmers through loosening their liquidity constraint.
Currently numerous financial cooperative and specialized microfinance institutions
are involved in the delivery of agricultural credits and saving services.
However, our knowledge on the contribution of the financial services delivered by
these institutions on adoptions of agricultural technologies is limited. There have not
been any systematic research works that examined whether access and use of institu-
tional financial services impacted technology adoption behaviors of farm households
in Ethiopia. The existing few methodical studies on specialized microfinance insti-
tutions focus on other outcomes, such as on income, housing and consumption im-
provements. Given that two third of the loan portfolio of financial cooperatives and
microfinance institutions channeled to the agricultural sector with the purpose of im-
proving technology adoption, evaluating its direct impact is imperative from policy
perspective. This chapter aims at bridging this gap by examining the impact of access
to institutional finance on adoption of divisible agricultural technologies using a farm
household survey from 21 districts in Ethiopia. It also investigate potential impact
variations by source of credit and farm size. The study used PSM, a non-parametric
approach commonly used for casual inference under the hypothesis of selection on ob-
servables - a method that substitute for the absence of experimental comparison group
using a control group who have the same set of parametric pre-exposure covariates
- to construct comparison group and estimate impact.
The results obtained from the matching estimation indicate a positive and strong im-
pact of access to institutional finance on both adoption and application rates of risky
and highly productive agricultural technologies by smallholder farmers. The study no-
ticed that the adoption and application rates of fertilizer and improved seeds would
be 11 and 32 percent less in a situation where farmers would not have access to in-
stitutional services, respectively. Likewise, the results show a statistically significant
application intensity differences between the two groups by at least 24 kg for improved
seeds and 51kg/ha for fertilizer. Robustness checks indicate that these results are in-
sensitive for probit model specification, matching technique and method of analysis
used, unobserved covariates and sample considered.
Furthermore, testing for possible impact heterogeneity through disaggregation of farm
households with access to finance by farm size and ownership of the institution from
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where households received financial services indicates differential adoption and appli-
cation rates. While access to institutional finance significantly improves the intensity
of fertilizer use among small farmers, it does not have significant impact on adoption
and application rates of improved seeds. Significant effects of access to institutional
finance on improved seeds rate and extent of adoption is observed only for large
farmers with farm size of more than two hectares. From the results differentiated
by ownership of the financial institutions, it is observed that adoption and application
rates of fertilizer and improved seeds have not differ significantly for farm households
who receive financial services from specialized microfinance institutions. In contrast,
farm households who are users of financial cooperatives exhibit significantly higher
adoption and application rates of agricultural technologies compared to households
without access to institutional finance.
The general conclusion drawn is that providing access to institutional financial ser-
vices positively influences technology adoption behavior of smallholder farmers. The
potential contributions of access to finance depends on farm sizes for improved seeds
adoption - the adoption of improved seeds by small farmers with access to finance
and farm size of less than two hectares have not significantly differ from compara-
ble households without access to finance. In addition to credit and saving, providing
insurance products may overcome the adoption-discouraging effects of farm size on
application of improved seeds among small farmers. The findings also suggest that the
ownership of the financial institutions from where farmers receive financial services
matters most. Focusing on financial cooperatives that are owned and controlled by
the users themselves seems to be a promising avenue to increase technology diffusion
effects of financial services.

Part II
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES IN ETHIOP IA
- BACKGROUND
The second part of this dissertation focus on agricultural cooperatives in
rural Ethiopia. It tested theoretical propositions on the existence of agricul-
tural cooperatives, identified the drivers of farm households membership
and patronage decisions, and distinguish various forms of membership in
agricultural cooperatives with corresponding explanatory attributes. It also
estimated the impact of agricultural cooperative membership on house-
holds levels of technical efficiency. This section provides readers a brief
background on the history, prevalence and recent developments of agricul-
tural cooperatives in Ethiopia.
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troublous history
Historically, agricultural cooperatives have played an important role all over the world
in providing reliable market access and enhancing farmers market participation and
bargaining position. In particular, agricultural cooperatives in the United States and
Western Europe have had played an important economic role in providing competitive
returns for independent farmers (Cook, 1995; Chaddad et al., 2005). Agricultural coop-
eratives in those countries traditionally operate as an independent service providers
(as a separate firm) and primarily aimed at countervailing the market power of pro-
ducers trading partners, preservation of market options and reduction of transaction
costs and risks through pooling. They have also been accorded with a range of pub-
lic policy supports that has perpetuated their market coordination and competitive
yardstick roles in agri-food system still today (Cook, 1995; Staatz, 1987; 1983).
In Ethiopia, however, the tradition of agricultural cooperatives was completely differ-
ent from the western type of agricultural cooperatives from the initial days of estab-
lishment to the socialist regime. Before the economic transition during 1991, agricul-
tural cooperatives in Ethiopia did not espouse the concept of voluntary cooperation
and have suffered from lack of autonomy and meaningful public policy and regula-
tory supports. During the imperial regime (1960s-1974), a period during which co-
operatives were started, agricultural cooperatives were externally setup in the form
of cooperative production or agricultural collectives to jointly produce commercial
and industrial crops (e.g., coffee, tea and spices). Membership in cooperatives was
restricted to farmers with larger landholding, excluding smallholder farmers. They
were not also in a position to operate efficiently due to unenforceability of efforts, in-
equitable incentives or ill-defined property rights, high agency costs, and slow and
centralized decision-making, which are inherent problems of collective production
(Deininger, 1995)13.
During the socialist regime (1974-1990) as well agricultural cooperatives were ex-
tended arms of the state and primarily used as instruments of the government in
order to control the agricultural sector and prevent the rise of capitalistic forms of
organization, following Marxist principles (Rahmato, 1990). There were two types of
agricultural cooperatives during this period: production cooperatives engaged in col-
lective production and service cooperatives handling modern inputs, credit, milling
services, selling of consumer goods, and purchasing of farmers produce. Production
cooperatives were expected to operate over 50 percent of the nations cultivable land
in the same fashion of joint production and were believed to be more cost-effective
13 See Deininger (1995) for complete historical accounts on the inefficiencies of cooperative production
systems as compared to agricultural cooperatives providing services (marketing, credit and informa-
tion) to independent farmers in Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Peru and Ethiopia in terms of utilization of
economies of scale, innovation, equity and provision of public goods.
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(Rahmato, 1994). However, as documented by Rhamato (1994), ill-conceived policies
coupled with shirking by coerced farmers resulted in lower output and underutiliza-
tion of scale and deployed labors by producer cooperatives as compared to individual
farmers. Besides the inefficiencies emanated from collective production, forced for-
mation and routine intervention from the state agents were the critical factors that
contributed to the poor record of agricultural cooperatives during the socialist regime
(Rahmato, 1993).
Subsequently, when the new mixed economic system was introduced in 1991 farmers
were given the choice to work on commonly or individually owned land; despite the
tradition of both formal and informal collective actions in Ethiopia, the past negative
experience on cooperative production led most of the farmers to reallocate common
lands to individual holdings, which eventually led to the collapse of most production
cooperatives (Abegaz, 1994). During the transition period, regardless of the efforts
made to create an enabling environment for agricultural cooperatives through the
issuing of new regulations14, most of them continued to be burgled by individuals
and others downsized due to competition from the private traders following trade
liberalization (Kodama, 2007; Rahmato, 1994). In general, prior to 1990 agricultural co-
operatives in Ethiopia were pseudo cooperatives both in their organizational structure,
undertakings and membership.
recent developments and prevalence
Since 1990s, the Government of Ethiopia revived its interest in cooperatives and has
made efforts to promote a new generation of cooperatives that differ from their prede-
cessors that were put in place under previous regimes. Although externally induced
formation is still prevalent15, as proclaimed in the new legal framework, these new
wave of cooperative organizations should be: based on the members free will to orga-
nize; able to fully participate in the free market; and free of government intervention.
As part of the government support for cooperative promotion, cooperative governance
was also reinforced through the establishment of the Federal Cooperative Commis-
sion in 2002, a public body to promote cooperatives at the national level (Bernard et
al., 2010; Francesconi and Heerink, 2010; Kodama, 2007). The commission was estab-
lished with a plan of providing cooperative services to two-thirds of the rural popula-
tions and to increase the share of agricultural cooperatives in input and output market
coordination.
14 Agricultural Cooperative Societies Proclamation No. 185/1994.
15 In Ethiopia member initiated cooperatives account only for the 26 per cent of the total. The remaining 74
per cent of the cooperatives are externally initiated, mostly by government and donor agencies (Bernard
et al., 2008).
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In the agriculture sector in particular, cooperatives are meant to play a central role
in efforts to develop the sector. For example, Ethiopias Sustainable Development and
Poverty Reduction Program (FDRE, 2002) seeks to organize, strengthen and diversify
autonomous cooperatives to provide better marketing services and serve as a bridge
between small farmers (peasants) and the non-peasant private sector. Cooperatives are
also expected to render vital services other than those related to agricultural market-
ing, including: (i) expanding financial services in rural areas; (ii) purchasing agricul-
tural machinery, equipment and implements, and leasing them to farmers; (iii) setting
up of small agro-processing industries where processed agricultural products with
greater value added could be produced; and (iv) establishing various social institu-
tions to provide different kinds of social services (FDRE, 2002).
There are evidences that indicate the new policy regime induce growth in the cooper-
ative sector. For instance, of the total cooperatives in the country, about 60 percent are
newly established after the economic reform (Bernard et al., 2013). According to the
data from Federal Cooperative Agency, over the last six to seven years the number of
cooperatives in Ethiopia grew by about 87 percent (i.e., from 23,084 to 43,256). The new
policy regime has also considerably promoted the growth of agricultural cooperatives
over the past 20 years. Agricultural cooperatives are the largest number of cooperative
types in the country (i.e., 26.5 percent) and the proportion of kebeles with at least on
agricultural cooperatives grew from only 10 percent in 1991 (Bernard et al., 2010) to 29
percent in 1998 and 55 percent in 2011 (Figure 4.1). About 43 percent of smallholders
in Ethiopia live in a kebele with agricultural cooperative and the proportion of farm
households participating in agricultural cooperatives grew from 9.1 percent in 2005 to
36 percent in 2012. If one account only households residing in kebeles with agricultural
cooperatives where the choice to participate does exist, households membership rate
grew sharply from 17 percent in 2005 to 51 percent in 2012 (Bernard et al., 2013; 2010).
With regards to performance, the impact of agricultural cooperatives is less studied.
There have been only a few attempts made to understand their commercialization role
in aggregating and selling members produces and the results showed a mixed picture
of impact. Francesconi and Heerink (2010) found a higher commercialization rate for
the farmers that belong to agricultural marketing cooperatives. Bernard et al. (2010;
2008) conversely found a similar commercialization rate for the farmers that belong
to agricultural cooperatives (i.e., cooperative members tend to sell an equivalent pro-
portion of their output to market as compared to non-members), notwithstanding the
higher price obtained by the cooperatives for members per unit of output. Their role
in providing a better price through leveraging collective actions (e.g., product aggrega-
tion) and inducing competition in favor of the producer is also corroborated by Teigist
(2008).
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Figure 4.3: Proportion of kebeles with at least one agricultural cooperative in Ethiopia (1998-
2011)
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Other recent studies on impact of agricultural cooperatives by Abebaw and Haile
(2013) and Getnet and Tsegaye (2012) respectively indicated better adoption of agricul-
tural inputs and livelihood improvement among users of cooperatives as compared
to non-users. What are scarce in the literature are studies on the drivers of agricul-
tural cooperative incidence and farmers membership and patronage decisions. What
explains the actual existence of agricultural cooperatives in some particular places and
not in the others and what types of farmers are members and/or users of the services
agricultural cooperatives provide are questions which are not empirically addressed.
While there are the aforementioned few research works that have contributed to our
understanding on the effects of agricultural cooperatives on price, commercialization,
technology adoption and members livelihood, the direct impact of agricultural cooper-
atives on productivity and technical efficiency of members remain unknown, despite
the fact that they are mainly used as a preferential channel to access agricultural inputs
(i.e., fertilizer and improved seeds) and services (i.e., financial, training and extension).
In an effort to address these gaps, the following two chapters in this part made an ef-
fort to identify the drivers of cooperative existence and farmers decisions to join and
use agricultural cooperatives and estimated the impact of cooperative membership on
farm households levels of technical efficiency.

5
DRIVERS OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES INCIDENCE
AND FARMERS MEMBERSHIP AND PATRONAGE DECIS IONS :
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYS I S
Abstract
Agricultural cooperatives are a prominent form of farmers economic organization in the world
of agri-food system. Through leveraging collective actions, agricultural cooperatives in develop-
ing countries, in particular, are eminent in modern input supply and enhancing smallholders
market participation and bargaining position. For instance, in Ethiopia, agricultural coopera-
tives commercialize more than 10 percent of the marketable surplus from small farmers and sup-
ply about 90 percent of modern inputs. However, despite its economic imperatives and policy
supports agricultural cooperatives are not ubiquitous and membership rates and use of cooper-
ative services by farm households are not anywhere closer to one would expect. Organizational
and the new institutional economics theories explain the existence of agricultural cooperatives
and farmers participation through their ability to develop countervailing power and internal-
izing transaction costs. Using a unique data set that includes community, cooperative, and
household level survey data, this chapter empirically investigates the drivers of agricultural
cooperatives incidence and farmers’ membership and patronage decisions in Ethiopia. The re-
sults indicate that agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia tend to exist in advanced kebeles that
are connected to major roads and with relatively developed local market, supporting the market
power argument. Farm households decisions to join and use agricultural cooperatives, on the
other hand, are strongly related with their location, scale of operation, specialization, and hu-
man and relational capitals. Households membership and patronage decisions are also affected
by the size, specialization, and integration of agricultural cooperatives. This chapter also distin-
guishes four types of membership from combining patronage and membership decisions, viz.,
strong, soft, shadow and no membership, and examined the corresponding household, coopera-
tive, and location related attributes.
keywords : Agricultural cooperatives; Membership; Patronage; Ethiopia.
5.1 introduction
Collective procurement of inputs, processing and marketing of outputs via cooper-
atives is one among the transaction governance structure in agriculture, along with
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markets and hierarchies (Ménard, 2004; Williamson, 2000; Bonus, 1986). In most de-
veloping countries, considerable proportion of farmers heavily relies on agricultural
cooperatives that are collectively set-up by producers to govern their backward and
forward transactions. Producers join forces in agricultural cooperatives by becoming
members and users of the services provided by their collective organization. However,
given the similarities of market problems facing producers, such forms of organiza-
tional arrangements are not widespread everywhere. Moreover, even in places where
agricultural cooperatives exist, all producers often not join forces and those who join
are not necessarily users of the services their cooperative provides - membership and
patronage are not solidly related, as one would expect.
In most of the cases agricultural cooperatives coexist with other firms and/or traders
in markets and farmers have a decision space on where to procure their inputs and
market or deliver their outputs. The data at hand from Ethiopia, for instance, make
it evident that there are members of agricultural cooperatives who dont make use
of services and, on the other hand, there are non-member farmers who are users of
cooperative services. These observations on agricultural cooperative incidence and
membership-patronage relations lead to the following interesting research questions
this chapter aims to address. What determines the actual existence of agricultural co-
operatives in some places, and not in the others? Which farmers become members
of agricultural cooperatives and why? Which farmers make use of the services pro-
vided by agricultural cooperatives? Is there a link between farmers’ membership and
patronage decisions in agricultural cooperatives?
Addressing these questions is crucial if one looks at the raising expectations on agricul-
tural cooperatives (producer organization) in achieving equitable growth and poverty
reduction. In developing countries, in particular, agricultural cooperatives are expected
to enhance smallholders market participation and bargaining position through lever-
aging collective actions (World Bank, 2008; Chen et al., 2007; Berdegué, 2001). For
instance, in Ethiopia, where this chapter focuses, agricultural cooperatives are an ac-
cepted policy instrument towards this direction and they account for about 90 percent
of modern input supply and commercialize more than 10 percent of the marketable
agricultural surplus in the country (Rashid et al., 2013; GTP, 2010; Bernard et al., 2008;
PASDEP, 2005). It is worth mentioning that the roles of agricultural cooperatives are
not limited to underdeveloped market contexts. In matured markets, like in the USA
and Europe, agricultural cooperatives continue to be farmers’ integrating agency and
account for about 30 percent of agricultural input and output marketing in the USA
and 40-50 percent of the agro-food business in Europe (Bijman et al., 2012; Cogeca,
2010; Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000; Cook, 1995).
Despite the economic imperatives of agricultural cooperatives in integrating farmers
to downstream and upstream trading partners, empirical studies that elucidate the
rationales of cooperative existence are still very limited. Factors that actually drive the
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incidence of agricultural cooperatives and the objective(s) agricultural cooperatives
maximize are less evident. Equally lacking is empirical research on the determinants of
membership and patronage decisions in this collective producers organization. While
distinct or mixed, significant progress is made in the theoretical front. The dominant
theoretical interpretations on the economic rationale behind the presence of agricul-
tural cooperatives are found in the mixed-oligopoly/oligopsony literature and in the
new institutional economics theories of contracting, agency and property rights.
The mixed-oligopoly/oligopsony literature characterizes the existence of cooperatives
as a defensive response by producers towards the opportunistic behaviors of their
trading partners - opportunistic behaviors of trading partners is asserted as a source
of incentive for farmers to integrate via cooperatives (Staatz, 1987). According to this
view point, agricultural cooperatives exist to countervail the potential adverse perfor-
mance implications of oligopoly/oligopsony ( Rogers and Sexton, 1994; Sexton and
Sexton, 1987; Cotterill, 1987; Rhodes, 1983; Helmberger, 1964). Agricultural coopera-
tives are seen as a pro-competitive farmers’ bargaining agency that beneficially regu-
late the performance of the market by acting as a yardstick of competition and playing
a pacemaker role once price and service adjustments are effected (Giannakas and Ful-
ton, 2005; Karantininis and Zago, 2001; Sexton and Iskow, 1993; Sexton, 1990; LeVay,
1983).
The new institutional economics literature, on the other hand, underlines information
asymmetry and uncertainties in transactions as the drivers of agricultural coopera-
tive. In general, cooperatives are seen as alternative transaction governance structure
(alternative to market and hierarchy) that arises to internalize transactions that are
characterized by uncertainties, demand high degree of trust and potentially lead to
ex post renegotiation over the trade benefits (Valentinov, 2007; Hendrikse and Bijman,
2002; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Bonus, 1986). In this literature, the efficiency gains from
internalizing crucial transactions into firms jointly owned by the holders of transac-
tion specific resources1 is postulated as rationale behind the presence of cooperative
firms. Another complementary theory by Hansmann ( 2012; 1996) claims that the type
of ownership structure that will arise to govern a particular transaction is the one that
minimizes ownership and market contract costs. In his argument, cooperatives are epi-
demic in agriculture because farmers generally face higher costs of market contracts
that prompt them to join forces to economize/internalize such costs.
Building on these theoretical evidences that emphasis the institutional advantages cre-
ated by agricultural cooperatives for producers mainly by economizing transaction
costs and developing countervailing power, this chapter aims at empirically under-
1 In the presence of transaction specific resources cooperatives tend to arise as best transaction governance
structure as their membership and patronage contract with the holders of such resources effectively
address allocation of values, uncertainties and property rights, the three basic economic components of
any transactions (Sykuta and Cook, 2001).
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standing the drivers of cooperative incidence and determinants of producers mem-
bership and patronage decisions in rural Ethiopia. Towards this end, the chapter use
unique data set that includes 200 community survey, survey on 102 agricultural coop-
eratives and 1450 farm household survey data from the four major regions of Ethiopia
(Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR, Tigray. Probit and seemingly unrelated bivariate probit
models are used to estimate the drivers of agricultural cooperatives incidence and
to jointly estimate the determinants of farmers membership and patronage decisions,
respectively.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical re-
view on the economic rationales behind the presence of agricultural cooperatives and
a framework on farmers membership and patronage decisions. Section 3 discusses
the empirical approach followed to identify the drivers of cooperatives presence and
investigates the links between membership and use of services in agricultural cooper-
atives. Section 4 describes the data used and results from summary statistics on the
variables considered. Section 5 presents and discusses the main results from the pro-
bit and bivariate probit models. The last section concludes by summarizing the main
findings of the chapter.
5.2 theoretical framework
5.2.1 Economic rationales for cooperative incidence
Interest on alternative modes of organizing economic transactions - alternative to the
price mechanism - is awaked by the seminal contribution of Coase (1937), who argues
that the type of institution (market vs., firm) that will arise to organize transactions
is largely a function of the relative costs of alternative modes of organization. Fol-
lowing Coases insight on the roles of firms in the organization of economic activities,
significant progress has been made in understanding alternative forms of transaction
governance mechanisms. Theoretical works that specifically studied organization of
transactions via cooperative firms hold distinct thoughts on its nature: cooperatives
are seen as (1) a vertical integration (Emelianoff, 1942), (2) a coalition and nexus
of contracts (Staatz, 1983; Kaarlelto, 1955), (3) a hybrid that stand between markets
and hierarchies (Chaddad, 2009; Ménard, 2004; Williamson, 1991; Bonus, 1986, among
others), and (4) as independent transaction governance mechanism (Valentinov and
Fritzsch, 2007; Valentinov, 2005).
According to the vertical integration argument by Emelianoff (1942), cooperatives are
not a separate firm; rather they are integrating agency of multi-plant firms that exist
to enhance market efficiency by acting as a yardstick of competition. A cooperative
as a coalition and nexus of contracts is pioneered by Kaarlelto (1955) and viewed
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cooperatives as an alliance of heterogeneous members that involves if they feel that
their objective is being fulfilled by the coalition. Thoughts that viewed cooperative as
a hybrid organization on the other hand, locate cooperative firms between markets
and hierarchies and asserts that the need to combine the benefits of independent and
collective organization of transactions as a driver of cooperative mechanisms. Coop-
erative as independent governance mechanism by Valentinov and Fritzsch (2007) and
Valentinov, (2005) is a contention to the later thought. On the contrary to that of hybrid,
this perspective locates hierarchies between markets and cooperative mechanisms and
argues that the relationship between members in cooperatives is inconsistent with the
use of both the price mechanism and authority relations.
Regardless of their differences in locating the cooperative mechanism in the transac-
tion governance continuum, the economic rationales behind the existence of cooper-
atives governance mechanism advanced by these bodies of literature are analogous
- the rationales for the incidence of agricultural cooperatives are largely related to the
market-failure argument2. The first market-failure related cause for using cooperative
mechanism by farmers is to countervail market power. Agricultural markets are charac-
terized by pervasive market imperfections and farmers are confronted with informa-
tion asymmetries and opportunistic behaviors of their trading partners. In such types
of markets contractual agents have little to lose by acting opportunistically. Such be-
havior therefore creates an incentive to farmers to integrate via cooperatives and gain
market power other than competing against each others (Valentinov and Iliopoulos,
2013; Hansmann, 1996; Sexton, 1990; Staatz, 1987). The incentive to withhold informa-
tion is also lower in the case of trading with cooperatives, as the farmers are involved
in both sides of the transaction (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cook, 1995).
Cooperative also exists to internalize/economize transaction or market contract costs. The
efficient ownership assignment criteria of Hansmann (2012; 1996) argues that assign-
ing transaction governance ownership to a patron or a contractual partner who faces
the highest market contract costs enhance market efficiency and eliminate opportunis-
tic behavior. Cooperatives are common in agriculture for the reason that producers
are the one who assume the highest market contract costs compared to down and
upstream trading partners. In other words, when transactions are characterized by
high uncertainties and information costs, cooperatives are able to design agreements
that enhance economic efficiency, as their membership and patronage contracts can
effectively address allocation of values, uncertainties and property rights, the three
basic economic components of a transaction (Valentinov, 2007; Sykuta and Cook, 2001;
Bonus, 1986).
Achieving scale economies is another economic rationale for agricultural cooperatives
formation. This cause is linked with the size of producers and local economy. Agricul-
2 One has to note, however, different types of cooperatives exist to deal with different kinds of coordination
or market failure problems.
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tural cooperatives arise in cases where the sizes of producers are small and demands
aggregation to achieve gains from scale economies. The economies of scale argument
for the presence of cooperatives also refers to the cases where the size or volume
of transaction in the local economy justifies the operation of not more than one firm
(Valentinov and Iliopoulos, 2013). In such contexts, producers established cooperatives,
as they prefer to deal with their own monopoly instead of someone elses (Rohodes,
1983).
Another market-failure related cause for founding cooperatives is filling missing mar-
kets or services. This motive is directly related to the absence of markets and cases when
other forms of transaction governance mechanisms (e.g., for-profit investor owned
firms) doesn’t find it profitable to function in a particular sector, industry or geo-
graphic location. In such contexts farmers join forces via cooperatives to fill missing
markets (Valentinov, 2007; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Karantininis and Zago, 2001). There
are also theoretical arguments for founding cooperatives that are not directly related to
market-failure causes. For instance, farmers establish cooperatives for risk/uncertainty
reduction - to ration or transfer risks/uncertainties. Besides sharing and transferring
risks, founding cooperatives give farmers an assurance that there will be a market
for their produce as far as a head as their contemplated investments (Rhodes, 1983).
Recent developments of New Generation Cooperatives (NGCs) also make it evident
that cooperatives can also be formed to achieve additional marketing margins (Chaddad
and Cook, 2004; Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999; Stefanson and Fulton, 1997).
Empirically, there is a growing evidence that agricultural cooperatives (producer or-
ganizations) offer one avenue for smallholders to participate in the market more ef-
fectively by providing access to markets, reducing/sharing transaction costs and im-
proving their bargaining position in the market place (Bernard and Spielman, 2009;
Markelova et al., 2009; Bernard et al., 2008; Thorp et al., 2005; Stockbridge et al., 2003;
Kherallah et al., 2002). However, studies on the drivers of cooperative presence in the
first place are very scarce. One of the particular interests of this chapter is, therefore, to
empirically investigate the correlates of cooperative incidence using variables related
to their environment (e.g., market structure and geographic isolation).
5.2.2 Framers membership and patronage decisions
Following Pascucci et al. (2011) and Masten and Saussier (2000), farmers decision
to become a member of agricultural cooperatives is represented in a double discrete
choice model. The assumption is that farmers will choose to become a member and/or
users of cooperative services if the expected benefit or utility from membership and
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patronage is greater than associated costs. Formally, farmers membership decision can
be specified as follows:
M∗ =
⎧⎨⎩ M1 i f U
(
M1
)
> U
(
M0
)
M0 i f U
(
M1
) ≤ U (M0) (5.1)
where M1 represents membership in agricultural cooperatives and M0 non-membership,
U
(
M1
)
and U
(
M0
)
represent the expected benefit or utility of being a member and
non-member, respectively, and M∗is the membership decision actually chosen by the
farmer.
The above discrete choice model of membership in Eq. (5.1), in general, shows that
farmers will become members of agricultural cooperatives if membership benefits ex-
ceed costs. The membership benefits in agricultural cooperatives range from getting
prior access to its supply and marketing services to the receipt of additional incomes
from redistribution of the cooperative rents (Sexton, 1990; Sexton and Iskow, 1988). In
particular, membership in cooperatives provides farmers with the institutional mech-
anisms to bring economic balances under their control and prevent opportunistic and
hold-up situations (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cook, 1995). Agricultural cooperatives that
control the flow of production downstream and supply of inputs upstream can also
result in a higher price for farmers produce and access to cheap inputs (Giannakas
and Fulton, 2005; Sexton and Iskow, 1988).
Joining forces via cooperatives also gives the opportunity to share or internalize trans-
action costs (Valentinov, 2007; Staatz, 1987; Bonus, 1986). From internalizing transac-
tions members in cooperatives directly benefit from common incentives (e.g., farmers
wish to sell at the highest price possible and the cooperative wishes to pay its mem-
bers the highest price possible) and free flow of information (Sexton and Iskow, 1988).
Reducing the aspects of risks and uncertainties and providing assurance on the avail-
ability of markets for their produce in the future is another benefit of membership
(Valentinov and Iliopoulos, 2013; Valentinov, 2007; Sexton and Iskow, 1988; Rhodes,
1983). While it may not provide the reason for joining cooperatives, the tax advan-
tage for cooperatives in some contexts can be additional benefit for members when
other benefits are also present. Furthermore, membership in cooperatives also pro-
vides intangible benefits, such as trust, fairness, reciprocity and the opportunity to
assume leadership positions (Bijman and Verhees, 2011; Karantininis, 2007; Hansen et
al., 2002).
On the other hand, membership in cooperatives has its own costs and detriments.
The costs of membership mainly related to membership commitments and opportu-
nity costs of participation (Bontems and Fulton, 2009; Fulton and Giannakas, 2001).
A farmer who decides to become a member is required to allocate time to decision
making processes, discharge leadership duties, and monitor the performance of the
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appointed governing bodies. Ill-defined property rights in cooperatives and its associ-
ated problems3 can also arise additional costs, which can discourage membership in
cooperatives (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cook, 1995; Vitaliano, 1983; Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976).
Similar to farmers membership decision, the decision to make use of the services
provided by agricultural cooperatives (i.e., patronage decision) can be specified as
follows:
P∗ =
⎧⎨⎩ P1 i f U
(
P1
)
> U
(
P0
)
P0 i f U
(
P1
) ≤ U (P0) (5.2)
where P1 represents use of agricultural cooperatives services and P0 non-use of ser-
vices, U
(
P1
)
and U
(
P0
)
represent the expected benefit or utility of being a user and
non-user, respectively, P∗is the patronage decision actually chosen by the farmer. Eq.
(5.2) shows that farmers will become users of agricultural cooperative services if pa-
tronage benefits exceed costs (i.e., if the utility of being user of cooperative services
exceeds the utility of being non-user).
User benefits in agricultural cooperatives are related to getting a higher price possi-
ble from better bargaining power by cooperatives (Cook, 1995; Sexton, 1990; Cotterill,
1987; Staatz, 1987). Cooperatives can offer users a better price using their inherent abil-
ity in reducing search and information costs and costs related to ex post renegotiation
(Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002). For users that are at the same time members of the co-
operatives, being user of cooperative services also offer additional benefits or incomes
from premium payments and earnings that are redistributed based on patronage or
use of cooperative services (Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cook,
1995; Cotterill, 1987; Staatz, 1987; LeVay, 1983; Rhodes, 1983; Helmberger and Hoos,
1962). In other words, given the costs are assumed the same for both types of service
providers in the market, the economic benefits are in the patronage dividend by the
cooperatives for its users based on volume of use, but not by other firms. On the other
side, using cooperative services can have costs like transportation (delivery and col-
lections costs to and from cooperative centers) and costs related to meeting specific
quality and delivery requirements. Collective decision making procedures can also
have adverse effect on the speed of transaction in cooperatives.
As one can understand form the above discussions, there is an overlap of attributes
that drive farmers membership and patronage decisions. This leads to joint analysis
of these two discrete choice models following a framework deployed by Pescucci et
3 Free-riding, horizon, portfolio, control and influence problems, which often mentioned as incentive prob-
lems in cooperative organizations (Cook, 1995; Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Vitaliano, 1983).
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Table 5.1: Farmers membership and patronage decision in agricultural cooperatives.
Patronage decision (Pp)
Yes (p = 1) No (p = 0)
Membership
decision(Mm)
Yes (m = 1) U
(
M1, P1 | X, Z) =
U1 (X, Z)
strong-membership
U
(
M1, P0 | X, Z) =
U2 (X, Z)
soft-membership
No (m = 0) U
(
M0, P1 | X, Z) =
U3 (X, Z)
shadow-membership
U
(
M0, P0 | X, Z) =
U4 (X, Z)
no-membership
Note: Mm and Pp refers to farmers membership and patronage decisions, respectively. X and
Z represents the variables that affect the shape of the utility functions. U1- U4 represents the
utility functions that are specified by the combination of membership and patronage decisions
and variables that influence or drive farmers decisions. Source: Adapted from Pescucci et al.
(2011).
al. (2011). Accordingly, as shown in Table 5.1, combining membership and patron-
age decisions results in four possible types of relationships between a farmer and a
cooperative: member and user; members and non-user; non-member and user; and
non-member and non-user. Pescucci et al. (2011) defined these relationships as strong,
soft, shadow, and no membership, in that order.
Theoretically, besides the associated benefits and costs discussed above, cooperative
membership and the use of cooperatives as a transaction governance mechanism is
largely linked to the level of uncertainties, asset specificity and frequency of transac-
tions. According to Ménard (2007) and Ménard and Valceschini (2005), transacting via
cooperatives becomes attractive or advantageous governance solution in the presence
of high uncertainty, asset specificity and less frequent transactions (see Pescucci et
al., 2011 and Ménard, 2007 for the relationships between asset specificity and custom-
ary governance mechanisms and the type of cooperative membership that will arise
across the continuum). In other words, farmers more tend to join and use coopera-
tives if they held specific assets and transactions that are less frequent and involve
uncertainties. Taking into account the study context (research area) and availability of
empirical data, the theoretical discussions that follows in this section on the drivers of
farmers membership and patronage decision in agricultural cooperatives are limited
to attributes related to location, size, specialization, human capital and social relation
or networking of farm households.
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The market structure and geographic isolation of the location where farmers and co-
operative operate is one among the determinants of farmer-cooperative relationship.
In particular, the existence of market in the locality and the level of concentration
and competition are important to understand in what type of market structure farm-
ers tend to join forces via cooperatives (Karantininis and Zago, 2001). The hypothesis
this chapter sought to test with regard to market structure is that in locations where
market exist and characterized by traders concentration the more likely producers
are to join and use the cooperatives mechanism as response to their trading partners
bargaining power and opportunistic behavior (Cook, 1995; Sexton, 1990; Staatz, 1987).
The study used availability of markets and financial service providers and number of
traders and input dealers in the locality as indicators of the local market structure.
The geographic area where the producers operate is another location specificity that
determines the establishment and use of cooperative services by farmers. The study
proposition is that in remote locations where infrastructures are less developed, fewer
or no alternative service providers present, and information costs are higher the more
likely farmers are to found, join and use cooperative services to take advantage of
gains from transaction costs sharing/reduction (Sexton and Iskow, 1988). Kebeles dis-
tance to district center, major road, and to the nearest agricultural cooperatives are
used as explanatory variables of geographic isolation.
Size and specialization of farmers are asset specificity related determinants of farmers
membership and patronage decisions in agricultural cooperatives. The theoretical ar-
gument is that membership and use of cooperative mechanisms increases with asset
specificity and decreases with frequency of transactions (Ménard, 2007; Ménard and
Valceschini, 2005; Hendirikse and Bijman, 2002; Williamson, 1996). In the context of
this chapter, relatively large-scale farmers tend to specialize and therefore have specific
assets than subsistence farmers with mixed farms, consistent with the specialization
vs., self-sufficiency argument. Hence, the hypothesis put forward is that large-scale
producers and farmers that produce assets which require less frequent transactions
are likely to join and use services provided by agricultural cooperatives. The study
uses farmers landholding size and livestock ownership as measures of scale/size and
the types of produces as indicators of specialization. Besides, the size and specializa-
tion of farmers, the study also controls for the scale and specialization of the nearest
agricultural cooperatives found in the locality, as farmers commitment to join and use
cooperative services is also linked with the cooperative ability to meet their demands
(Fulton and Giannakas, 2001).
Finally, the study controls for the effects of human capital and affiliation in other
networks on membership and patronage decisions. The assertion here is that farm
households experience and level of education are important to understand the bene-
fits and costs of alternative transaction governance mechanisms. Size of family labor
in the household is also relevant, given the need to allocate times for discharging
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membership commitments and meeting specific delivery or service use requirements
by cooperatives. On the other hand, while it depends on the level of substitutabil-
ity, farmers membership in other groups/networks can affect their membership and
patronage decision in cooperatives. The study take into account for the effect of rela-
tional capital using a proxy indicator that measures whether a farmer takes part in
rural saving and credit groups.
5.3 empirical approach
Probit and bivariate probit models are used to estimate the drivers of agricultural
cooperative incidence in rural Ethiopia and farm households membership and patron-
age decisions, respectively. The discussion that follows in this section focus on the
rationale and specification of the bivariate probit model.
As one can understand from Eq. (5.1) and (5.2), farmers are more likely to join agri-
cultural cooperatives and make use of its services if the benefits of membership and
patronage exceed the costs or the gains from using alternative transaction governance
choices. In practices, however, the benefits and costs farmers expect from governing
their transactions in different ways (markets, hierarchies or cooperatives) are very dif-
ficult to observe and measure (Masten and Saussier, 2000; Masten et al., 1991). In this
study, following the suggestion by Masten and Saussier (2000), the empirical analysis
relies on the observable attributes of the transactions (decisions) rather than the costs
and benefits, which are very difficult to observe and measure, if not impossible. Thus,
to the previous membership and patronage decisions one must include observable
characteristics that affect the gains from joining and using the cooperatives transaction
governance mechanism by farmers and residual terms. For the membership decision
the relationship that takes into account observable attributes and disturbance terms
can be specified as follows:
U
(
M1
)
= U
(
M1
)
(X, e1) (5.3)
and
U
(
M0
)
= U
(
M0
)
(X, e0) (5.4)
where X represents a vector of observable characteristics affecting the gains from
membership in agricultural cooperatives, e1 and e0 are residual terms that accounts
for variables that are omitted and misperceptions by farmers about the actual benefits
and costs of membership.
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Assuming a linear relationship between relevant observable characteristics, X, affect-
ing membership gains and the utility frommembership (U
(
M1
)
) and non-membership
(U
(
M0
)
), the association can be specified as follows:
U
(
M1
)
= α1X+ e1 (5.5)
and
U
(
M0
)
= α0X+ e0 (5.6)
The likelihood that membership in agricultural cooperatives (U
(
M1
)
) will be chosen
can be specified by substituting Eq. (5.5) and (5.6) in Eq. (5.1) as follows:
Pr
(
M∗ = M1
)
= Pr
[
U
(
M1
)
> U
(
M0
)]
=
[
e0 − e1 <
(
α1 − α0
)
X
]
(5.7)
Eq. (5.7) symbolizes that the observable characteristics X that have an effect of α1
on the expected gains from membership (U
(
M1
)
), which is greater than the effect
of α0 on the gains from non-membership (U
(
M0
)
) will increase the likelihood that
membership (M1) is chosen.
Assuming similar linear relationship between relevant observable characteristics, Z,
affecting patronage decision and the utility from using cooperative services (U
(
P1
)
)
and non-use (U
(
P0
)
), and substituting it in Eq. (5.2), the probability that patronage
or use of cooperative services will be chosen can be specified as follows:
Pr
(
P∗ = P1
)
= Pr
[
U
(
P1
)
> U
(
P0
)]
=
[
u0 − u1 <
(
β1 − β0
)
Z
]
(5.8)
Eq. (5.8) represents that the observable characteristics Z that has an effect of β1 on
the expected gains from using cooperative services (U
(
P1
)
), which is greater than the
effect of β0 on the gains from being non-user (U
(
P0
)
) will increase the likelihood that
patronage (P1) is chosen.
In Eq. (5.7) and (5.8), the dependent variables (i.e., membership and patronage) are
binary, providing the basic framework for two binary choice models. Given that both
membership and patronage contracts are warranted to enhance economic efficiency
of transactions via cooperatives, the study assumes a strong association between the
two contractual decisions on their observed and unobserved drivers. Thus, a bivariate
probit model, a natural extension of the probit model, which performs a joint estima-
tion of the two binary choice equations, is used for empirical analysis. Formally, the
estimated bivariate probit model can be specified as follows (Greene, 2007):
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M∗i = αXi + ei, Mi = 1 i f M∗i > 0, 0 otherwise
P∗i = βZi + δMi + ui, P = 1 i f P∗i > 0, 0 otherwise
E [ei | α, β] = E [ui | α, β] = 0
Var [ei | α, β] = Var [ui | α, β] = 1
Cov [ei, ui | α, β] = ρ
(5.9)
where M∗and P∗are latent variables for which only the dichotomous variables M and
P can be observed, X and Z are vectors of exogenous variables that are not necessarily
distinct, ei and ui are a vector of bivariate normally distributed residual terms with the
usual restrictions, and E (ei) = E (ui) = 0 and Var (ei) = Var (ui) = 1. The covariance
term ρ indicates that the two equations are related in their residual terms. In other
words, it indicates whether the two equations have a common measurement error,
shocks or omitted variables. If ρ is different from zero, a bivariate probit model is
expected to yield a more efficient and consistent parameter estimates than the results
from separate estimation of the two equations.
A concern in Eq. (9) is that the patronage equation contains the dependent variable of
the membership equation, membership dummy (δMi), which is endogenous. However,
Greene (2007), Wooldridge (2002), and Wilde (2000), show that in the presence of
variations in the data and in full information maximum likelihood estimations of a
bivariate or two equation probit model, with one of the equation having the other’s
dependent variable as a regressor, one can proceed with no special attention to its
endogeneity. It is because in the estimation the log-likelihood is maximized based on
the joint probability4 distribution defined by the different combinations of the binary
variables, whereas in the linear regression cases the estimation is based on sample
moment that does not necessarily converge to the necessary population parameter in
the presence of simultaneity (Greene, 2007).
5.4 data and summary statistics
This chapter used the 2012 Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) base-
line survey data collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
The data set is suitable for the research questions, as it includes a survey data from 200
communities/kebeles, 102 agricultural cooperatives and 3000 farm households from the
four main regions of Ethiopia. These three survey data altogether contain information
on households, demographic and geographic characteristics, agriculture production
4 The joint probabilities in this case that yields four types of membership described in the previous section
can be specified as follows (Greene, 2007): Pr11 = φ (αXi, βZi + δMi, ρ); Pr10 = φ (αXi,−βZi − δMi, −ρ);
Pr01 = φ (−αXi, βZi + δMi, −ρ); and Pr00 = φ (−αXi, βZi − δMi, ρ).
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics of kebele’s characteristics by availability of agricultural coopera-
tives.
Indicators
Kebeles with
agricultural
cooperatives
Kebeles without
agricultural
cooperatives
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Market availability 0.440 0.498 0.406 0.493
Number of trader (in number) 4.788 11.19 1.967 5.171
Credit provider availability 0.944 0.229 0.791 0.408
Feeder road availability 0.697 0.461 0.472 0.502
Distance to road (in minute) 30.09 31.56 51.98 56.14
Distance to district center (in minute) 157.8 97.65 171.3 122.6
Mobile penetration rate (in %) 34.05 26.66 27.32 25.29
Note: Bold refers a statistically significance mean difference compared to respective compari-
son groups at below 10%.
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the ATA baseline survey (2012).
and marketing, infrastructure and market structure, households access to basic ser-
vices like credit, information and post-harvest facilities, and on the availability and ser-
vices provided by agricultural cooperatives. Sample households were selected using
stratified5 random sampling, while all the randomly selected kebeles and agricultural
cooperatives found in those kebeles are considered for the community and cooperative
surveys.
The data from community and agricultural cooperative level surveys are mainly used
to understand the drivers of agricultural cooperatives presence. The descriptive statis-
tics presented in Table 5.2 indicates that agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia tend
to exist in kebeles with relatively better access to output traders and input dealers,
credit services providers, roads, and information. The mean equality test in particular
shows that kebeles with institutional credit providers, higher number of traders, and
connected to main roads and mobile networks are more likely to have agricultural
cooperatives.
For the analysis of farm households membership and patronage decisions or farmers-
agricultural cooperatives relations, the chapter used a combination of the three survey
5 The sample is stratified by woredas/districts affiliation to Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) and
location. In the first stage 100 woredas were selected and stratified into AGP and non-AGP woredas. In
the second stage two kebeles were randomly selected from each of the 100 woredas. In the third stage 15
agricultural households were selected randomly from each 200 kebeles.
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Table 5.3: Frequency of households in the sample by membership and patronage.
Membership in agricultural
cooperatives
Use of cooperative services (Patronage)
Yes No Total
Yes 495 199 694
No 334 422 756
Total 829 621 1450
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the ATA baseline survey (2012).
data. However, only kebeles with agricultural cooperative and households residing in
those kebeles where the choice to join and use cooperative services does exist are con-
sidered for this study. The analysis retained and used 1450 sample households after
dropping farm households residing in kebeles where agricultural cooperatives doesn’t
exist. The two related dependent variables (i.e., membership and patronage decisions)
are constructed based on information on farm households membership in agricultural
supply and/or marketing cooperatives and whether they use the services provided by
agricultural cooperatives found in their locality, respectively.
As shown in Table 5.3, from the total sample considered, 48 percent of the house-
holds found to be members of agricultural cooperatives. As indicated in Section 2,
however, all member households may not be users of the services provided by coop-
eratives. Supporting this argument, the frequency results presented in Table 5.3 show
that nearly one-third of member households don’t make use of the services their agri-
cultural cooperatives provide and only 34 percent of the total sample belongs to the
strong membership category defined in Section 2. The remaining 14, 23 and 29 percent
of the sample households made the soft, shadow and no-membership categories, respec-
tively. Surprisingly, of the sample households that are non-member, 44 percent are
users of agricultural cooperatives and they account for 40 percent of the total users of
agricultural cooperative services in the whole sample (Table 5.3).
Table 5.4 presents the summary statistics of explanatory variables considered in the
empirical analysis. The explanatory variables are selected based on the theoretical
framework discussed in Section 2 and only indicators that are related to location, mar-
ket structure, households scale of operation, specialization, human capital and net-
working, and attributes of agricultural cooperatives are included (Table 5.4). Simple
mean difference tests by membership and patronage across the explanatory variables
indicate that geographic proximity to major roads and agricultural cooperatives and
availability of traders and credit providers encourages strong membership in cooper-
atives. That is, households that are members and users of agricultural cooperatives
are those residing in kebeles closer to main roads and cooperative premises and where
relatively large number of traders and credit providers are present. Households with
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regular market in their kebele, on the other hand, are also more likely to become mem-
bers of agricultural cooperatives, but they are not necessarily users of the services
cooperatives provide.
The summary statistics on households scales of operation and specialization shows
that relatively larger farmers (as measured by farm size and livestock ownership) are
members of agricultural cooperatives, compared to small farmers. With regard to spe-
cialization, while households producing grains, pulses and oilseeds are more likely
to join agricultural cooperatives, only households producing grains are users of the
services agricultural cooperatives provide. This can be due to the fact that most of
the agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia mainly trade grains and supply inputs that
are required for grain productions. Household demographic characteristics at the bot-
tom of Table 5.4 also indicate that farm households experience (as measured by age),
literacy, household size and affiliation in other groups or networks determines mem-
bership and use of cooperative services. It shows that households that are experienced,
literate and with relatively large number of adults are members and users of agricul-
tural cooperatives. Affiliation in rural saving and credit groups encourage households
membership in agricultural cooperatives with no significant effect on patronage.
The analysis also includes explanatory variables that measure the size and special-
ization of agricultural cooperatives in order to understand the effects of cooperative
related attributes in attracting farmers to become members and users of the services it
provides. The descriptive statistics and mean difference tests in Table 5.4 clearly show
that agricultural cooperatives that are integrated and active (as measured by affiliation
to upper level cooperative unions), with large number of members and providing agri-
cultural input supply and credit services tend to attract more members and users. In
other words, households residing in kebeles where agricultural cooperatives are active,
larger in size and provide inputs and credit services are more likely to join and use
the cooperative transaction governance mechanism. Note, however, that conclusions
cannot be made at this point, as the results from the descriptive statistics don’t account
for potential confounding factors.
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables by cooperative membership and pa-
tronage/use of agricultural cooperative services.
Indicators
Members
(n=694)
Non-
members
(n=756)
Users
(n=829)
Non-users
(n=621)
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Market availability 0.53 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.52 0.49
Trader availability 0.67 0.46 0.64 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.56 0.49
Credit providers 0.93 0.24 0.92 0.26 0.95 0.21 0.90 0.29
Distance to woreda 170 164 168 121 173 134 163 153
Distance to road 163 145 185 163 157 141 196 169
Distance to coop 43.4 48.6 51.6 51.2 45.3 44.5 50.9 56.4
Land size 3.05 0.98 2.68 1.07 2.89 1.00 2.80 1.10
Livestock (in TLU) 7.53 6.90 4.84 5.52 6.49 6.36 5.60 6.30
Produce gain 0.98 0.13 0.92 0.27 0.97 0.14 0.90 0.28
Produce pulses 0.36 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47
Produce oilseeds 0.25 0.43 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.41
Produce root crops 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.41
Produce fruits 0.05 0.23 0.11 0.32 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30
Produce permanent 0.29 0.45 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.48
Coop affiliation to union 0.78 0.41 0.69 0.46 0.79 0.40 0.65 0.47
Coop membership size 1046 1237 694 937 867 1014 847 1202
Coop provide inputs 0.94 0.23 0.84 0.35 0.94 0.22 0.82 0.38
Coop provide marketing 0.59 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.49
Coop provide credit 0.82 0.38 0.66 0.47 0.82 0.37 0.61 0.48
HH head age 47.8 13.3 45.7 15.6 47.5 13.9 45.6 15.4
HH head literacy 0.51 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.39 0.48
HH size 3.35 1.39 2.73 1.23 3.19 1.33 2.80 1.33
Membership in RSCG 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Note: Tropical livestock unit. Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) is calculated based on conversion
factors suggested by Jahnke et al. (1988). RSCG denotes Rural Saving and Credit Group. Bold
refers a statistically significance mean difference compared to respective comparison groups
at below 5%.
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the ATA baseline survey (2012).
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5.5 results and discussions
5.5.1 Drivers of agricultural cooperatives incidence
What explains the presence of agricultural cooperatives in a particular kebele and not in
other is a question of particular interest in this section. Based on theoretical arguments
of the mixed-oligopoly and the new institutional economics literatures discussed in
Section 2 and prior empirical observations, four factors may serve separately or jointly
to determine the incidence of agricultural cooperatives or where agricultural cooper-
atives are more present in Ethiopia. One, following the new institutional economics
(transaction cost economics) literature, one may argue that the main advantages of
agricultural cooperatives is through reduction of information costs and economies of
scale in physical transaction costs (Valentinov, 2007; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Hans-
mann, 1996; Bonus, 1986). That is, agricultural cooperatives lower the incentive to
withhold information and enable the bulking of inputs, outputs and other services
such that transportation cost per unit to or from a supplier or downstream trading
partners are lowered. Accordingly, one would expect to find more agricultural coop-
eratives in remote kebeles to enable farmers reduce/share transaction and information
costs where such costs are higher.
Two, based on the mixed-oligopoly/oligopsony literature that characterize the pres-
ence of agricultural cooperatives as a defensive response by farmers to offset oppor-
tunistic behaviors of trading partners, one might also claim that an important service
provided by agricultural cooperatives is through the enhanced bargaining power they
offer farmers in purchasing inputs from suppliers or selling outputs to traders/proces-
sors (Karantininis and Zago, 2001; Sexton, 1990; LeVay, 1983, among other). According
to this argument, one would expect to find more agricultural cooperatives established
in kebeles where markets are available and relatively developed in order to strengthen
the engagement and bargaining position of farmers in the existing markets.
Three, another practical explanation related to the mixed-oligopoly proposition is
that agricultural cooperatives can be more present in kebeles where sufficient market-
oriented agricultural productions exist. Lastly, empirical observation by Bernard et al.
(2010) highlight that a majority of Ethiopian agricultural cooperatives were created un-
der the impulse of external partner (public cooperative offices, NGOs and others) and
thus their incidence in particular kebelesmay not be directly linked to kebele or location
related attributes. Various levels of political and social factors also could drive the
presence of agricultural cooperatives in a given kebeles. While it is beyond the scope of
this chapter to fully explain the process of agricultural cooperative formation and lo-
cation, it nevertheless shade lights on the drivers of agricultural cooperative incidence
based on the characteristics of their environment.
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Table 5.5 presents kebele-level correlates to the establishment or presence of agricultural
cooperatives from probit model analysis. Consistent to the descriptive statistics, the
results indicate that the probability of agricultural cooperative incidence is higher in
kebeles that have relatively developed market structure (as measured by availability of
markets and institutional credit providers and number of traders) and are accessible
(as measured by availability of roads and kebeles proximity to major roads). Number of
traders based in the kebele, the availability of credit service providers, the availability of
(feeder) road, and kebeles proximity to major roads by an hour increases the probability
of agricultural cooperative incidence or establishment in the kebele by at least 2, 80, 51,
and 42 percent, respectively.
In other words, the estimates indicate that relatively well developed market structure
and kebeles connection to major roads drive the incidence of agricultural cooperatives
in rural Ethiopia. Given that access to institutional credit providers and major roads
are rare realities found in few advanced kebeles, significantly higher probability of co-
operative existence in kebeles with markets/traders, institutional credit providers, and
better road infrastructure indicates that more agricultural cooperatives present in ad-
vanced locations than in remote kebeles. This result is in line with the mixed-oligopoly
literature that explains agricultural cooperatives as farmers bargaining agency. It ar-
gues that agricultural cooperatives exist not only to fill missing markets and internal-
ize transaction costs, but mainly to bargain for better terms of trade and countervail
the opportunistic behavior of farmers trading partners in places where markets ex-
ist. Nonetheless, the results in Table 5.5 indicate only a correlation between market
availability and cooperative presence. Whether the presence of a cooperative kindles
market development or the existence of market lead to a cooperative formation is an
interesting research issue, which is not fully addressed due to the dearth of appropri-
ate instrument/indicator.
The regional dummy variables included at the bottom of Table 5.5 also explain some
additional regional variations on agricultural cooperatives presence. The estimates
show that kebeles that are found in Tigray region (omitted reference category) are
more likely to have agricultural cooperatives, compared to the other three main re-
gions (i.e., Amhara, Oromia and SNNP). However, closer observation to the sample
kebeles considered from Tigray region revealed that most of these kebeles are found in
advanced location in terms of market structure and geographic isolation, supporting
the main results. Of the total kebeles from Tigray region 71 percent are connected to
major roads, all have access to institutional credit providers, and on average, they have
higher number of traders and input dealers next to Amhara region.
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Table 5.5: Determinants of agricultural cooperatives presence in a kebele (probit).
Indicators
Agricultural cooperative presence in a kebele
(1) (2) (3)
Market availability -0.033
(0.192)
-0.044
(0.200)
0.110
(0.208)
Number of trader 0.027
(0.013)**
0.022
(0.010)**
0.016
(0.010)*
Credit providers
dummy
0.889
(0.300)***
0.873
(0.332)***
0.800
(0.331)**
Feeder road 0.420
(0.210)**
0.510
(0.234)**
Distance to road -0.008
(0.003)***
-0.007
(0.003)**
Distance to woreda
center
0.002
(0.001)**
0.001
(0.001)
Mobile penetration 0.003
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
Amhara region -1.370
(0.527)***
Oromia region -1.567
(0.534)***
SNNP region -2.178
(0.545)***
Constant -0.739
(0.286)***
-1.150
(0.442)***
0.516
(0.721)
Number of obs. 200 200 200
Chi2 14.34*** 31.07*** 44.59***
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.11 0.24
Sensitivity (%) 94.50 77.06 67.89
Specificity (%) 19.78 50.55 73.63
Total correctly classified
(%)
60.50 65.00 70.50
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. Tigray region is omitted
as a reference category.
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the ATA baseline survey (2012).
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5.5.2 Membership and patronage decisions in agricultural cooperatives
As indicated in the previous sections, this study used a two equations or bivariate
probit model to understand the links and determinants of membership and patronage
decisions by farmers in relation to agricultural cooperatives. At first step the estima-
tion checked for potential multicollinearity, as the analysis used 25 different types of
explanatory variables in the two equations. Following the suggestions by Studenmund
(2006), test for the presence of multicollinearity problem was performed by calculat-
ing the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values and pairwise correlation coefficients.
The VIFs were calculated based on a separate estimation of the two equations using
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. The results for both of the equations show
a much lower VIF values compared to the common rule of thumb or cut-off value,
which is 5 (Studenmund, 2006; Kutner et al., 2004) - the highest VIF values were 1.71
and 1.70 with an average values of 1.32 and 1.29 for membership and patronage equa-
tions, respectively. The results from the pairwise correlations also don’t show a strong
association between the variables considered in the analysis. From 293 pairwise cor-
relations only three correlation coefficients had a value greater than 0.4/-0.4 with the
largest correlation coefficient being 0.48 and the majority of the pairwise correlation
coefficients are between -0.01 and 0.01.
Table 5.6 presents the results from the bivariate probit estimation. The general Wald
test statistics has a value of 1084.16 which exceeds 60.48, the critical chi square value
at 44 degree of freedom, indicating that the null hypothesis that claim a zero slope for
all of the 44 parameters in the two equations is rejected. The correlation coefficient of
the residuals (ρ) is also significantly different from zero, indicating the relatedness of
the two equations and significance efficiency gains from deploying the bivariate probit
model.
The general research question the analysis sought to address in this section is whether
there is a link or interdependence between farmers membership and patronage de-
cisions in agricultural cooperatives. The result shows that the two farm household
decisions are related - that is, the membership coefficient in the patronage equation
is positive and statistically significant, indicating that farm households who are co-
operative members are more likely to use the service provided by their cooperatives,
compared to non-members. The correlation coefficient of the residuals (ρ) indicated
above also show a significant association between the unobservables that relates to
membership and patronage equations, corroborating the result from the parameter
estimate.
The analysis also preformed a general hypothesis test on whether households location,
size and specialization, and human and relational capital affect their membership and
patronage decisions simultaneously. The Wald test of joint significance on location
specificity that includes variables related to local market structure and geographic iso-
142 drivers of agricultural cooperatives incidence in ethiopia
lation shows that households location matters. Farm households that are located in
kebeles with relatively better market conditions and closer to major roads and coop-
erative premises are more likely members of agricultural cooperatives, but they are
not necessarily users of the cooperative services. Only households that are closer to
the cooperative premises and with no regular market in their locality are found to be
users. Consistent to the results from the descriptive statistics, in the presence of local
markets farmers tend to become members but not users of the services agricultural
cooperatives provide. This is plausible, because producers can found and join cooper-
atives to induce competition and countervail trading partners opportunistic behavior
in the market place and once price and service adjustments are effected they may
tend to use the market mechanism to avoid costs related to specific use and delivery
requirements by the cooperatives (Karantininis and Zago, 2001; LeVay, 1983).
Joint significance test on the explanatory indicators of size and specialization of farm
households and agricultural cooperatives also clearly indicates that scale and special-
izations are important determinants of households membership and patronage deci-
sions. The results show that households that are relatively larger scale (as measured
by farm size and livestock ownership) and residing in kebeles where agricultural co-
operatives are larger in size (as measured by number of members) are found to be
members. However, larger farmers are less likely to use the services provided by their
agricultural cooperatives. This can be due to the fact that the reduction in physical
transaction costs from economies of scale or aggregation by cooperatives is relatively
smaller for larger farmers. With regard to specialization, households producing grains
are found to be members and users of agricultural cooperatives. This is conceivable,
as the majority of agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia mainly deal with grains and
supply inputs that are mostly required for grain production.
Besides the specialization of households, the services provided by agricultural coop-
eratives also affect households membership and patronage decisions. The estimates
show that agricultural cooperatives that provide input supply and credit services at-
tain more members and patrons than those specialize or provide commercialization
services. This can be due to lack of significant commercialization impact by agricul-
tural cooperatives in Ethiopia (Bernard et al., 2008). The third Wald test on joint sig-
nificance of variables related to households human capital and affiliation in other
groups/networks is also positive and statistically significance. It indicates that farm
households that are experienced (as measure by age), literate, and with large number
of adults are more likely to become members of agricultural cooperatives. Affiliation
in traditional saving and credit groups, on the other hand, encourage membership
but negatively associated with farmers patronage decision, hinting the possible pres-
ence of close substitutes among the services provided by agricultural cooperatives and
rural saving and credit groups.
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Table 5.6: Determinants of membership and use of services in agricultural cooperatives (bivari-
ate probit).
Core
variables
Explanatory indicators Membership Patronage
Constant -3.117 (0.331)*** -1.269 (0.258)***
Membership - 1.764 (0.139)***
Location (x1)
Market availability 0.169 (0.077)** -0.260 (0.072)***
Trader/input dealer availability -0.123 (0.080) 0.442 (0.074)***
Credit providers availability 0.517 (0.127)*** -
Distance to district center 0.001 (0.000)* 0.001 (0.001)
Distance to road -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)**
Distance to coop -0.002 (0.001)** 0.001 (0.001)
Wald test H1: x1 = 0 39.83*** 55.33***
Size and spe-
cialization
(x2)
Land size 0.137 (0.042)*** -0.103 (0.041)**
Livestock (in TLU) 0.021 (0.007)*** -0.013 (0.006)**
Produce gain 0.554 (0.197)*** 0.496 (0.193)**
Produce pulses 0.116 (0.075) -0.017 (0.071)
Produce oilseeds 0.022 (0.099) -0.172 (0.092)*
Produce root crops 0.169 (0.100)* -0.150 (0.094)
Produce fruits -0.302 (0.134)** 0.090 (0.114)
Produce permanent 0.141 (0.086) -0.050 (0.081)
Coop affiliation to union 0.175 (0.093)* 0.209 (0.091)**
Coop membership size 0.000 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.000)***
Coop provide inputs 0.373 (0.138)*** 0.200 (0.120)*
Coop provide commercialization -0.201 (0.082)** 0.075 (0.078)
Coop provide credit 0.366 (0.100)*** 0.230 (0.103)**
Wald test H1: x2 = 0 111.02*** 80.19***
Human
capital and
networking
(x3)
HH head age 0.004 (0.002)* -
HH head literacy 0.348 (0.076)*** -0.070 (0.073)
HH size 0.134 (0.031)*** -
HH head membership in roscg 0.218 (0.123)* -0.231 (0.116)**
Wald test H1: x3 = 0 46.63*** 5.21*
Diagnostic
statistics
Number of obs. 1450 1450
ρ -0.796 (0.111)***
Wald test Chi2(44) 1084.16***
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the ATA baseline survey (2012).
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The bivariate probit estimation also revealed important empirical results that relate
to the theoretical discussions presented in Section 2 on the four possible member-
ship forms arising from combining households membership and patronage decisions,
viz., strong membership, soft membership, shadow membership and no membership.
Strong membership is when farmers join agricultural cooperatives and make use of the
services it provide. Theoretically, such form of membership is common in agricultural
cooperative that handle transactions that are specialized, less frequent, and have an
element of uncertainties (Ménard, 2007; Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). In line with
the theory, the empirical results reported in Table 5.6 correspond strong membership
to specialization of farm households and agricultural cooperatives. It indicates that
households specialized in grain production and residing in kebeles where agricultural
cooperatives are specialized in input supply are more likely members and users of the
services their cooperatives provide. Note, however, that this can be due to limited ac-
cess to alternative input suppliers, as agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia are the ma-
jor suppliers of modern inputs that are mostly required for grain production (Rashid
et al., 2013). Besides specialization, agricultural cooperatives that are integrated or
affiliated to upper-level unions attain/attract strong members. This can be because
forward and backward integration by agricultural cooperatives enables coordination
of complex tasks (e.g., quality control) at lower costs and give farmers the assurance
that they will have reliable market outlets for their production (Valentinov, 2007; Sten-
fanson and Fulton, 1997; Rhodes, 1983).
Soft membership, on the other hand, arises when farmers join forces and become mem-
bers of a cooperative but not users of the services it provides. The results show that
such form of membership or arrangement is prevalent among relatively large scale
farmers and in kebeles where regular local markets exist and agricultural cooperatives
are larger in size. The result is consistent with theories that characterize agricultural
cooperatives as a countervailing force or a pacemaker in the market place (Fulton and
Giannakas, 2001; Sexton and Iskow, 1993; LeVay, 1983). In that respect, agricultural
cooperatives can be considered as playing their ’yardstick’ role. As indicated before,
in the presence of markets, farmers found and join agricultural cooperatives to re-
duce market power of their trading partners and after achieving better bargaining
positions they tend to use the market mechanism because of specific use or delivery
requirements by the cooperatives or integrate downstream through hierarchies due
to high degree of uncertainties and transaction specificity, which is probably true for
large scale farmers (Ménard, 2007; Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). Small farmers, on
the other hand, tend to avoid ownership and control costs and accrue benefits from
economies of scales in physical transaction costs by using cooperative services (e.g.,
aggregation).
The association between soft membership and cooperative sizes is also in line with
theoretical expectations, as in open membership agricultural cooperatives (like the
case in point) farmers may inclined to become members mainly because other house-
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holds in the kebele are members or the socio-political condition requires them to join.
However, they will not tend to use the services provided by cooperatives, seeing that
the inherent problems of ill-defined property rights in cooperatives increases with
number of members (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000; Cook, 1995).
Households affiliation in traditional saving and credit groups is also linked with soft
membership. As indicated before, this can be because some of the services provided
by this two producer groups are likely close substitutes (e.g., credit).
As one can see in Table 5.3, there are also farmers in the sample who are users of
the services agricultural cooperatives provide without membership commitment. This
group of farmers made the shadow membership category. With shadow membership
farmers avoid the contractual costs of ownership and control and obtain benefits from
using its services and cooperative induced competitions in the market (Ménard, 2007;
Hendirikse and Bijman, 2002). The results in this chapter shows that such forms of
membership more likely occurs among small scale farmers and households residing
in kebeles where traders and input dealers are available. Finally, no membership refers to
a situation where farmers use either the spot markets or hierarchies (vertical integra-
tions) instead of agricultural cooperatives. The results related such forms of member-
ship to geographic isolation or location specificity. It indicates that farm households
that are away from major roads are neither members nor users of agricultural cooper-
atives. This can be explained by the nonexistence of agricultural cooperatives in their
locality, as most of the agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia are found at advanced
locations that are connected to main roads (Table 5.5).
5.6 conclusions
In Ethiopia, like anywhere in the world, cooperatives are among the major players
in agriculture input supply, processing and output marketing. Over the last decade
in particular, agricultural cooperative have been promoted as a policy instrument to-
wards achieving agricultural transformation in the country - that is, through lever-
aging collective actions, they are expected to engage in value-addition and enhance
farmers market participation and bargaining position. Although their role in value-
addition is not that evident, agricultural cooperatives are playing crucial roles in input
supply and first-stage output handling. Empirical works show that over the last five to
seven years agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia account 90 percent of modern input
supply and market more than 10 percent of the marketable surplus from agriculture
(Rashid et al., 2013; Bernard et al, 2008).
However, despite promotional efforts and its economic imperatives, agricultural co-
operatives are not ubiquitous, as one would expect. Moreover, in places where agri-
cultural cooperatives exist not all farm households are members and those who are
members are not necessarily users of the services agricultural cooperatives provide.
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This leads to the following research questions that are of particular interest of this
chapter. What drives the actual existence of agricultural cooperatives in particular
places and not in others? Which types of farmers become members and/or users of
agricultural cooperatives and why? Is there a link between farm households member-
ship and patronage decisions in relation to agricultural cooperatives?
In theory, the presence of agricultural cooperatives and farmers decision to join and
use its services are largely linked with market power and transaction cost arguments.
The mixed-oligopoly literature portray the incidence of agricultural cooperatives as a
defensive response by farmers to countervail opportunistic behaviors of trading part-
ners - farmers found, join and patronize agricultural cooperatives to induce competi-
tion and achieve better bargaining position. Accordingly, one could argue that agricul-
tural cooperatives tend to present in places where market exists. The new institutional
economics literature, on the other hand, characterizes agricultural cooperatives as al-
ternative governance mechanism that arises to internalize transactions that involve
specific assets, uncertainties and information costs. According to this literature farm-
ers join forces via agricultural cooperatives mainly to reduce or share transaction costs.
Thus, on the contrary to that of the mixed-oligopoly, one would expect more agricul-
tural cooperatives in remote locations where transaction costs are relatively higher.
This study addressed the aforementioned research questions and theoretical propo-
sitions using a unique data set that includes three survey data from 200 communi-
ties/kebeles, 102 agricultural cooperatives and 1450 farm households. The empirical
results on the incidence of agricultural cooperatives indicates that kebeles that are ac-
cessible and with relatively developed market environment are more likely to have
agricultural cooperatives. In other words, availability of output traders and input deal-
ers (markets) and kebeles connection and proximity to major roads are found to be the
drivers of agricultural cooperatives incidence in rural Ethiopia. This result is in line
with the market power argument, which asserts that agricultural cooperatives exist
mainly to induce competition and bargain for better terms of trades in places where
markets exist.
The links between farm households membership and patronage decisions (farmer-
cooperative relations) is another general issue the chapter sought to address. Even
if the descriptive statistics evident that there are member households that are not
users of the services agricultural cooperatives provide and conversely non-members
who are users, the results from the bivariate probit model shows a significant linkage
between farmers membership and patronage decisions - that is, more of the house-
holds that are members make use of the services provided by agricultural coopera-
tives, compared to non-members. The chapter further investigate the determinants
of households membership and patronage decisions. The results clearly shows that
households location, size, specialization, human and relational capital and the ser-
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vices agricultural cooperatives specialize in and its forward and backward integration
affects farmers membership and patronage decisions.
The chapter also distinguishes four forms of membership that arises while combing
membership and patronage decisions, viz., strong, soft, shadow and no membership,
and examined their driving factors. Strong membership in agricultural cooperatives is
more likely to occur among households that are specialized in grain production and
residing in a kebele where agricultural cooperatives are active (integrated upstream
and downstream) and specialized in input supply provisions. This is partly explained
by the central role of agricultural cooperatives in modern input supply in Ethiopia
and hence limited access for alternative suppliers. Soft membership, a form of member-
ship that arises when farmers decide to join agricultural cooperatives but not to use
its services, is found to be more probable among households that are relatively large
scale, affiliated in other groups and residing in kebeles where markets are relatively
developed and agricultural cooperatives are larger in size. These results substantiate
the argument that in places where markets exist farmers join cooperatives to induce
competition and once they gain better bargaining position or prices and services ad-
justments are effected they tend to use the market mechanism due to specific use
or delivery requirements by cooperatives. The inverse relation between cooperative
size and patronage is explained by potential ill-defined property right problems in
cooperatives, which increases with cooperative size or number of members.
Shadow membership is a type of membership that arises when farmers decide to use the
services agricultural cooperatives provide without membership commitments (e.g.,
contractual costs of ownership and control). This form of membership or arrange-
ment corresponds to small scale households and households residing in a kebelewhere
traders and input dealers are available and the cooperative specialized on commercial-
ization of outputs. Finally, no membership is likely to occur in kebeles that are geograph-
ically isolated - farm households located away from major roads are neither members
nor users of agricultural cooperatives and this is explained by the nonexistence of
agricultural cooperatives in remote kebeles, as evident by this chapter.

6
IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES ON
SMALLHOLDERS TECHNICAL EFF IC IENCY: EV IDENCE FROM
ETHIOP IA
Abstract
Using household survey data from Ethiopia, this chapter evaluates the impact of agricultural
cooperatives on smallholders technical efficiency. The study used propensity score matching to
compare the average difference in technical efficiency between cooperative member farmers and
similar independent farmers. The results show that agricultural cooperatives are effective in
providing support services that significantly contribute to members technical efficiency. These
results are found to be insensitive to hidden bias and consistent with the idea that agricultural
cooperatives enhance members efficiency by easing access to productive inputs and facilitating
extension linkages. According to the findings, increased participation in agricultural coopera-
tives should further enhance efficiency gains among smallholder farmers.
keywords : Agricultural cooperatives, Smallholder farmers, Technical efficiency, Ethiopia.
6.1 introduction
Enhancing productivity and commercialization among smallholder farmers is widely
perceived as a key strategy for rural development, poverty reduction, and food secu-
rity in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2008). For productivity gains to be achieved,
smallholder farmers need to have better access to technology and improve their techni-
cal efficiency. It is important for smallholders to have easy access to extension services
in order to optimize on-farm technical efficiency and productivity, given the limited
resources available. While the private sector is gradually emerging as a contender,
the public sector remains the major provider of extension services in most of these
countries (Venkatesan and Kampen, 1998). A third option for providing services to
smallholder farmers is agricultural cooperatives, which serve the dual purpose of ag-
gregating smallholder farmers and linking them to input and output markets (Davis,
2008; Coulter et al., 1999).
Given that agricultural systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are typically fragmented into
a myriad of small or micro farms over vast and remote rural areas, the role of agri-
cultural cooperatives has become increasingly important (Wanyama et al., 2009). De-
spite the turbulent history sometimes associated with post-independence and highly
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centralized governance regimes, agricultural cooperatives are nowadays omnipresent
throughout the sub-continent. In recent days considerable public development pro-
grams or private initiatives are channeled through cooperatives in order to overcome
prohibitive transaction and coordination costs (Pingali et al., 2005). However, it is still
empirically unclear and highly contested whether these collective organizations can
deliver and live up to their promises. Given the prominence of agricultural coopera-
tives, this is an important policy question for many African countries.
Since the downfall of the Derg regime in 1991, agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia
have become an integral part of the national strategy for agricultural transformation
(MoFED, 2006; FDRE, 2002). With varying degrees of success, agricultural coopera-
tives are longstanding and widespread throughout the country (Getnet and Tsegaye,
2012; Francesconi and Heerink, 2010; Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Bernard et al., 2008;
Teigist, 2008; Francesconi and Ruben, 2007). The recently established Agricultural
Transformation Agency (ATA) has also strongly asserted agricultural cooperatives as
preferential institutions for moving smallholders out of subsistence agriculture and
linking them to emerging input and output markets. In conjunction with promotional
activities by the National Cooperative Agency, this effort has resulted in considerable
growth both in number of agricultural cooperatives and the services they provide to
their members. In June 2012, the majority of both the 43,256 primary cooperatives and
the 200 cooperative unions in the country were agricultural cooperatives engaged in
input and output marketing.
By 2005, agricultural cooperatives had commercialized more than 10 percent of the
marketable surplus in Ethiopia (Bernard et al., 2008). In recent years they are the major
suppliers of improved seeds and chemical fertilizer for all farm households (Rashid et
al., 2013; MoFED, 2010: Unpublished). While their role in agricultural inputs adoption
for productivity growth is widely recognized (Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Spielman et al.,
2011), the impact of technical efficiency gains among their members remain unproven.
Whether cooperative members are technically more efficient than non-members is an
open question. Agricultural cooperatives, as producer organizations, are mandated to
supply inputs together with providing embedded support services and for facilitating
farmer linkage with extension service providers; hence, members are expected to be
technically more efficient.
This chapter aims to answer this question by comparing cooperative members and
similar independent farmers within the same kebeles (in order to reduce potential dif-
ferences in technology and agro-ecology in which this procedure tempers possible
diffusion effects). This approach, which compares members and non-members within
the same kebeles in which the agricultural cooperatives operate, enables us to precisely
capture the efficiency gains from membership, since members receive benefits from
dividends, information, and extension services that are embedded in new technolo-
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gies and have prior access to inputs, which are directly linked with technical efficiency
gains.
The study used the Stochastic Production Frontier (SPF) function model to measure
the technical efficiency of sampled farm households, as it is effective in estimating the
efficiency score of households that account for factors beyond the control of each indi-
vidual producer (Coelli et al., 2005; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). After estimating the
technical efficiency score, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique is applied to es-
timate the impact of membership in agricultural cooperatives on technical efficiency,
drawing on the approaches of Francesconi and Heerink (2010), Bernard et al. (2008),
and Godtland et al. (2004). Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis is conducted to
understand the sensitivity of the results obtained from the matching estimates to pos-
sible unobservable covariates. Moreover, the estimation checked the robustness of the
results following alternative estimation strategy that aimed at accounting potential
bias that might arise in estimating technical efficiency scores.
The results consistently show a positive and statistically significant impact of member-
ship in agricultural cooperatives on technical efficiency at the farm level. On average,
the results found about a 5 percent difference in technical efficiency between coopera-
tive members and non-members. The results suggest that member households are in
a better position to obtain maximum possible outputs from a given set of inputs. The
results are insensitive for a hidden bias that would double the odds of participation
in cooperatives and they are consistent with the idea that agricultural cooperatives
enhance members efficiency by providing easy access to inputs, information, and em-
bedded support services.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data source
and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the
research methodology, including discussion of the empirical strategy, estimation pro-
cedure of the propensity scores and estimation of household technical efficiency scores.
Section 4 reports the results and section 5 concludes by discussing the main findings.
6.2 data and descriptive analysis
The key variables used in this study include household characteristics; inputs used for
production; production value and village level characteristics (such as population den-
sity and availability of farmer training centers). The data used are from the Ethiopia
Agricultural Marketing Household Survey, jointly carried out by the Ethiopian Devel-
opment Research Institute (EDRI), Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR)
and International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) between June and August
2008. This survey provided data on all the variables of interest except village level
variables, which were then obtained separately from the Central Statistical Authority
(CSA).
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The Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household Survey is focused on smallholders
production and marketing patterns and covers the four most populated regions of
Ethiopia (Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray). The sampling procedure employed
was a three-stage stratified random sampling1. The original sample includes 1,707
households randomly drawn from 73 Peasant Associations (PAs). From the original
sample the analysis dropped households with missing observation on variables of in-
terest2. The resulting sample used in this study includes 1,638 farm households, from
which the study drew a sub-sample (i.e., member and non-member farm households
within cooperative kebeles) mainly used to address the research question.
Table 6.1 presents a summary of demographic characteristics of sample households
used in the analysis. From the total sample households considered, 34 percent are
members of agricultural cooperatives (i.e., treatment group) and the remaining (66
percent) is found to be independent farm households (i.e., comparison group). Farm
households belonging to agricultural cooperatives are relatively more literate, older,
more likely to have a male head and have higher household size both in numbers and
adult equivalents. In addition, members are also more likely to own radios, televisions
and mobile phones, as compared to the non-members.
As expected, members are using more productive inputs (i.e., fertilizer and improved
seeds). This can be explained by ease of access, as agricultural cooperatives are the
major last-mile distributors of fertilizers and seeds, and also by the fact that members
need to compensate for relatively lower fertile land. Although not reported in the ta-
ble to conserve space, the data indicates a mean difference within non-member farm
households in input use by locations. Non-member farm households residing in co-
operatives kebeles use a higher amount of fertilizer and improved seeds as compared
to non-members living in a kebele without agricultural cooperatives. This suggests the
potential presence of a spill-over effect in input use and the presence of similar tech-
nology among members and non-members to study efficiency gains in kebeles with
agricultural cooperatives.
As shown in Table 6.2, farm households that belong to agricultural cooperatives are
those located at comparatively accessible locations (closer to the nearest local markets,
closer to the nearest all weather roads and woreda amenities). This can also suggest
that most of the agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia are found in locations that are rel-
atively accessible. In terms of other village level characteristics, on average, members
1 In the first stage, the woredas from each region were selected randomly from a list arranged by degree
of commercialization as measured by the woreda-level quantity of cereals marketed (i.e., the major focus
of the survey). This ensured that that woredas were uniformly distributed across the range of level
of marketed cereal outputs. In the second stage, farmers or peasants associations (FAs or PAs) were
randomly selected from each woreda. For the third stage of selection, households were randomly selected
from the list provided by the PA office.
2 For example, we dropped households that report production volume without amount of seed used or
land cultivated.
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Table 6.1: Demographic characteristics of sample households.
Indicators
Members
(n = 564)
Non-members
(n = 1074)
Pooled
Sample
(N = 1638)
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Household size 6.50 2.04 6.18 2.66 6.29 2.47
Sex of HH head 1.04 0.20 1.10 0.30 1.08 0.27
Age of HH head 45.76 12.28 44.09 13.35 44.67 12.99
HH head education level 0.45 0.49 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.46
Number of plots 6.37 2.81 5.14 2.72 5.56 2.81
Number of crops 2.75 1.04 2.34 1.04 2.48 1.06
Off-farm income 0.55 0.49 0.61 0.48 0.59 0.49
Radio and/or TV ownership 0.60 0.49 0.39 0.48 0.46 0.49
Phone ownership 0.01 0.13 0.006 0.08 0.01 0.10
Value of crop produced 3423.4 3149.9 2266.4 2437.8 26665.5 2758.8
Fertilizer used by HHs 96.39 136.32 22.41 49.61 47.88 96.13
Improved seed used by HHs 7.46 23.86 1.70 7.53 3.68 15.51
Cultivated land size 1.37 0.94 1.14 0.90 1.22 0.92
Labor (adult equivalent) 5.43 1.77 5.08 2.20 5.20 2.07
Oxen owned by HHs 1.71 1.11 1.19 1.07 1.37 1.11
TLU (excluding ox) 3.34 3.33 3.22 5.29 3.26 4.71
Note: Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) is calculated based on conversion factors suggested by
Asfaw et al. (2010), Chilonda and Otte (2006), and Jahnke et al. (1988).
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
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Table 6.2: Geographic characteristics of sample households.
Indicators
Members
(n = 564)
Non-members
(n = 1074)
Pooled
Sample
(N = 1638)
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Distance to all weather road 55.10 73.98 76.63 89.57 69.22 85.12
Distance to nearest market 67.21 69.5 75.63 72.71 72.73 71.71
Distance to woreda capital 141.60 111.86 154.74 111.48 150.22 11.75
Population density 183.2 114.6 187.4 144.4 185.9 134.8
Access to irrigation 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
Soil quality
Fertile 0.19 0.39 0.34 0.47 0.29 0.45
Medium 0.65 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.49
Teuf 0.14 0.35) 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35
Farmer training center 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32
Note: Medium denotes that the land owned by the household in question is a combination of
both fertile and infertile soil qualities.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
and non-members are located in Peasant Associations (PAs) with similar population
density and have comparable access to irrigation and Farmer Training Centers (FTC).
6.3 analytical approach
This chapter aims at measuring the average impact of membership in agricultural co-
operatives on farm households technical efficiency. In other words, the study aims
to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)3, where the treatment
is membership in agricultural cooperatives and the treated are member farmers. In
such types of casual inference, the estimation of treatment effects in the absence of
information on the counter-factual poses an important empirical problem. In impact
evaluation literature this is known as the problem of filling in missing data on the
3 See Becker and Ichino (2002), Dehejia and Wahba (2002), Heckman et al. (1997), Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983), Smith and Todd (2005), Todd (2006), and Chapter 4 of this dissertation for detailed methodological
discussion on estimation of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated through matching procedures. We
didn’t include equations of ATT to conserve space.
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counter-factual (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Heckman et al.,
1997; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). As clearly described in Chapter 4 of this disser-
tation, the challenge is to find a suitable comparison group with similar covariates
and whose outcomes provide a comparable estimate of outcomes in the absence of
treatment.
The empirical approach in this chapter is twined to reduce three potential sources
of biases in the selection of a comparison group of non-member or non-cooperative
farmers. These potential biases are common in evaluations aimed at measuring ex post
impact of projects that involve some degree of self-selection among participants. A
point in case is given by this chapter, which aims to evaluate the impact of membership
in agricultural cooperatives, given that participation is voluntary and based on the
intrinsic preferences, ability and motivation of the farmers, as well as considering
that no baseline (i.e., ex ante) observations are available to assess the performance of
member-farmers before they joined a cooperative.
The first potential source of bias is given by selection on observables, which may
arise due to sampling bias, meaning that the selection of cooperative location was
not-random but determined by spatial fixed effects (e.g., village level characteristics)
and farm households characteristics. To control for selection bias associated with the
fact that participation in cooperatives was not random, the analysis draw from similar
approaches by Francesconi and Heerink (2010), Bernard et al. (2008), and Godtland et
al. (2004), and apply Propensity Score Matching (PSM) techniques to account for dif-
ferences in observed covariates between members and non-members. Using PSM has
a great importance in providing unbiased estimate through controlling for observable
confounding factors and in reducing the dimensionality4 of the matching problem
(Becker and Ichino, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
With regards to placement bias, however, one can argue that Ethiopias past and current
governance of cooperative organizations minimizes the importance of farmers free
will and locations resource endowments, since every kebele is expected to have at least
one cooperative and participation in cooperatives means access to agricultural inputs,
as agricultural cooperatives are the major last-mile distributor of modern inputs in
Ethiopia (Rashid et al., 2013). Hence, in most cases the establishment of agricultural
cooperatives is more driven by location specificity (as evident in Chapter 5) than the
characteristics of farm households. Further supporting this argument, Bernard et al.
(2008) assume, as this study do, that the majority of the agricultural cooperatives are
externally formed in its PSM analysis, and found that government and development
agencies initiate 74 percent of cooperatives in Ethiopia. Thus, in Ethiopia cooperative
placement based on households characteristics is rather negligible.
4 Propensity score methods solve the dimensionality or separateness problem through creating a single
composite score from all observed covariates X, which will be used for matching (Becker and Ichino,
2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Steiner and Cook, 2012).
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The second source of bias in selecting a comparison group is spill-over effects. In the
presence of externalities, comparing members of cooperatives with non-members in
the same kebele can increase the possibility of having spill-over effects that underes-
timate the cooperative impact. On the other hand, considering a comparison group
from kebele without cooperatives can increase differences at the kebele level (i.e., differ-
ence in agro-ecological conditions, infrastructure and institutions) by increasing the
likelihood of selection bias. In the empirical analysis the study tried to take care of
both concerns. The estimation first considered a sample that includes members and
non-members from the kebeles with cooperatives and then used the whole sample to
match cooperative members with non-members from kebeles without cooperatives as
well.
The third source of bias is selection on unobservable, which arises due to differences
between members and non-members in the distribution of their unobserved charac-
teristics (e.g., in their ability, desire, risk preference, aspiration etc.). Given the data
available cannot control for selection on unobservable referring to farmers preferences,
motivation or ability. Controlling for such biases requires a suitable instrument that ex-
plains the probability of participation in agricultural cooperatives but does not explain
their outcome (see for detailed discussions on alternative estimators under the hypoth-
esis of observables and unobservable in Chapter 4). In this case, however, since the
study deployed matching and compared members and non-members whose propen-
sity scores are sufficiently close or have the same distribution, one can assume that the
distribution of unobservable characteristics is the same or at least not so different for
both groups independent of membership to induce a bias (see Becker and Ichino, 2002,
for a discussion). Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis is used to test the sensitivity
of the results to possible hidden biases due to unobservable household characteris-
tics when this assumption is relaxed. Furthermore, the robustness of the results is
checked using alternative estimation strategy that accounts for similar potential bias
that might arise in technology selection. In this strategy the technical efficiency scores
are estimated after obtaining a comparable treatment and control groups.
6.3.1 Estimation of the propensity score (p-score) and matching
As indicated in the previous section the study used propensity scoring to match mem-
bers of agricultural cooperatives with similar independent farm households. Hence,
the analysis first estimated the conditional probability of becoming a member in agri-
cultural cooperatives (i.e., propensity score) given observed household characteristics
using a flexible probit model, where membership status in cooperatives is the depen-
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dent variable and covariates and their quadratic terms are introduced as independent
variables5.
Although the probability of participation needs to be estimated only for households
living in a kebele with cooperatives for better identification of the variables that de-
termine participation, the study also estimated the likelihood of participation for the
whole sample to understand the existence of sufficient overlap of the covariates. At
large, the coefficients and statistical significance of the covariates are similar, except for
livestock ownership, telephone ownership and households that produce barley. The
analysis mainly used the propensity scores based on the reduced sample to estimate
the average treatment effect on the treated for two reasons. One, the opportunity to
participate exists in the restricted sample; and two, the restricted sample is the primary
focus of the analysis as it better controls local level differences that can potentially bias
the impact, tempering possible spill-over effects that are found to be negligible.
The results from the probit estimation are summarized in Table 6.3. From the results
it was evident that the propensity to become a member of agricultural cooperatives
is high for households with large family size, experience in farming, number of farm
plots, mobile ownership, wealth (i.e., number of ox and land), and crop types pro-
duced by household (i.e., teff, wheat and finger-melt). However, after certain threshold
wealth, household size and age adversely affect probability of participation. On the
other hand, farm households that have off-farm incomes, live closer to roads, and
grow diverse crops are less likely to participate in agricultural cooperatives.
The results are more or less consistent with what has been found by Bernared et al.
(2008) as predictors of participation in agricultural cooperatives. They suggest that
poorer households without any resources (i.e., land, labor, oxen etc.) and households
producing different crops than the common cereals marketed through agricultural
cooperatives are less likely to become members. They also show that wealthy house-
holds with sufficient experience in farming and excess owned labor will not tend to
be involved in collective action, which is consistent with theoretical predications.
The density distribution of propensity scores for members and non-members are pre-
sented in Figure 6.16. In order to improve the robustness of the estimate, the matches
are restricted to members and non-members who have a common support7 in the
distribution of the propensity score. As it can be seen in the figure, the distributions
appear with sufficient common support region that allows for matching. Besides, the
difference between members and non-members in their propensity score distribution
5 Quadratic terms are introduced in order to account for possible non-linear relationships and to maximize
the predicting power of the model (see Godtland et al., 2004, for detailed discussion).
6 The reported density distribution is for the reduced sample that includes only members and non-
members in a kebele with agricultural cooperatives.
7 Common support refers to the values of the propensity scores where both treatment (i.e., members) and
comparison groups (i.e., non-members) are found. 8 to 13 observations that are off-support are dropped
(Table A3 and A4).
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Table 6.3: determinants of participation in agricultural cooperatives.
Indicators
Members and
non-members from
cooperatives Kebeles
(reduced sample)
Members and
non-members from
Kebeles with and
without cooperatives
(whole sample)
Coefficient (Std. Err) Coefficient (Std. Err)
Household size 0.201 (0.067)*** 0.206 (0.064)***
Household size2 -0.013 (0.004)*** -0.014 (0.004)***
Gender of household head -0.182 (0.153) -0.161 (0.151)
Age of household head 0.034 (0.019)* 0.040 (0.018)**
Household head age2 -0.001 (0.000)* -0.001 (0.000)**
Household head literacy 0.408 (0.078)*** 0.404 (0.077)***
Distance to the nearest road -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)***
Distance to the nearest market 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Distance to woreda capital -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000)
Number of farm plots 0.027 (0.016)* 0.038 (0.016)***
Number of crops -0.165 (0.109) -0.197 (0.105)*
Household access to irrigation -0.060 (0.126) -0.085 (0.123)
HH receives off-farm income -0.157 (0.075)** -0.139 (0.073)**
Household owns telephone 0.987 (0.441)** 0.521 (0.342)
Number of ox owned 0.259 (0.073)*** 0.252 (0.071)***
Number of ox owned2 0.033 (0.015)** -0.029 (0.015)*
Livestock, other than ox (in TLU) -0.008 (0.011) -0.017 (0.010)*
Hectare of land held 0.127 (0.041)*** 0.162 (0.040)***
Hectare of land held2 -0.004 (0.002)** -0.006 (0.002)***
Household produces Teff 0.381 (0.136)*** 0.444 (0.131)***
Household produces wheat 0.572 (0.140)*** 0.662 (0.136)***
Household produces sorghum -0.177 (0.147) -0.180 (0.141)
Household produces barley 0.170 (0.135) 0.240 (0.131)*
Household produces maize 0.155 (0.138) 0.137 (0.135)
Household produces finger melt 0.643 (0.149)*** 0.762 (0.145)***
Constant -2.369 (0.488)*** -2.665 (0.477)***
Number of obs. 1455 1638
Pseudo R^2 0.1464 0.1861
Sensitivity (%) 50.00 48.58
Specificity (%) 83.73 87.52
Total correctly classified (%) 70.65 74.11
Note: *** Significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
Figure 6.1: Distributions of the propensity scores for members (treated group) and non-
members (comparison group).
validates the use of matching techniques to ensure comparability. From several match-
ing techniques applicable in impact evaluation, the estimation used two extensively
applied methods (i.e., non-parametric kernel based matching and five nearest neigh-
bors matching).
The non-parametric kernel regression method is used to allow matching of members
with the whole sample of non-members, since the technique uses the whole sample
of the comparison with common support to construct a weighted average match for
each treated (Heckman et al., 1998; Heckman et al., 1997). That is, the entire sample of
non-members in the comparison group is used to construct a weighted average match
to each member in the treatment group. On the other hand, the five nearest neighbors
matching is used to match each member with the mean of the five non-members who
have the closest propensity score. The imperative of the nearest neighbors matching is
that it compares non-members with scores that are closer to the scores of the members.
What is more, the validity of the matching procedure relies on the extent to which
these techniques sample or construct a comparison group that resembles the treatment
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group. Besides, the balancing test within blocks that are satisfied in the estimation of
the propensity score in case of both samples (see propensity score blocks in Table A.7),
the study undertake a balancing test that compares a simple mean (i.e., mean equality
test) of household characteristics within the treatment group to the corresponding
comparison groups created by the matching techniques before and after matching as
a complement.
As reported in Table 6.48, the unmatched sample fails to satisfy the balancing prop-
erty. Although the groups are found to be comparable in terms of access to irrigation,
age of household head and distance to market and district administration, it shows
a systematic difference between members and non-members in the majority of their
observed characteristics before matching. The balancing test results after matching
that compares cooperative members to the sub-set of comparison non-members se-
lected through five nearest neighbors matching and kernel-based matching shows no
systematic or statistical difference in observed characteristics between the two groups.
Hence, the results suggest that the comparison is valid from statistical point of view.
6.3.2 Measuring technical efficiency
The technical efficiency measure is intended to capture whether agricultural coopera-
tives enable their members in getting better access to productive inputs and services
including training on better farming practices that enhance their productive efficiency.
The stochastic frontier production model9 is used to estimate the technical efficiency
of sample households. It measures the ability of households to obtain maximum possi-
ble outputs from a given set of inputs (Coelli et al., 2005; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000;
Farrell, 1957). Such a measure is of great importance in estimating the household ef-
ficiency score by accounting for factors beyond the control of each producer. Besides,
8 The reported balancing test is for the reduced sample (i.e., sample 1) that includes only members and
non-members in a kebele with agricultural cooperatives. We did similar tests for the full sample and the
balancing properties are satisfied.
9 Unlike the deterministic approach, it is a model that incorporates household-specific random shocks
that represents statistical noises due to factors beyond the control of households, measurement errors
and omission of relevant variables (Coelli et al., 2005; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). In other words,
in stochastic production frontier the error term is composed of the symmetric error component and
the technical inefficiency component that measures shortfall of output from its maximum frontier or
possible output. Hence, in this approach technical efficiency is measured as the ratio of observed output
to maximum attainable output in a context characterized by household specific random shocks (i.e.,
exp
{
Vj
}
): TEj =
Yj
f (Xj,β). exp{Vj} . Where, TEj refers to the technical efficiency of the jth producer, Yj
is the observed output, f
(
Xj, β
)
indicates the deterministic part that is common to all producers or
households, exp
{
Vj
}
is a producers specific part that captures the effect of random noises or shocks on
each producer. See Aigner et al. (1977), Coelli et al. (2005), Jondrow et al. (1982), Kumbhakar and Lovell
(2000), and Meeusen and Ven den Broeck (1977) for detailed methodological discussions.
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Table 6.4: Balancing test of matched sample.
Indicators
Unmatched samples Five nearest
neighbors
matching
Kernel-based
matching
M N-M Diff:
P-value
M N-M Diff:
P-value
M N-M Diff:
P-value
Household size 6.50 6.03 0.000 6.50 6.45 0.676 6.50 6.46 0.775
Gender of HH head 1.04 1.10 0.000 1.04 1.04 0.834 1.04 1.03 0.799
HH head literacy 0.45 0.25 0.000 0.45 0.48 0.320 0.45 0.46 0.768
Age of HH head 45.76 44.80 0.169 45.81 44.95 0.239 45.81 45.41 0.585
Distance (minutes)
To the road 55.10 72.11 0.000 55.20 57.51 0.590 55.20 57.7 0.562
To the market 67.21 68.26 0.783 67.16 71.43 0.357 67.16 69.95 0.523
To Woreda capital 141.6 148.5 0.249 142.2 140.7 0.828 142.2 143.5 0.837
Number of plots 6.37 5.38 0.000 6.35 6.33 0.942 6.35 6.21 0.432
No. of crops planted 2.75 2.42 0.000 2.74 2.76 0.764 2.74 2.72 0.741
Access to irrigation 0.10 0.08 0.367 0.10 0.08 0.328 0.10 0.09 0.481
Off-farm income 0.55 0.61 0.014 0.55 0.57 0.492 0.55 0.56 0.744
Own telephone 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.011 0.672 0.014 0.017 0.627
Number of ox 1.71 1.22 0.000 1.70 1.68 0.711 1.70 1.68 0.693
Livestock (in TLU) 3.34 2.80 0.008 3.32 3.14 0.972 3.32 3.43 0.631
Size of farm land 2.06 1.51 0.000 2.05 2.06 0.929 2.05 1.30 0.869
Note: M refers to members and N-M refers to non-members. Bold denotes that the p-value is
statistically significance at lower than 10%. Livestock owned (TLU) refers to livestock other
than ox owned by the household.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
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it helps to understand the factors that determine technical inefficiency of farm house-
holds, since some of the factors can be influenced by policies.
Following this approach the estimation first detected the presence of inefficiency in the
production for sample households. Estimating the stochastic production frontier and
conducting a likelihood-ratio test assuming the null hypothesis of no technical ineffi-
ciency on input-output data carried out the test. The result shows that the inefficiency
component of the error term is significantly different from zero, which indicates the
presence of a statistically significant inefficiency component (i.e., Ho: Sigma_u = 0 is
rejected). The lambda (λ) value is also greater than one, indicating the significance
of the inefficiency. Moreover, the value of gamma indicates that there is a 70 percent
variation in output due to technical inefficiency. In other words, the technical ineffi-
ciency component is likely to have an important effect in explaining output among
farm households in the sample.
Once the presence of technical inefficiency detected, the study estimate a one-stage
simultaneous maximum likelihood estimate for the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas10
stochastic frontier production function to predict households technical efficiency scores
and to understand determinants of inefficiency. As expected, all conventional inputs
(land, labor, fertilizer, seed and number of oxen owned) are found to be significant
determinants of household production (Table 4.5). In particular, landholding size and
number of oxen owned are found to be the major input variables that affect output
considerably. Overall, the return to scale shows that farmers in the sample considered
are operating under increasing return to scale, suggesting that size may matter in the
efficiency of smallholder farmers. This result is expected in smallholder farms context
and consistent with prior studies in Ethiopia by Asefa (2012) and Haji and Andersson
(2008), among others.
The inefficiency model suggests that inefficiency of farm households is significantly
linked with number of plots, diversification of crops, gender of household head and
membership in agricultural cooperatives11. Overall, the above results are in line with
the findings of Jaime and Salazar (2011), Alemu et al. (2009), and Idiong (2007) and
comparable to the results obtained from the alternative strategy that estimate the tech-
nical efficiency scores using matched group of member and non-member farmers.
With regard to membership in agricultural cooperatives, the result indicates that mem-
bership reduces technical inefficiency by about 5 percent (Table 6.5). Concurrently,
from the descriptive statistics it is understood that the mean technical efficiency of
members is significantly higher than that of non-members (i.e., 71 and 62 percent, re-
10 Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontiers are found to be adequate representations of the data as compared to
the specifications of the translog stochastic frontiers.
11 The coefficient of membership in agricultural cooperatives obtained from the inefficiency model is com-
parable to the average impacts of cooperative membership on technical efficiency resulted from matching
estimators.
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Table 6.5: Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates of the parameters for Stochastic Production
Frontier (SPF) function and correlates of technical inefficiency.
Production function Dependent variable: production
value in birr (logged)
Coefficient (Std. Err.)
ln (Land size held by household (ha)) 1.174 (0.063)***
ln (Seed used (Kg)) 0.071 (0.017)***
ln (Fertilizer used (Kg)) 0.036 (0.009)***
ln (Labor (hired in number of days)) 0.051 (0.014)***
ln (Number of oxen owned) 0.472 (0.042)***
Constant 6.327 (0.101)***
Return to scale (sum of elasticities) 1.804
Technical inefficiency component
Household size 0.023 (0.026)
Gender of household head 0.726 (0.204)***
Age of household head -0.004 (0.004)
Household head read and write -0.231 (0.148)
Distance to local market 0.001 (0.001)*
Number of plots held 0.106 (0.028)***
Number of crops planted -0.620 (0.135)***
Household access to irrigation -2.800 (1.219)**
Household receives off-farm income 0.152 (0.141)
Membership in cooperatives -0.512 (0.176)***
Household access to institutional credit 0.053 (0.162)
Constant -0.567 (0.439)
Diagnostic statistics
Sigma_v 0.600 (0.032)***
Lambda 1.556 (0.091)***
Gamma (γ = λ2/(1+ λ2) 0.707
Number of obs. 1638
Wald chi2 (5) 1567.38
Prob > chi2 0.000
Log likelihood function -1871.810
LR test of Sigma_u=0: chibar2(01) 24.80
Note: *** Significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
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Figure 6.2: Frequency distribution of technical efficiency scores by cooperative membership.
spectively) and the majority of the members are above the mean efficiency (i.e., 65
percent) of the pooled sample (Figure 6.212). Besides, as is clear from Figure 6.2, the
density of non-members is above that of the members on the distribution below the
mean efficiency of the whole sample. However, one cannot draw any conclusion at this
stage as this difference can be partially or totally due to original differences among
households. Thus, as indicated above, the study used matching that computes the av-
erage difference in technical efficiency scores between members and non-members in
the common support region using the techniques described above.
12 The reported frequency distribution is for the reduced sample (i.e., sample 1) that includes only members
and non-members in a kebele with agricultural cooperatives.
6.4 results and discussion 165
6.4 results and discussion
6.4.1 Average impact of agricultural cooperatives on technical efficiency
As described in the above sections, the average impact of cooperative membership on
the technical efficiency of small farmers is analyzed using the reduced sample (i.e.,
sub-sample 1) that includes members and non-members from kebeles with agricultural
cooperatives and the whole sample that aimed at accounting for possible spill-over ef-
fects (i.e., sample 2). The resulting non-parametric estimate of the Average Treatment
Effect on the Treated (ATT), average impact of membership in agricultural coopera-
tives on the technical efficiency of smallholder farmers, based on the Propensity Score
Matching (PSM) methods, is reported in Table 6.6.
The chapter mainly used the analysis based on the reduced sample as it accounts for
differences in technology and agro-ecology that can affect efficiency estimation. On
the other hand, the impact estimate based on the whole sample aimed at examining
the extent of spill-over effects. As is clear from Table 6.6, the diffusion effect is found to
be negligible. Meaning, the impact estimate based on the whole sample is lower13 than
the impact estimate based on the reduced sample where the possibility of diffusion
effects exists.
Consistent with the results from the descriptive statistics and the inefficiency model of
the stochastic frontier function, the study found that, on average, farmers belonging
to agricultural cooperatives are more technically efficient than independent farmers.
The results suggest that member households are in a better position to obtain maxi-
mum possible outputs from a given set of inputs used, by about 5 percentage points,
in line with the expectation that agricultural cooperatives likely make productive tech-
nologies accessible and provide embedded support services (i.e., training, information
and extension linkages). The impact estimates are robust across different estimation
methods and samples considered. The estimation further checked the robustness of
the estimates for a specific region (i.e., Amhara Region), where the size of the sample
allows for using matching techniques. The results are comparable to the results from
the reduced and the whole sample (i.e., about a 5.5 percent and 4.5 percentage points
difference for kernel based and five neighbors matching, respectively).
Nonetheless, the above results rely heavily on the assumption of unconfoundeness or
conditional independence14 (i.e., once the factors affecting participation are taken into
13 Lower average impact from the whole sample that include non-cooperative kebeles can also indicate
the presence of technology difference between cooperative and non-cooperative kebeles, strengthening
our decision to focus on cooperative kebeles in order to reduce potential differences in technology, as it
should be accounted to compare differences in technical efficiency due to cooperative membership.
14 Unconfoundedness in our case means that participation in agricultural cooperatives does not depend
on households technical efficiency, after controlling for the variations in technical efficiency induced by
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Table 6.6: Effect of cooperative membership on technical efficiency of smallholders.
Indicator
Kernel-based matching Five nearest neighbors
matching
Number
of obs.
ATT Std. Err. ATT Std. Err.
Reduced sample:
(% Difference in TE)
5.64 (0.008)*** 5.70 (0.010)*** 1455
Whole sample:
(% Difference in TE)
5.42 (0.009)*** 4.55 (0.010)*** 1638
Check for robustness: observations limited to Amhara region only
Reduced sample 4.82 (0.012)*** 4.11 (0.011)*** 385
Whole sample 5.30 (0.010)*** 4.02 (0.012)*** 431
Note: Reduced sample includes members and non-members only from kebeles with agricul-
tural cooperatives; Whole sample includes the whole sample (i.e., members and non-members
from kebeles with and without agricultural cooperatives). TE refers to households Technical
Efficiency score. Bootstrap with 100 replications is used to estimate the standard errors. ***
Significant at 1%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
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account, the condition of randomization restored) and are not robust against hidden
bias. If there are unobserved variables which affect participation in cooperatives and
technical efficiency simultaneously, unobserved heterogeneity affecting the robustness
of the estimates might arise (Keele, 2010; Becker and Caliendo, 2007; Rosenbaum, 2002;
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
The study assessed the presence of this problem using Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity
analysis when the key assumption is relaxed by a quantifiable increase in uncertainty.
As reported in Table 6.7, the results are found to be insensitive to a bias that would
double the odds of participation (self-selection) in agricultural cooperatives but sensi-
tive to bias that would triple the odds. The magnitude of hidden bias, which would
make the finding of a positive and significant effect of membership in agricultural co-
operatives on technical efficiency questionable or spurious, should be higher than =2.5
and =2.6 for the reduced sub-sample and whole sub-sample, respectively. Hence, the
study deduce that the strength of the hidden bias should be sufficiently high to under-
mine the conclusion of positive and significant impact of membership in agricultural
cooperatives on technical efficiency based on the matching analysis.
6.4.2 Robustness check
Besides the Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis for hidden bias presented in Table
6.7, the estimation checked the robustness of the results following alternative estima-
tion strategy used by Crespo-Cebada et al. (2013) and Mayen et al. (2010) to address
the same problem of correcting potential selection bias in measuring technical effi-
ciency difference between two groups using PSM. In this approach the stochastic fron-
tier model is estimated on sub-samples of cooperative non-members and members
that are obtained from PSM. The strategy is aimed at addressing potential bias that
may arise in estimating technical efficiency scores using unmatched samples, as the
technology use can be affected by the same selection bias like that of membership in
agricultural cooperatives.
Thus, before estimating the technical efficiency scores, the analysis constructed statis-
tically comparable non-members using PSM. Single-nearest-neighbor matching tech-
nique is used to pair each cooperative member with a non-member that has the closest
propensity score15. Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of the propensity score for sub-
sample members and non-members obtained from the matching. As expected, the
propensity score distribution of the PSM sub-sample of non-members closely resem-
differences in observable covariates. It is a strong assumption that implies that participation is based
on observable characteristics and that variables simultaneously influencing participation and technical
efficiency are observable.
15 Similar probability model and specification presented in section 4.1 and Table 3 is used to estimate the
propensity scores.
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Table 6.7: Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis for hidden bias.
Critical Value of
Hidden Bias (Γ)
TE (Sample 1) Sig+ (max) TE (Sample 2) Sig+ (max)
1 <0.0000001 <0.0000001
1.10 <0.0000001 <0.000001
1.20 <0.000001 <0.000001
1.30 <0.000001 <0.000001
1.40 <0.000001 <0.000001
1.50 <0.000001 <0.000001
1.60 <0.000001 <0.000001
1.70 <0.000001 <0.000001
1.80 0.000011 <0.000001
1.90 0.000085 0.000012
2 0.000489 0.000084
2.10 0.002134 0.000443
2.20 0.007333 0.001824
2.30 0.020519 0.006039
2.40 0.048091 0.016554
2.50 0.09674 0.038524
2.60 0.170595 0.077759
2.70 0.268689 0.1387
2.80 0.384324 0.222264
2.90 0.506814 0.32474
3 0.624664 0.43839
Note: Reduced sample includes members and non-members only from kebeleswith agricultural
cooperatives; Whole sample includes the whole sample (i.e., members and non-members from
kebeleswith and without agricultural cooperatives). TE refers to households technical efficiency
score. The sensitivity analysis is for one-sided significance levels. Γ measures the degree of
departure from random assignment of treatment or a study free of bias (i.e., Γ=1).
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
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Table 6.8: Means and standard deviations of technical efficiency: PSM sub-sample.
Members Non-members Difference in
MeansMean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Reduced sample 68.37 0.58 61.08 0.74 7.29***
Whole sample 67.17 0.60 62.03 0.73 5.13***
Note: Reduced sample includes members and non-members only from kebeleswith agricultural
cooperatives; Whole sample includes the whole sample (i.e., members and non-members from
kebeles with and without agricultural cooperatives). *** Significant at 1%.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
bles that of members in terms of their propensity to membership, compared to the
distribution in Figure 6.1. Furthermore, as it is a matched sub-sample, there are no
farm households that are off-support in either of the groups (Figure 6.3).
Next the analysis estimated the technical efficiency scores of the farm households us-
ing stochastic frontier model on the two different sub-samples obtained from PSM
(i.e., PSM sub-sample that include members and non-members in cooperative kebeles
and PSM sub-sample that also include non-members in non-cooperative kebeles). The
results from the stochastic frontier analysis are presented in Table 6.816. For the whole
sample the analysis found the technical efficiency of cooperative members to be 67.17,
which is 5.13 percentage points higher than for non-members. When the study account
for potential technology differences across locations by restricting the sample to farm
households only living in cooperative kebeles, the it found that cooperative members
are 7.29 percent more efficient compared to non-members. Overall, the 5 to 7 percent-
age points efficiency gap found from alternative estimation strategy is comparable
with the results obtained from ATT reported in Table 6.6.
In all, although the magnitude or economic significance is not as high as expected, the
results obtained from the two alternative estimation strategies suggested that partici-
pation in agricultural cooperatives resulted in technical efficiency gains among small-
holder farmers. This efficiency difference can be due to greater benefit of agricultural
cooperatives in farm technology/inputs adoption by lowering costs and improving
members access to productive inputs and services (Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Getnet
and Tsegaye, 2012). As presented in Table A.8, the study also found considerable im-
pact of cooperatives membership in use of farm inputs (i.e., fertilizer and improved
16 As indicated in section 4.2 the coefficients of the production parameters, inefficiency correlates and
diagnostic statistics obtained from the SPF estimation using the matched sample are more or less similar
to the one resulted from the estimation based on the whole unmatched sample.
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Note: Reduced sample includes members and non-members only from kebeles with agricul-
tural cooperatives; Whole sample includes members and non-members from kebeles with and
without agricultural cooperatives.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
Figure 6.3: Distributions of the propensity scores for members and non-members: PSM sub-
sample.
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seeds). Moreover, benefits of cooperatives in linking smallholders to extension services
can be also the sources of this efficiency gap between members and non-members, as
recent study by Rodrigo (2012) found a positive effect of agricultural cooperatives in
increasing farmers involvement in agricultural extension programs in Ethiopia that
results in productivity growth among members.
6.4.3 Impact heterogeneity
The above results obtained from the alternative estimation strategies assume a ho-
mogenous treatment effects among cooperative member households. However, treat-
ment impacts can vary within cooperative members, as households are distinct in their
socio-economic realities. In order to understand potential impact heterogeneity within
members, the distribution of cooperatives impact on members level of technical effi-
ciency is plotted using the results obtained from Kernel matching estimates (i.e., the
difference between actual observed technical efficiency and corresponding matched
values obtained from the estimation of ATT).
While the impacts are normally distributed, one can observe some variations of mem-
bership impact on technical efficiency within members across the two samples (Figure
A6.1). For large proportion of members, involvement in cooperatives results in about 5-
15 percent efficiency gains as compared to non-members. For the remaining few mem-
ber households is shows both efficiency gains and losses ranging from 20-40 percent
as compared to their counterparts. The analysis further regress technical efficiency
gains due to membership in cooperatives obtained from Kernel matching estimates
by household characteristics, with the purpose of understanding the determinants or
correlates of observed impact variations within members.
The results from the regression suggests that the impact of membership in coopera-
tives on technical efficiency significantly increases with cultivated land size, applica-
tion of improved seeds and access to irrigation and farmer training center and de-
creases with distance to market, off-farm income and sex of household head (Table
A.9). It implies that technical efficiency gains from cooperative membership is better
responsive for member households with large and irrigated land holding and resides
in villages with farmer training centers. The lower impact of cooperatives membership
for members away from local market on the other hand can be due to higher costs of
accessing the services provided by the cooperatives, as most of the cooperatives in
Ethiopia are located closer to nearest markets (Bernard et al, 2013). Conversely the
results indicate that household head literacy, access to media, as measured by radio
ownership and application of fertilizer does not explain variations in efficiency gains
within members.
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6.5 conclusions
Over the past decade and a half, agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia have strongly
promoted as instrument to transform subsistence agriculture by preserving market
options and increasing farmers income, as they are believed to be efficient in inter-
nalizing transaction costs, reducing the variability of farmers income through risk
pooling and countervailing opportunistic behaviors (Hogeland, 2006; Staatz, 1987).
Though many variations in the agricultural cooperatives model can be distinguished,
typical agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia combine both agricultural supply and
marketing activities. Currently, agricultural cooperatives market more than 10 percent
of farmers produce and supply farm inputs for all farm households irrespective of
membership. Although their share in input and output marketing shows how vibrant
the cooperatives are in supporting agricultural transformation, empirical studies on
their efficiency and productivity impacts are very limited.
Using household data drawn from the Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey in 2008, this chapter aims to understand the impact of membership in agricul-
tural cooperatives on technical efficiency in a context where membership incentives
can result in efficiency gains. The study assume that the establishment of cooperatives
in Ethiopia has been independent of household level characteristics due to negative
experiences in the past and current policies on cooperative formation (i.e., one co-
operative for each kebele). Moreover, the study assume that difference in technology
between members and non-members is insignificant, as agricultural cooperatives in
Ethiopia are required to supply basic farm inputs for all farm households. In addi-
tion, the role of spill-over effects cannot be underestimated. With these assumptions,
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique is used to compare the average technical
efficiency difference between cooperative member households and independent farm
households living within the same kebele in which agricultural cooperatives operate.
The results consistently indicate a positive and significant impact of agricultural co-
operatives on members levels of technical efficiency. On average members are better
situated to get maximum possible output from a given set of inputs used, by at least
5 percent. These results are in line with the predicted role of agricultural cooperatives
in improving efficiency by providing easy access to productive inputs and embedded
support services such as training, information, and extension on input application.
The robustness of the findings is demonstrated by similar results obtained from differ-
ent approaches and techniques. However, as compared to the results of the descriptive
statistics, the impact based on the average treatment effect is lower, which indicates
the existence of variation or heterogeneity across households within members.
In general, the efficiency gains from membership in agricultural cooperatives emerged
from the analysis has important policy implications. It suggests that besides their pro-
gressive role in input and output marketing, agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia
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are effective in providing embedded supportive services, significantly contributing to
members technical efficiency. Therefore, promoting agricultural cooperatives as com-
plementary institutions to public extensions services should further enhance small-
holders technical efficiency.

7
CONCLUS IONS AND DISCUSS IONS
7.1 introduction
Microfinance institutions that aim at providing financial services to the unbanked
poor and agricultural cooperatives which often arise to ameliorate problems related
to market-failures in (smallholder) agriculture are the two prominent pro-poor de-
velopment institutions advanced by scholars and policy makers over the last three-
to-four decades across developing countries. This dissertation mainly focuses on un-
derstanding the driving forces and efficiency and impact of these two institutions
in the Ethiopian context - it examines the impact and business viability of microfi-
nance institutions in serving the poor and the drivers of agricultural cooperatives
incidence and its economic imperatives in two separate parts. The first part specif-
ically addresses whether microfinance providers can achieve financial sustainability
together with serving the poor and estimates the actual impact of access to microfi-
nance credit on farmers agricultural technology adoption and intensity of use. The
analysis distinguished the efficiency and impact of microfinance institutions by own-
ership form. The second part of the dissertation investigates the drivers of agricultural
cooperative presence and farmers membership and patronage decisions. It also exam-
ines the effect of agricultural cooperatives membership on farmers level of technical
efficiency.
This chapter presents a summary of the main results from the preceding five chap-
ters that are organized in these two thematic parts. It also discuss on how the main
empirical results are related to theoretical and empirical evidences. The rest of this con-
cluding chapter is organized as follow. The next section recapitulates the main results
with some general remarks. Section 7.3 locates the general conclusions in the broader
theoretical and empirical literature of microfinance and agricultural cooperatives. The
last section presents potential areas of future research.
7.2 summary of main results
Whether microfinance providers can be financially self-sufficient in serving the poor
and have impact on borrowers agricultural investment are the main issues addressed
in the first part of the dissertation . The estimates on outreach-financial performance
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trade-offs show distinct results by microfinance ownership form. For microfinance
institutions that are owned by agents other than their clients (i.e., NBFIs), financial
self-sufficiency and outreach to the poor are found to be challenging objectives to
achieve altogether and can be conflicting. The results indicate that NBFIs that serve
small size loans and more to women borrowers are less financially sustainable. While
NBFIs with relatively lower cost per unit of currency lent are financially self-sufficient,
those which serve small size loans face higher loan costs that significantly undermine
their financial sustainability. On the other hand, the results indicate a complementary
relationship between outreach and financial performance for microfinance providers
that are owned by their clients (i.e., financial cooperatives). There exist financial coop-
eratives that serve small loans and more to women borrowers in cost-covering basis.
Overall financial cooperatives face about 30 percent lower costs per unit of currency
lent compared to NBFIs. These results are plausible, as microfinance providers that
are owned by their clients can better dispense with information and enforcement prob-
lems and reduce or internalize high market contract costs in micro-lending.
Additional results that examine the relation between interest rates and financial perfor-
mance confirm to theoretical expectations. The profitability or financial self-sufficiency
of NBFIs, in particular, increases with interest rate charges, but up to a point. It became
evident that charging high enough interest rate (i.e., 25 percent per annum) adversely
affects their financial performance. This can be due to the problems of adverse selec-
tion and moral hazards and fall of demands, as higher interest rates can drive worthy
clients out of the market and only risky borrowers would find it in their interest to
borrow (Armendàriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; stigltiz, 1990). Although financial
cooperatives charge significantly lower interest rates compared to NBFIs, for financial
cooperatives as well, relatively higher interest charges are negatively related with fi-
nancial performance.
Following the results that point to cost containment as potential avenue for microfi-
nance institutions towards achieving financial viability in serving the poor, chapter
three further examines whether microfinance providers in Ethiopia are reasonably
cost-efficient or their costs include significant avoidable expenses. The results from
stochastic cost frontier estimation indicate that operating at the efficient cost frontier
is an objective not yet achieved by the majority of microfinance providers in Ethiopia.
The predicted cost-efficiency scores suggest that most of the microfinance institutions
in the sample could have reduced their costs by half had they been efficient in using
and/or allocating the available resources. The estimates specifically show a 58.7 per-
cent efficiency gap between the average microfinance providers and microfinance op-
erating at the frontier. The inefficiency model simultaneously estimated with the cost
function identified outreach variables as one among the sources of cost-inefficiency,
corroborating the trade-offs between outreach and financial performance. It indicated
that microfinance providers with relatively small average loan sizes and cater more to
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women borrowers are less cost-efficient. Moreover, consistent to the regression results
above, financial cooperatives are found to be more cost-efficient compared to NBFIs.
Besides the institutional analysis that examines the ability of microfinance institutions
to dispense with information and enforcement costs in serving poor clients, part one of
this dissertation evaluates the actual impact of microfinance credit on farmers agricul-
tural technology adoption and application rates, indicators directly related to the main
purposes of microfinance credit for farmers in Ethiopia. The analysis used carefully
stratified samples and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method that systematically
restore the counterfactual scenario in the absence of experimental comparison group
in impact evaluation. The results across the three matching techniques deployed indi-
cate a significant positive impact of access to microfinance credit on adoption and ap-
plication rates of the two main divisible agricultural technologies in Ethiopia (i.e., fer-
tilizer and improved seeds). However, impacts disaggregated by subrogate variables
such as farm size and ownership structure of the microfinance institution reveals con-
siderable heterogeneity concealed by mean estimates. While access to microfinance
credit significantly improves fertilizer use and application rates among all sizes of
farmers, it doesn’t have significant effect on use of improved seeds among small farm-
ers with less than 2 ha of farm land. On the other hand, the results distinguished by
microfinance ownership form found a strong impact of credit on technology use only
among farmers who are users/clienteles financial cooperatives.
In general, the main results from part one indicates: (1) the difficulty microfinance
institutions face while trying to serve the unbanked poor clients in cost covering basis
and the need to engage in experimentation and innovations that aimed at reducing
costs of lending other than relying heavily on simplistic assumptions that assert trans-
fer of higher costs of lending to poor clients onto the clients themselves. (2) the need
for efficient assignment of ownership rights in microfinance organization. Consistent
to theoretical predictions the results suggest that assigning ownership right to clients
significantly lower costs per unit of currency lent and enables microfinance institu-
tions to fulfill their full promises - serving small loans and more to women borrowers
together with financial sustainability. (3) the crucial roles of access to institutional
financial services like credit in stimulating adoption and use of technological innova-
tions in smallholder agriculture. The results also indicate the need for targeting by
farm size and supply of complementary financial products like insurance, which can
reduce (perceived) adoption risks among small farmers who have limited scale for
experimentation.
Understanding the drivers of agricultural cooperative incidence, its impact, and farm-
ers membership and patronage decisions are of particular interests of the second part
of the dissertation. In Ethiopia, like anywhere in the world, agricultural cooperatives
are a prominent farmers’ integrating and bargaining agency. They serve both as a
source of modern inputs and market outlets for farmers’ produces. However, despite
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their economic imperatives agricultural cooperatives are not ubiquitous (equally dis-
tributed) and empirical evidences on the drivers of their presence are scarce. Most of
the existing works are more of theoretical. Using indicators that are related to the envi-
ronment where agricultural cooperatives actually exist (i.e., local market structure and
geographic isolation) this dissertation made effort to empirically test two theoretical
propositions (i.e., market power vs., transaction cost arguments) often used to justify
the presence of agricultural cooperatives. The results found support the market power
hypothesis that view agricultural cooperatives as a defensive response by farmers to
effect price and service adjustments in the face of trading partners opportunistic be-
havior. Most of the agricultural cooperatives in the sample are found to be located at
advanced locations with markets/traders and closer to major roads than in remote
locations where information and transaction costs are likely to be higher.
The analysis in chapter five further examines the drivers of farmer membership and
patronage decisions, as in places where cooperatives exist all farmers are not members
and all members are not necessarily users of the services agricultural cooperatives
provide. The results from seemingly unrelated probit model that estimated double
discrete choices indicate that the two decisions are related - farmers who choose to
become a member more likely patronize their cooperatives. Joint significance tests
identified location, asset and relational specificity as major drivers of farmers mem-
bership and patronage decisions. While farmers with access to local markets, reside in
advanced locations, specialized in grain production and affiliated to other network/-
group tend to become a member, only small scale farmers that produce grain and
reside in places with no regular local markets more likely make use or deliver to
agricultural cooperatives. Moreover, the specialization of the agricultural cooperative
itself and its integration downstream significantly affect farmer-cooperative relation.
Farmers more likely become members and users of agricultural cooperatives if the
cooperative is specialized in modern input supply (other than commercialization) and
affiliated to secondary level cooperative unions.
The second part of this dissertation also made effort to fill a research gap on the ac-
tual impact of agricultural cooperative membership on household outcomes. After
decades of agricultural cooperatives revival in Ethiopia, there are only few empirical
studies that evaluate the impact of agricultural cooperatives on smallholder commer-
cialization, technology use and livelihood improvements. Despite its roles in modern
input supply and extension linkages, its effect on efficiency improvements is an open
question. The last chapter of this dissertation estimated technical efficiency gains from
membership in agricultural cooperatives. The results indicate a positive impact of agri-
cultural cooperatives on farmers’ technical efficiency - farm households that belong to
agricultural cooperatives produce relatively higher outputs from a given set of inputs
used compared to non-members, at least by five percentage points. This result is in
line with the expected role of agricultural cooperatives in improving efficiency by
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providing easy access to productive inputs and embedded support services such as
training, information and extension linkages.
7.3 discussions
Microfinance institutions and producer organizations are prominent pro-poor eco-
nomic organizations that are playing a crucial role in filling missing market or services
across low income communities in developing countries. The ability of microfinance
institutions to serve poor households whom banks would spurn with remarkable suc-
cess in loan repayment rates has specially attracted worldwide attention, which led to
redirecting of resources from traditional poverty reduction programs to microfinance
institutions by governments, donors and non-governmental organizations (Morduch,
1999). Despite greater common interest in microfinance as a tool to triumph poverty,
policy debates or schism exist over its role, goals and methods of service delivery
(Robinson, 2001; Morduch, 2000; Woller et al., 1999; Rhyne, 1998). At the center of the
debate is difference over the scope of potential trade-offs between outreach to the poor
and financial sustainability. Contentions between two camps are emanate (advocates
of financial development vs., social impact).
On the one hand, the financial system approach asserts pursuing profitability by mi-
crofinance institutions as the surest way to perpetually serve the poor at large scale
(Frank, 2008; Rhyne and Otero, 2006; Christen, 2001). The supporters of this approach
argue that poor clients demand access to credit not cheap credit and hence microfi-
nance should operate in full cost-recovery basis by simply transferring the higher costs
of lending to poor clients onto the clients themselves without compromising outreach.
The advocates of the poverty approach, on the other hand, claim that the strife for full
cost-recovery would only force microfinance providers to crowed-out poor clients, as
they are costly to service and cannot repay at the higher interest charges that should
be paid for full cost-recovery (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006; Weiss and Montgomery,
2005; Woller and Schreiner, 2002; Hulme and Mosley, 1996).
Empirically examining the nature and scope of trade-offs between outreach and finan-
cial performance of microfinance providers in Ethiopia along with their actual impact
are of particular interest of the first part of this dissertation. The general conclusions
from chapter two and three that analyze potential trade-offs between outreach, finan-
cial self-sufficiency and cost-efficiency implies that outreach to the poor and financial
sustainability are not inherently conflicting objectives difficult to achieve altogether. It
was evident that the ability of microfinance providers to contain their costs or avoid
unnecessary costs matters most to achieve financial self-sufficiency in serving the poor.
Microfinance providers that spent lower costs per unit of currency lent are found to be
self-sufficient in serving the poor and more to women borrowers. Although lowering
costs mean lower interest charges, higher credit demand, better repayment and finan-
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cial performance subsequently, microfinance in Ethiopia are on average cost-inefficient.
Cost-efficiency estimates show that microfinance providers in the sample could have
reduced their costs by half had they been efficient in resource use and allocation.
One potential path to reduce cost of services in microfinance, which was found across
the analysis, is efficient assignment of ownership rights (i.e., the right to control and
appropriate earnings). The results in chapter two and three clearly indicate that assign-
ing ownership rights to clients is cost-efficient and can enable microfinance providers
to be financially sustainable in serving the poor. Microfinance providers in the sample
that are owned by their clients (i.e., financial cooperatives) are found to be relatively
cost-efficient and able to serve the poor in cost-covering basis with significantly lower
interest charges compared to NBFIs that are owned by patrons other than their clients.
This result is consistent with the economic theory of ownership that asserts assigning
ownership of a firm to patrons who will be most affected or born most of the costs of
market contracts and ownership as cost-efficient (Hansmann, 1996). In microfinance
clients shoulder costs of services/lending - all costs are transferred onto the clients
through interest following an assumption that asserts that poor borrowers demand ac-
cess to credit not to cheap credit (Rosenberg et al., 2013; Dehejia et al., 2012; Morduch,
2000). For instance, recent studies on microfinance cost structure indicate transfer of
high cost of lending onto borrowers through charging higher interest rates, of which
about 62 percent emanated from exorbitant operating costs (Cull et al., 2009; Gonza-
lez, 2007; Rosenberg, 2007). Hence, in markets with pervasive imperfection, putting
the clients on both sides of the transaction (possibly both as a provider of the demand
for and the supply of loanable funds) can generate creditable individual incentives
which can significantly curb costs of market contracts in microfinance (i.e., costs of
screening, monitoring and enforcement).
The results on the actual impact of access to microfinance credit on farmers adoption
of agricultural technologies also substantiate the importance of ownership form in
microfinance. While access to microfinance credit significantly improved farm house-
holds adoption and application rates of divisible modern inputs overall, its impact is
found to be higher or strong among the borrowers of financial cooperatives. Given
that microfinance credit in Ethiopia are mainly provided to stimulate the use of agri-
cultural inputs among farmers by both types of lenders in the sample (Amha and Peck,
2010), this result implies that the tendency to use or redirect credits for purposes/pro-
jects other than the one approved by the lender is relatively lower among clients of
financial cooperatives compared to users of NBFIs. This can be due to the nature and
scope of follow-up and monitoring incentives in place. In financial cooperatives the
dual role of clients both as provider of the demand for and the supply of loanable
funds can generate follow-up incentives for each individual client. Its embeddedness
in small communities can also make monitoring easier.
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The impact estimates disaggregated by farm size also revealed additional interesting
results. The results indicate a heterogeneous effect of access to microfinance credit on
technology adoption by landholding sizes. While microfinance credit improves the use
of fertilizer among all size of farmers, its impact on adoption and application rates of
improved seeds among small farmers (with less than 2 ha of land) is not statistically
distinguishable from zero. The result is in line with theoretical studies of adoption be-
haviors using safety-first type of model (Roumasset, 1976; Bell, 1972). The argument
is that, in rain-fed crops, the level of risk is much higher to small farmers than those
of large farmers, forcing them to refrain from adopting improved seed varieties which
may not increase yield if the weather is poor. The result in general implies that ac-
cess to institutional credit per se may not stimulate use of risky technologies among
small farmers who generally are risk averse and have a limited scale for experimenta-
tion. Providing insurance products along with credit can reduce (perceived) risks of
adoption and encourage the use of yield enhancing modern inputs by smallholders
(Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011).
The second part of this dissertation discusses on agricultural cooperatives, a promi-
nent farmers economic organization that serve as source of inputs and market outlets
for farmers produce in rural Ethiopia. The focus is on understanding the drivers of
the presence of agricultural cooperatives and farmers membership and patronage de-
cisions. Most of the existing works that closely studied agricultural cooperative focus
on theoretical explanation of when transacting via cooperatives will be a preferred
governance system over the price mechanism (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cook, 1995;
Sexton and Iskow, 1993; Sexton, 1990; Bonus, 1986; LeVay, 1983). These studies explain
the incidence of agricultural cooperatives and farmers participation through their abil-
ity to countervail market power and reduce information and transaction costs. The
mixed oligopoly literature view agricultural cooperatives as a defensive response by
farmers to avoid opportunistic behavior of trading partners (Sexton and Iskow, 1993;
Sexton, 1990; LeVay, 1983). The new institutional (transaction cost) economics theories,
on the other hand, characterize cooperatives as a hybrid governance mechanism that
arise to internalize or reduce transaction costs (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Bonus, 1986;
Cook, 1995).
Chapter five of this dissertation empirically test these two related propositions on the
incidence of agricultural cooperatives in the Ethiopian context based on their working
environment (i.e., geographic isolation and local market structure) and assuming that
reduction in information and physical transaction costs and improving bargaining
power are main advantages of agricultural cooperatives in remote and advanced loca-
tions, respectively. The results indicate that most of the agricultural cooperatives are
found in advanced locations that are connected to major roads and with alternative
service providers (i.e., traders and financial institutions), supporting the market power
argument. Their incidence in advanced location, instead of on remote areas, implies
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that agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia mainly exist to bargain for better terms of
trades and effect price and service adjustments in the market place.
The results on farmers-agricultural cooperatives relation clearly show the importance
of location, asset and relational specificity on the choice of cooperative transaction
mechanism by farmers. It was evident that farmers residing in places with local mar-
ket, specialized in grain production, relatively large scale, and affiliated to other net-
works are more likely to become members of agricultural cooperatives. However, these
categories of farmers less likely make use of the services their agricultural cooperatives
provide. Only small farmers specialized in grain production and with no regular local
market are strong users of cooperative services. This implies that relatively large scale
farmers with access to markets found and join agricultural cooperatives to induce
competition and once competitive price prevails they tend to use the market mech-
anism either to avoid costs of specific use or delivery requirements by cooperatives
(Karantininis and Zago, 2001; LeVay, 1983) or due to lower benefits from reduction in
physical transaction costs from aggregation. Small farmers with no regular local mar-
ket, on the other hand, tend to avoid ownership and control costs and accrue benefits
from using the services agricultural cooperatives provide.
Moreover, the size, specialization and vertical integration of the agricultural coopera-
tives itself affects farmers’ membership and patronage decisions. Farmers more likely
become members and users of agricultural cooperatives if the cooperatives are affili-
ated to business consortium and are specialized on input and credit provision. The link
between integrated cooperatives and farmers’ choice to join and patronize their coop-
eratives is in line with theoretical expectations. In theory, vertical integration through
consortium can enable agricultural cooperatives to coordinate complex tasks and ac-
crue most of the value of the products to farmers (Valentinov, 2007; Stenfanson and
Fulton, 1997). Integrated cooperatives can attain strong members, since it also gives
farmers the assurance that they will have reliable market outlets for their produces
(Rhodes, 1983). Regarding the link between specialization and farmers membership
and patronage decisions, two factors can be at play. One, limited commercialization
impact of agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia (Bernard et al., 2008). Two, limited
access to alternative input and credit suppliers, as agricultural cooperatives are the
major last-mile providers of such services (Rashid et al., 2013).
Size of agricultural cooperatives (as measured by number of members) attract mem-
bership but not use of services - large size agricultural cooperatives attract more farm-
ers, but farmers less likely use the services agricultural cooperatives provide if the
members are numerous. This result corresponds to the problems of open member-
ship in traditional agricultural cooperatives. Farmers tend to join cooperatives mainly
because the socio-political conditions require them to join. However, they less likely
use the services provided by the cooperatives, seeing that the problems of ill-defined
property right in cooperatives increases with size (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cook and
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Iliopoulos, 2000; Cook, 1995). In general, the results from the double discrete choices
by farmers (i.e., membership and patronage) indicates that strong participation in agri-
cultural cooperatives depends not only on farm household characteristics, but also on
the services the agricultural cooperatives provide and its ability to control the flow of
products down and upstream.
Besides the drivers of agricultural cooperative presence and farmers membership and
patronage decisions, the second part of this dissertation contributes to the missing agri-
cultural cooperatives impact evidence on farmers productivity/efficiency. The existing
few studies on agricultural cooperatives focus on measuring its impact on commercial-
ization (Francesconi and Heerink, 2010; Bernard et al., 2008), technology use (Abebaw
and Haile, 2013), and livelihood improvements (Getnet and Tsegaye, 2012). Chapter six
estimates the impact of membership in agricultural cooperatives on farmers technical
efficiency using two alternative estimation strategies that aimed at reducing potential
selection problems both in membership and choice of technology. The results from
both of the strategies indicate a positive impact of membership in cooperatives on
farmers technical efficiency, by at least five percentage points. Easy and prior access to
inputs and embedded support services by agricultural cooperatives to their members
can be the reason for such efficiency gaps. The role agricultural cooperatives are play-
ing in increasing farmers’ involvement in agricultural extension programs can also be
the source of efficiency gains among cooperative members (Rodrigo, 2012).
To conclude, this dissertation overall touches the institutional features and impacts
of two prominent organizations that arise to ameliorate financial, input and output
markets in rural Ethiopia, viz., microfinance institutions and agricultural cooperatives.
It systematically examines their incidence, efficiency, and impact and discusses chal-
lenge they need to address to perpetually serve the demands of the rural poor without
compromising their institutional sustainability.
7.4 future research
The existing researches on microfinance are mostly theoretical with a greater focus
on micro-banking/finance problems (e.g., Armendàriz de Aghion and Szafarz, 2009;
Guttman, 2008; Ghatak, 2000; Besley and Coate, 1995; Smith et al., 1981). Empirical
studies on its efficiency, lending methods, and impact are far behind theoretical guid-
ances. This section presents potential future research areas relating to the topics dis-
cussed in this dissertation .
The analysis on outreach-financial performance trade-offs in chapter two and three ex-
amined whether serving small loan sizes and more to women borrowers and financial
self-sufficiency are conflicting objectives to each other. However, using the available
data it wasn’t empirically possible to firmly conclude about the incidence of mission
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drift. For example, it was evident that NBFIs with higher average loan sizes are finan-
cially self-sufficient and vice versa. Nonetheless, in the presence of progressive lending
(i.e., increasing loan sizes with the passage of time based on repayment records), high
average loan size may not necessarily indicate that the microfinance shifts its focus to
the unbanked wealthier clients. Hence, further investigation on the trade-offs between
the two bottom-lines of microfinance over a long span of time can contribute to the
missing empirical evidence on the effect of the growing microfinance commercializa-
tion and competition on their social mission.
Following the economic theory of ownership, the analysis in the first part of this disser-
tation are disaggregated by microfinance ownership form (i.e., financial cooperatives
vs., shareholder owned NBFIs). The question was whether the relation between the
clients and microfinance institutions affects the lenders’ ability to dispense with infor-
mation and enforcement costs - that is, which form of ownership better generates cred-
ible screening, monitoring and enforcement incentives for individual clients. Lending
or contractual term is another source of variation that might affect market contract
costs and participation (demand) in microfinance. For instance, Berhane (2009) indi-
cates that joint liability or group lending can limit participation (depress credit de-
mand) in microfinance, as it increases (perceived) risks. Investigating the effects of
lending terms (i.e., individual, group, solidarity, etc.) on service costs or the ability of
microfinance providers to serve the poor on full cost-recovery basis is an interesting
area of future research. Relating to ownership form, examining the effects of the dual
roles of clients in financial cooperatives as a provider of both the demand for and
the supply of loanable funds in reducing/overcoming micro-banking problems can
be potential area for theoretical research. Moreover, the analysis in chapter three indi-
cates that microfinance providers in Ethiopia are not cost-efficient - their cost includes
significant avoidable expenses. Applied researches on microfinance cost-structure and
the effects of each cost components on efficiency can have a practical value in terms
of indicating potential avenues of cost containment.
With regard to microfinance impact, there is progress in understanding its role on
poverty reduction (e.g., Berhane and Gardebroek, 2011; Khandker, 2005; Morduch
and Heley, 2002; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). In Ethiopia, for instance, Berhane and
Gardebroek (2011) systematically measure the impact of microfinance on borrowers
consumption and housing improvement over long span of time. However, most of
the existing impact studies assume homogenous impact across borrowers of all types
of lending contracts and microfinance providers. Although the analysis is not over
long period, chapter four checked potential heterogeneity using relevant subrogate
variables (like ownership form and farm size). For example, the assumption with
ownership is that efficient assignment of ownership rights to patrons who will be the
most affected is efficient - reduce cost of services and interest charges to borrowers
and increase impact subsequently. Similar arguments can be made on lending terms.
While joint liability lending reduces repayment risks for lenders, it may increase indi-
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vidual borrowers risks (e.g., partner failure and denial of future access) and adversely
affects impact (Berhane and Gardebroek, 2011). Thus, disaggregated impact estimates
by ownership and lending terms over long span of time can be important for optimal
organizational and product design, respectively.
Like that of microfinance, most of the researches closely studied agricultural coopera-
tives are theoretical (e.g., Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Cotteril,
1987; Sexton and Sexton, 1987; Bonus, 1986; Rhodes, 1986). The analysis in chapter
five empirically tested two closely related theoretical propositions on the economic
rationale of agricultural cooperative presence (i.e., market power vs., transaction cost
arguments). The results shade light that the advantage of agricultural cooperatives
in Ethiopia is more through the bargaining power offered - that is, through effecting
price and service adjustments in the market place. More empirical studies in this direc-
tion can contribute to our understanding on the roles of cooperative firms on market
economy. For instance, empirically investigating theoretical arguments which claim
that the entry of cooperatives in a market beneficially regulates market performances
is an interesting future research agenda for applied research.
The analysis on the drivers of farmers membership and patronage decisions, on the
other hand, distinguished four types of membership, of which the two (i.e., shadow
and soft membership) indicates the presence of farmers who use the services agricul-
tural cooperatives provide without membership commitment and members who are
not users of cooperatives services. Investigating membership commitment (e.g., what
differentiate members from non-members in open membership agricultural coopera-
tives) can be imperative in terms of understanding the efficiency and viability of co-
operatives and how cooperatives are able to differentiate itself from other transaction
governance mechanisms.

Part III
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
Figure A.1: Distribution of access to institutional finance impacts across user households (Fer-
tilizer).
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on primary data collected between April and June, 2012.
Figure A.2: Distribution of access to institutional finance impacts across user households (Im-
proved Seeds).
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Table A.7: Propensity scores blocks for members and non-members of agricultural coopera-
tives (reduced and whole sample).
Block of Pscore
(reduced sample)
Members Non-members Total
0.026 43 248 291
0.2 60 196 256
0.3 96 174 270
0.4 37 73 110
0.45 46 47 93
0.5 92 76 168
0.6 82 46 128
0.7 67 19 86
0.8 41 4 45
Total 564 883 1447
Block of Pscore
(whole sample)
Members Non-members Total
0.015 54 448 502
0.2 65 206 271
0.3 97 153 250
0.4 76 120 196
0.5 76 68 144
0.6 149 58 207
0.8 47 8 55
Total 564 1061 1625
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
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(a) Reduced sample: members and non-members only from Kebeles with agricultural
cooperatives.
(b) Whole sample: members and non-members from Kebeles with and without agricultural
cooperatives
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
Figure A.3: Distribution of cooperative membership impacts based on the results from Kernel
matching estimates.
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Table A.9: Correlates of variations in impact of cooperative membership on technical efficiency
within members.
Indicator
Dependent variable: Technical
efficiency gain from membership
Reduced sample Whole sample
HH head age 0.000
(0.76)
0.000
(0.46)
HH head gender -0.047
(2.19)**
-0.055
(2.58)**
HH head literacy -0.002
(0.27)
0.004
(0.42)
Distance to market (Minutes) -0.000
(1.68)*
-0.000
(1.51)
Access to irrigation 0.231
25.18)***
0.238
(27.47)***
Receives off-farm income -0.033
(4.01)***
-0.035
(4.21)***
Radio ownership 0.012
(1.26)
0.012
(1.25)
Land cultivated (ha) 0.015
(2.86)***
0.015
(2.92)***
Number of plots -0.003
(1.56)
-0.003
(1.42)
Number of Oxen -0.006
(1.24)
-0.004
(0.90)
Reside in village with FTC 0.037
(2.66)***
0.042
(2.86)***
Improved seed 0.000
(1.95)*
0.000
(1.88)*
Fertilizer -0.000
(0.14)
-0.000
(0.26)
Constant 0.095
(2.77)***
0.099
(2.86)***
Number of Obs. 559 549
R-Squared 0.37 0.39
Note: *** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level. t-
statistics in parenthesis.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household
Survey, 2008.
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Table A.10: Outreach and financial performance (after omitting the four big semipublic NBFIs).
Indicator Average
loan size
over GNP
per capita
Percentage
of women
borrowers
Percentage
of rural
borrowers
Time
between
install-
ment
Financial self-sufficiency 0.298
(0.291)
-0.355
(0.095)***
0.163
(0.255)
0.364
(0.705)***
Financial self-sufficiency (coops) -0.413
(0.353)
0.430
(0.105)***
-0.158
(0.268)
0.848
(1.06)
Financial coops -0.682
(0.446)
-0.654
(0.103)***
0.637
(0.257)**
4.494
(1.45)***
Age of the institution -0.037
(0.023)
-0.012
(0.005)
0.056
(0.015)***
0.033
(0.054)
Age (coops) 0.099
(0.046)**
0.005
(0.007)
-0.061
(0.018)***
0.034
(0.118)
Institutional size 0.236
(0.186)
-0.030
(0.060)
-0.255
(0.138)*
-0.098
(0.399)
Institutional size (coops) 0.523
(0.277)*
0.068
(0.074)
-0.028
(0.165)
-1.260
(1.15)
Length of client relationship -0.049
(0.046)
-0.001
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.019)
-0.410
(0.154)***
Donation over loan portfolio 0.104
(0.210)
0.226
(0.061)***
-0.016
(0.153)
0.512
(1.45)
Number of source of capital -0.560
(0.218)
0.124
(0.040)***
0.118
(0.094)
0.324
(0.793)
Individual/investor owned 0.203
(0.202)
0.045
(0.093)
-0.135
(0.158)
0.023
(0.434)
NGO owned 0.186
(0.275)
0.026
(0.109)
0.245
(0.230)
0.737
(0.891)
Constant 1.384
(0.526)***
0.597
(0.151)***
0.190
(0.325)
1.703
(1.49)
R-squared 0.46 0.45 0.29 0.30
Number of Obs. 103 103 103 103
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